Yesterday, “On the Ground News,” an outlet belonging to American journalist and activist Bilal Abdul Kareem, who has resided in Syria for more than a decade, reported that Bilal himself had been arrested by the Syrian government security apparatus in the Aleppo province town of al-Bab, where he has been residing. This marks Bilal’s second arrest within Syria, having previously been arrested by the security apparatus of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in August 2020, only to be released in February 2021, with accusations of working with groups that “violate public security,” spreading and concocting falsehoods, and interviewing people wanted by the “security apparatus.”
This time, the arrest shortly follows a video Bilal recently released in which he strongly criticized the Syrian government’s partnership with the United States in the global coalition against the Islamic State, saying that the American presence in Syria has no legitimacy and that America is the “enemy of the Syrian people.”
In light of this latest controversy regarding Bilal, it is worthwhile to shed more light on his views and activities in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, based on personal experiences with him inside the country. Although it is superficially easy to dismiss him as hot-headed and extreme, he taps into some legitimate concerns about the direction of the current leadership under Ahmad al-Sharaa, who previously led HTS, which played the leading role in bringing down the regime.
The arrest shortly follows a video Bilal recently released in which he strongly criticized the Syrian government’s partnership with the United States in the global coalition against the Islamic State.
Since the downfall of the regime, Bilal has been clear that he is not enthusiastic about Syria’s leadership under al-Sharaa, in continuity with his prior skepticism toward HTS. Part of this skepticism is ideologically rooted: for Bilal, the revolution was not merely about deposing Assad but also about establishing an Islamic system of governance. In his view, HTS deviated from its own founding principles and those of its predecessor organizations, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, which had called for “implementing the rule of God’s law.”
Although some of Bilal’s critics characterize him as “crypto-ISIS” or a “Daeshi” (supporter of the Islamic State), this is not an accurate representation of his position. In fact, he has opposed the Islamic State from the outset, considering it a deviant group. Even for those who do not know Bilal personally, his opposition to the Islamic State is evident in a 2019 video addressed to then–Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in which he lambasted Baghdadi and his group for actions such as assuming the authority of an Islamic court when called to arbitration with other Islamic factions.
A more accurate way to characterize Bilal’s vision for Syria is that he does not object to an electoral system but rejects democracy in the sense of allowing a popularly elected legislative body to pass laws that would contravene Islam (for example, permitting casinos). In his view, by not implementing an Islamic system of governance, al-Sharaa risks becoming like other rulers in the region: superficially appealing to Islam while remaining generally secular, authoritarian, and subservient to the interests and demands of the United States and Israel.
One does not have to agree with Bilal’s vision for Islamic governance in Syria—or with the notion that the United States is the “enemy of the Syrian people”—to recognize that he raises legitimate concerns about how Syria’s current leadership relates to the original HTS constituency that played a key role in bringing it to power. In the same video in which Bilal refers to America as the “enemy” of the Syrian people, his subsequent remarks merit close attention:
“So somehow we went from Americans being the troublemakers throughout the Middle East and for all the Muslims, and then we turn out that our country after the revolution joined them… If that’s the case, all right, he’s the president, and you know more than we know. I got that. I’m cool with that. But just let us in on it. You can’t say for thirteen years that they are the main ones who are causing the issues and this and that and so on and so forth, and then say, all right everybody, we’re with them, we’re over here now. People are going to be like: what is going on?”
A more accurate way to characterize Bilal’s vision for Syria is that he does not object to an electoral system but rejects democracy in the sense of allowing a popularly elected legislative body to pass laws that would contravene Islam.
Despite breaking ties with al-Qa‘ida in the original formation of HTS, the group’s leadership did not frame that break or its subsequent actions as a broader strategic alignment with the United States, even as it sought removal from the U.S. terrorist designation list. In 2020, leading HTS figure Abd al-Rahim Atun justified HTS’s positioning as “neutralizing as many enemies as possible” and portrayed it as continuity with the principles of Jabhat al-Nusra—that is, recognizing antagonism with the United States while seeking to prevent active U.S. targeting based on threat perception. Similarly, al-Sharaa told researchers Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni in 2022, “We shouldn’t be seeking a pro-American Islam but an attractive Islamic project that can prevent young people from being drawn toward this group [Islamic State]” (Transformed by the People, 62).
