America’s Military Buildup Around Iran: What We Know and What It Means

The United States is conducting its largest military buildup in the Middle East since the June 2025 strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. As protests rock the Islamic Republic and the Trump administration signals readiness for decisive action, American forces are converging on the Persian Gulf region from multiple directions. This analysis examines what open-source intelligence reveals about the scope, composition, and strategic implications of this buildup.

The picture that emerges is one of deliberate, multi-domain force projection. The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group is transiting from the South China Sea, ending a 20-day carrier gap in the region—the first such absence since October 2023. Approximately 35 F-15E Strike Eagles have deployed to Jordan. Tanker aircraft have surged to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Additional missile defense batteries are moving into position across the Gulf.

Yet significant uncertainties remain. The destination of the USS George H.W. Bush carrier strike group, which departed Norfolk on January 13, remains unclear. The current status of strategic bombers at Diego Garcia is unknown. Submarine deployments—always closely held—could add substantial Tomahawk cruise missile capacity that we cannot confirm.

What is clear is that the administration is assembling the tools for major contingency operations while maintaining diplomatic flexibility. The partial evacuation of Al Udeid Air Base on January 14 and reports that CENTCOM has been placed on a 24/7 war-planning posture suggest decision-makers believe action may be imminent.

Understanding the current buildup requires examining what came before. From June 13-24, 2025, the United States and Israel conducted Operation Midnight Hammer, striking three Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. The operation followed more than a week of escalating Israeli strikes on Iranian military and nuclear sites.

American participation was substantial. B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, armed with GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators, struck the deeply buried facilities. The USS Georgia (SSGN-729), a guided-missile submarine, launched over 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Isfahan. The 12-day conflict killed more than 1,000 Iranians and exhausted Israeli interceptor stockpiles.

Iran retaliated with ballistic missiles targeting Al Udeid Air Base, home to CENTCOM’s forward headquarters. Patriot batteries intercepted most incoming missiles, but one impacted the base, damaging a radome. The attack demonstrated both Iran’s willingness to strike American forces directly and the limitations of its capabilities against modern air defenses.

The June 2025 operation set several precedents relevant to the current situation: it showed American willingness to employ force directly against Iran, demonstrated the effectiveness of combined air defense operations, and revealed both the capabilities and limitations of Iranian retaliation.

The current crisis began on December 28, 2025, when protests erupted across Iran over the country’s economic collapse. The Iranian rial had plummeted in value, and hyperinflation exceeding 40 percent devastated ordinary Iranians. What started as economic grievances escalated rapidly into demands for regime change, spreading to more than 100 cities.

The regime’s response has been brutal. Reports suggest security forces have killed between 1,000 and 12,000 protesters, though exact figures are impossible to verify due to an internet and telephone blackout imposed by authorities. The disparity in casualty estimates reflects the information vacuum created by this communications shutdown.

President Trump’s response has been unequivocal. He has posted on social media that “help is on the way,” threatened military intervention if executions of protesters proceed, and stated publicly that “all options are on the table.” On January 14, he reportedly demanded “decisive” military options from his national security team. That same day, a partial evacuation of Al Udeid Air Base was ordered.

The situation remains fluid. On January 16, Trump claimed Iran had “stopped killing protesters”—a temporary pause that was unverifiable given the communications blackout. By January 23-24, he was describing a “massive fleet” heading to the Persian Gulf. International airlines began canceling flights through the region.

From January 5-25, 2026, no American aircraft carrier operated in the CENTCOM area of responsibility—the first such gap since October 2023. This absence, described by some analysts as a “psychological anomaly,” occurred at precisely the moment tensions with Iran were escalating. It marked the fifth time in two years that a carrier was redeployed from Asia to the Middle East, underscoring both the region’s persistent demands on American naval power and the strain this places on Pacific commitments.

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The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and its carrier strike group are now transiting from the South China Sea toward the Gulf of Oman. The strike group departed the Philippines around January 15 and is expected to arrive in waters closer to Iran by January 25-26. Carrier Air Wing Nine (CVW-9) embarked aboard the Lincoln includes F-35C Lightning II stealth fighters from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314), multiple squadrons of F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, CMV-22B Osprey logistics aircraft, and MH-60R/S helicopters.

The strike group’s escort force includes Destroyer Squadron 21, with guided-missile destroyers USS Spruance (DDG-111), USS Michael Murphy (DDG-112), and USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. (DDG-121), plus the guided-missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay. At least one fast-attack submarine likely accompanies the group, though this is never confirmed officially.

A significant uncertainty concerns the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), which departed Norfolk, Virginia, on January 13, 2026. The carrier had not completed its Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX), the final certification required before deployment. Its destination has not been officially announced.

If the Bush is heading to the Middle East, it would arrive several weeks after the Lincoln, potentially giving the United States two carrier strike groups in the region simultaneously. This would represent a significant concentration of naval aviation power. However, deploying a carrier that has not completed its full training cycle would be unusual and suggests either exceptional urgency or a different destination entirely.

It is worth noting that the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), the world’s largest warship and capable of supporting the most powerful air wing, is not available for Middle East operations. The Ford is currently operating in the Caribbean under Southern Command for Operation Southern Spear, supporting operations related to Venezuela. This limits options for additional carrier power projection in the Gulf.

Beyond the carrier strike group, several surface combatants operate in the Persian Gulf and surrounding waters. The guided-missile destroyers USS Mitscher (DDG-57) and USS Roosevelt (DDG-80) have been operating in the region, with the latter also reported in the Red Sea. Three Littoral Combat Ships—USS Canberra (LCS-30), USS Tulsa (LCS-16), and USS Santa Barbara (LCS-32)—are equipped with mine countermeasure packages, a capability that would be essential in any conflict where Iran attempts to mine the Strait of Hormuz.

The submarine picture is, as always, opaque. We know the USS Georgia (SSGN-729) participated in the June 2025 strikes, launching more than 30 Tomahawks at Isfahan. The Navy operates four Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGNs)—Ohio, Florida, Michigan, and Georgia—each capable of carrying 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles. In September 2025, the Navy removed USS Ohio and USS Florida from the fiscal year 2026 deactivation list, preserving this massive strike capacity. Current SSGN locations are unknown, but even one in the region would add substantial firepower.

The most visible element of the current buildup is the deployment of F-15E Strike Eagles to Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. Between January 18-21, 2026, approximately 35 aircraft from the 494th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron arrived from RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom. A second wave of 12 aircraft departed the U.K. on January 21.

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CENTCOM publicly acknowledged the deployment on January 20, stating that the “F-15’s presence enhances combat readiness.” This rare public acknowledgment underscores the signal the administration intends to send. The F-15E is a dual-role fighter capable of both air superiority and deep strike missions, equipped with the Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) for enhanced electronic warfare capabilities.

The choice of the F-15E is significant. During April 2024, F-15Es shot down more than 80 Iranian drones during an attack on Israel, demonstrating their effectiveness against the unmanned systems that form a key component of Iranian and proxy capabilities. The aircraft have been observed equipped with 70mm Hydra rockets, which proved highly effective in that engagement.

Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base has hosted rotating F-15E deployments for nearly a decade. The base sits within striking distance of western Iran and provides a land-based alternative to carrier aviation—an important consideration given host-nation sensitivities in the Gulf states about strikes being launched from their territory.

Additional fighter deployments have been reported but remain less firmly confirmed. F-22 Raptor stealth fighters are stationed at Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, providing air superiority capability and regional deterrence. Reports suggest an F-16 squadron has deployed to Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia and an A-10 squadron may be at Muwaffaq Salti alongside the F-15Es. Two F-35 squadrons are reportedly in theater, though their exact locations are unconfirmed.

Al Dhafra also hosts MQ-4C Triton high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aircraft, which provide persistent surveillance capabilities critical for monitoring Iranian military movements and maritime activity in the Gulf.

Diego Garcia, the remote British Indian Ocean Territory atoll that hosts a major American military facility, has historically served as a staging base for strategic bomber operations in the Middle East. The base sits approximately 2,358 miles from Iran—well within the range of the B-2 Spirit and B-52H Stratofortress.

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In March 2025, six B-2 Spirits deployed to Diego Garcia—roughly 30 percent of the entire B-2 fleet. B-52H Stratofortresses arrived in May 2025. The B-2s were used in strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen before returning to Whiteman Air Force Base following a ceasefire in May. F-15 fighters deployed to the base in May 2025 to provide protection.

The current status of strategic bombers at Diego Garcia is unknown. No recent satellite imagery or reliable reporting confirms their presence or absence as of late January 2026. If B-2s have returned to the base, they would be capable of employing the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator against hardened underground facilities. B-52Hs could launch AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) from outside Iranian air defense range.

Iran has explicitly threatened to strike Diego Garcia in the event of American military action, recognizing its importance as a bomber base. Whether Iran possesses the capability to execute such a threat at that range remains questionable.

Perhaps the most telling indicator of operational preparations is the surge in tanker aircraft. By January 22, at least 20 KC-135 Stratotankers were present at Al Udeid Air Base—a significant increase over normal levels. During the partial evacuation on January 14, six KC-135s departed the base around 10 p.m. A dozen KC-135s moved from European bases to the Middle East within a 48-hour period in mid-January. Four additional tankers deployed to Jordan alongside the F-15Es.

Aerial refueling capacity is the enabler for extended air operations. Strike aircraft flying from Jordan, the Gulf states, or carrier decks require tanker support to reach targets deep in Iran and return safely. Strategic bombers from Diego Garcia would need multiple refuelings for round-trip missions. The tanker buildup suggests planning for sustained air operations rather than a limited one-time strike.

Airlift activity has also increased substantially. More than 10 C-17 Globemaster III flights were tracked from England to Jordan over a two-day period, likely transporting equipment and personnel to support the F-15E deployment. C-5M Galaxy heavy transports have been observed heading eastward. C-17 flights to Diego Garcia have been reported, potentially positioning additional weapons or equipment at the bomber base.

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system provides the upper-tier layer of American ballistic missile defense. On January 22, the Wall Street Journal reported that additional THAAD batteries were deploying to the Middle East. One battery has been in Israel since October 2023, operated by approximately 100 American personnel.

THAAD’s capabilities are impressive: it can intercept ballistic missiles at ranges of 150-200 kilometers and altitudes exceeding 150 kilometers—well above the atmosphere. Each battery costs approximately $2.73 billion, with individual interceptors priced at $12.7 million.

However, the system faces a critical constraint: inventory. During the June 2025 conflict, THAAD batteries expended 92 interceptors defending Israel against Iranian ballistic missiles. The total THAAD interceptor inventory stood at 632 before that engagement. Defense officials estimate replenishment will take three to eight years given current production rates. This limited inventory means THAAD must be used selectively against the most threatening incoming missiles, with lower-tier systems handling less challenging threats.

Additional Patriot PAC-3 batteries are also deploying to the region. Patriot systems provide lower-tier defense against shorter-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. Batteries are positioned in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, Qatar, and the UAE.

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In March 2025, at least two Patriot batteries were redeployed from Asia to the Middle East amid escalating tensions. One unit from South Korea returned to the peninsula on October 30, 2025, to receive equipment upgrades before resuming its role in Korean Peninsula defense. This rotation illustrates the strain that Middle East demands place on a globally committed force.

At Al Udeid, Patriot batteries successfully intercepted most of the Iranian ballistic missiles during the June 2025 attack, though one missile impacted the base. The system’s performance validated years of investment but also demonstrated that no defense is perfect against a determined salvo attack.

On January 12, 2026, a new air defense coordination cell—the Middle East Air Defense-Combined Defense Operations Center (MEAD-CDOC)—opened at Al Udeid Air Base. The center integrates missile defense operations across 17 nations, enabling real-time coordination of intercept operations and sensor sharing. This multilateral approach multiplies the effectiveness of individual national systems and reduces the risk of gaps in coverage.

As of mid-2025, approximately 40,000 to 50,000 American troops were stationed across the Middle East, combining personnel at permanent bases with those at smaller forward sites. The number had risen from roughly 34,000 before the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023.

Kuwait hosts the largest concentration, with Camp Arifjan serving as the primary logistics and airlift hub for regional operations. Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base functions as CENTCOM’s forward headquarters despite Doha’s stated opposition to offensive strikes being launched from its territory. Bahrain hosts the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, making it the center of American naval operations in the Gulf.

Al Udeid is the largest American military base in the Middle East and serves as CENTCOM’s forward headquarters. The base hosts approximately 10,000 personnel and has been central to operations in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. It was from Al Udeid that many of the air operations during the June 2025 conflict were coordinated.

The base’s significance makes it both invaluable and vulnerable. Iran targeted Al Udeid during the June 2025 retaliation, with one ballistic missile impacting the facility and damaging a radome. On January 14, 2026, a partial evacuation was ordered, with “hundreds” of personnel relocated to other facilities and local hotels. Six KC-135 tankers departed around 10 p.m. that evening.

Qatar’s political position complicates matters. Doha has stated its opposition to American strikes being launched from its territory, though the practical enforcement of this position during an actual conflict remains unclear. British forces at Al Udeid have also reportedly reduced their presence.

Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base has emerged as a critical node in the current buildup. The base now hosts approximately 35 F-15E Strike Eagles and has seen substantial cargo aircraft traffic in recent days. Unlike the Gulf states, Jordan shares no maritime border with Iran, reducing its exposure to Iranian naval threats while still placing strike aircraft within range of Iranian targets.

The long-standing American presence at Muwaffaq Salti—nearly a decade of rotating F-15E deployments—provides established infrastructure and host-nation familiarity. Jordan’s monarchy has historically been supportive of American security objectives in the region, making it a more politically reliable base for offensive operations than some Gulf alternatives.

Diego Garcia occupies a unique position in American force projection. Located in the Indian Ocean, the atoll sits 2,358 miles from Iran—distant enough to be beyond the reach of most Iranian weapons but close enough for bomber operations with aerial refueling. The base’s isolation and British sovereignty provide political cover that bases in Muslim-majority Gulf states cannot. If strategic bombers are present, Diego Garcia would likely be their launch point for strikes on hardened Iranian targets.

January 5: Zero carriers in CENTCOM area of responsibility (source)—first time since October 2023.
January 9: CENTCOM announces “no change” to force composition (source) despite Iranian protests.
January 12: New air defense coordination cell (MEAD-CDOC) opens at Al Udeid (source).
January 13: USS George H.W. Bush departs Norfolk (source); destination unknown.
January 14: Partial evacuation of Al Udeid ordered (source); six KC-135s depart. Trump posts “help is on the way.”
January 15: USS Abraham Lincoln confirmed transiting west from the Philippines (source).
January 16: Trump claims Iran “stopped killing protesters”—temporary pause, unverifiable.
January 18: First F-15Es arrive at Muwaffaq Salti, Jordan (source); C-17 flights to Diego Garcia reported.
January 20: CENTCOM publicly acknowledges F-15E deployment (source).
January 21: Second wave of 12 F-15Es departs U.K.; approximately 35 now in theater.
January 22: Twenty or more KC-135s at Al Udeid (source); THAAD/Patriot deployments reported.
January 23-24: Trump describes “massive fleet” heading to Gulf (source); airlines cancel Middle East flights.
January 25-26: USS Abraham Lincoln arrives in Gulf of Oman (source).
January 27: US announces regional ‘aerial drills’ across Middle East (source).
Mid-January: CENTCOM reportedly ordered to 24/7 war-planning posture (source) for “the next month.”

Open-source analysis has inherent limitations, and several significant questions remain unanswered. Understanding these gaps is as important as understanding what we do know.

USS George H.W. Bush destination and timeline: The carrier’s departure without completing certification training and without an announced destination creates substantial uncertainty about whether a second carrier will arrive in the region.

Strategic bomber presence at Diego Garcia: No recent satellite imagery or reliable reporting confirms whether B-2s or B-52s have returned to the base. This is one of the most significant gaps given the role bombers played in the June 2025 strikes.

Submarine deployments: SSGN and fast-attack submarine locations are among the most closely held secrets. Even one SSGN adds 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles to the available strike package.

Additional fighter deployments: Reports of F-16, A-10, and F-35 deployments beyond the confirmed F-15Es remain unverified.

Exact missile defense positions: While we know THAAD and Patriot systems are deploying, specific locations and numbers remain unclear.

RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft: As of January 14, no RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft had been observed moving to the Middle East—surprising given their typical role in pre-conflict intelligence gathering.

Iranian protest casualties: Estimates range from 100 to over 12,000 killed. The communications blackout makes verification impossible, complicating assessments of regime stability and the justification for intervention.

The United States is assembling a multi-domain strike package capable of conducting sustained operations against Iran. The simultaneous deployment of carrier aviation, land-based fighters, tanker support, and missile defense systems indicates preparation for a major contingency rather than a limited, one-time strike.

The posture suggests three possible uses: deterrence signaling intended to modify Iranian behavior without actual combat; preparation for strikes on IRGC and Basij forces conducting the crackdown on protesters; or groundwork for a broader campaign against Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure.

Several factors create uncertainty about American intentions and capabilities. The carrier gap that existed until now left a window of reduced capability. Much of the military force available was recently surged to the Caribbean for Venezuela operations. Host-nation permissions—particularly from Qatar and the Gulf states—remain a political constraint, as these governments fear Iranian retaliation. A former senior U.S. military official told reporters that any major operation “would be massive” and “would dwarf anything we have likely done in the recent past.”

Israel’s position adds another layer of complexity. Israeli officials have reportedly requested that the United States delay any strikes until sufficient American forces are in place to help defend against Iranian retaliation. Israeli interceptor stockpiles were depleted in the June 2025 conflict, and Prime Minister Netanyahu has reportedly informed Washington that Israel is not currently prepared to defend against a major Iranian response.

Iran, for its part, has threatened “total war” in response to any American strike and has warned regional hosts that their facilities will be targeted. Whether Iranian capabilities match this rhetoric is unclear, but the June 2025 experience demonstrated Iran’s willingness to strike American bases directly.

The buildup is real, substantial, and accelerating. Whether it culminates in military action or serves as coercive leverage for a diplomatic outcome remains in the hands of decision-makers in Washington, Tehran, and regional capitals. What is certain is that the United States is positioning itself to have options.