Furthermore, HTS leadership and its predecessors publicly opposed collaboration with the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State. In 2015, Jabhat al-Nusra withdrew from frontline positions against the Islamic State in northern Aleppo countryside in anticipation of a possible Turkish “safe zone” created in collaboration with the United States, rejecting the idea of cooperating with non-Muslims to fight fellow Muslims—even those deemed “Kharijites.” After the transformation into HTS, the group continued arresting individuals accused of collaborating with the U.S.-led coalition, a practice that sparked internal controversy and major purges, as noted by Drevon and Haenni (Transformed by the People, 198).
Some reports have asserted that al-Sharaa secretly collaborated with the U.S.-led coalition to fight al-Qa‘ida and the Islamic State as early as 2016. Notably, the media directorate in al-Sharaa’s office felt compelled to deny these claims in a statement to state-run al-Ikhbariya. Whatever the truth, the current portrayal of Syria as an active partner in the U.S.-led coalition sharply contradicts HTS’s prior public positioning. Seen in this light, Bilal’s call for a clarification is understandable. It is reasonable to ask al-Sharaa to explain substantively why collaboration with the coalition was once rejected—so much so that alleged collaborators were arrested—and why such cooperation is now deemed legitimate.
The lack of a public, meaningful explanation for shifts in position here and elsewhere reflects a broader issue that Drevon and Haenni describe as “constructive ambiguity,” which characterized how HTS consolidated and maintained control over Idlib and its surroundings (Transformed by the People, 294). While this approach may have functioned previously, it risks becoming a liability in governing all of Syria. Regarding cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition, a clear stance must be taken: either reject cooperation outright or explain convincingly why the earlier rejection was wrong. Otherwise, more hardline elements incorporated from factions such as HTS may undermine cooperation from within or defect entirely.
Another major concern raised by Bilal, linked to his personal experiences under HTS, involves the treatment of detainees—especially those arrested on “public security” grounds. Whatever one thinks of his political or theological views, these concerns are legitimate. Respect for human rights requires rejecting maltreatment of detainees and upholding due process in detention and judicial proceedings.
Respect for human rights requires rejecting maltreatment of detainees and upholding due process in detention and judicial proceedings.
Since the fall of the regime, Bilal has promoted the idea of a “covenant of justice” in Syria, intended to gain support across communal lines. Prior to events in al-Suwayda’ province in July, he sought dialogue with the Druze community. This covenant envisions concrete safeguards within a strong state, including banning torture, rejecting arbitrary arrest and indefinite detention, presuming innocence until proven guilty, and guaranteeing access to a judge within forty-eight hours of arrest.
At a small “tribal conference” in Homs during the summer, Bilal was the only participant to articulate these principles substantively. Others offered little beyond rhetorical support for the state, including calls to “trust in God” or denunciations of minorities and alleged conspirators against “Sunni rule.”
As a recent Reuters investigative report shows, current detention practices in Syria cannot be compared with the industrial-scale killing of detainees under the Assad regime. Nevertheless, numerous cases persist in which detainees are held without charge for extended periods, subjected to torture, or released only after families pay bribes. Some prisons previously operated by HTS continue to hold detainees on security grounds without due process.
One such case involves the Egyptian jihadist cleric and former HTS member Abu Shu‘ayb al-Masri, abducted by HTS in July 2023, released in June 2024, interviewed about his imprisonment, and then re-arrested shortly thereafter. He remains in custody with no transparency regarding charges, conviction, or release.
It is easy to dismiss such cases because individuals like al-Masri held more hardline views than the HTS mainstream. Still, one either upholds due process or does not. Transparency and fair treatment should likewise be expected in Bilal’s case. Post-Assad Syria should be a place where substantive political discussion is possible without fear of arbitrary arrest and detention on “public security” grounds.
Published originally on December 23, 2025.
