Inside Iran’s Fragmented Decision-Making Structure

Operation Epic Fury has led to deepened Middle Eastern enmities, an uncertain ceasefire, closure of the Strait of Hormuz and little progress on resolving Iran’s nuclear program. Following the deaths of key figures in Iranian leadership, the central questions amid negotiations between Iran, the United States and their respective allies are not what proposals are on the table, but who in Tehran is making the decisions and what the likely trajectory will be if no political agreement is reached. Who is calling the shots in Tehran?

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are now the center of power in Iran, though clerics and politicians are playing important roles in negotiations as well. The Iranians’ attacks on the Arab Gulf states and their tough demands in the negotiations may serve as evidence that decisions are being made mainly by the extremist node within the country’s leadership but by no means solely by them. The pragmatists contribute too, albeit insufficiently to bring about a pragmatic proposal.

The Revolutionary Guards are generally estimated to have between 150,000 and 190,000 active soldiers separate from the state-controlled regular army. They also control around 1 million Basij militiamen. Following the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, including the most senior commanders of the IRGC, are the main decision-makers in Iran.

A widespread analysis in the West is that the IRGC consists of Shia religious fanatics who prefer martyrdom over political concessions that can save the regime. Without a thorough public opinion poll among those soldiers, there is no way to know. However, the available historical evidence points in a somewhat different direction.

During the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) IRGC soldiers and officers fought bravely, though they sacrificed thousands of children, sending them into battle in mass infantry charges, sometimes with no guns. Yet when, in August 1988, Khomeini agreed to a ceasefire with Saddam Hussein, they accepted it with no protest. Indeed, their leaders even suggested it to Khomeini. They fought well for Iran, for Khomeini, for the revolution and for the ideals of Shia Islam, but they were not suicidal. In 2013 they accepted Khamenei’s decision to negotiate Iran’s nuclear program with the U.S., and in 2015 they agreed to the nuclear deal. So, the IRGC may or may not still be a highly ideological corps, but either way they know how to recognize the needs of the regime and act accordingly. They certainly are not willing to die for purely ideological reasons. Their decisions are interest-based. The question is: What are the IRGC’s interests?

The new commander since March 1, 2026, Major General Ahmad Vahidi, has always been considered a hardliner, and he proved it when he ordered attacks on the Arab Gulf states. After President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized to those states and promised that this would not happen again, Mr. Vahidi severely reprimanded the president and the attacks resumed with a vengeance. Mr. Vahidi is believed to be the only senior leader who can meet with Mojtaba Khamenei. As far as can be judged, he and the IRGC’s most senior officers are the primary decision-makers.

Before Mr. Vahidi became commander, he served as the deputy commander of the IRGC from December 2025 until the death of Mohammad Pakpour earlier this year. Mr. Vahidi also served as the minister of interior from 2021 to 2024. He is a member of the Expediency Discernment Council. A significant portion of his career was the command of the Quds (Jerusalem) Force between 1988 and 1997. He was succeeded by the late General Qasem Soleimani.

This seems to explain his staunch insistence that the ceasefire in the 2026 war would include Hezbollah. Betraying an ally in whom he had invested almost a decade of his life was unacceptable to him. Eventually, after sustained attacks from the U.S. and Israel, he had to relent and Iran entered into negotiations. His diehard fingerprints are all over the Iranian proposals.

The first interest of the IRGC is regime survival, but only as long as they preserve their highly privileged status within it. The shocking superiority of the Israeli Airforce over Tehran’s skies and the assassination of much of the Iranian leadership humiliated the Revolutionary Guards beyond anyone’s imagination. Many Iranians no longer see them as effective Guardians of the Revolution. More than by religious fanaticism, they are moved now by the understanding that they cannot afford another humiliation. To preserve their status, they need to be able to declare some victory.

They therefore have four core goals. One: no immediate concession on the nuclear issue. Two: resources for the resuscitation of the economy, namely, a complete end to the Western embargo. Three: iron-clad guarantees for the eternal end to the American-Israeli attacks. Four: de facto international recognition of their sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. The latter has already been achieved, as scores of vessels are coordinating their passage directly with Tehran.

Other demands, like financial compensation for the war damage, American de jure recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the strait, and the evacuation of all American bases in the Gulf zone are raised as signs of defiance more than an actual political plan. As long as they can keep the strait closed, they believe that they have an enormous edge over the U.S., and they see no reason for core concessions.

Mojtaba Khamenei had little public exposure prior to becoming supreme leader after his father’s death. Yet he has the reputation of being even more of a hardliner than his father. It is not clear whether he is still alive or not, but if he is, he is certainly wounded, perhaps badly. On March 8, nine days after his father Ali Khamenei was assassinated, the Assembly of Experts announced that Mojtaba Khamenei was elected supreme leader in a “unanimous vote.” On March 17, a senior Iranian official stated that he had rejected de-escalation proposals conveyed by intermediaries. According to the official, the new supreme leader demanded that the U.S. and Israel be “brought to their knees.”

Dead or alive, in coma or in his full senses, it makes no difference: At this point Mojtaba Khamenei’s decisions are being dictated by the IRCG command. Yet, pledging allegiance to Mr. Khamenei is imperative for all regime luminaries, including President Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker and IRGC General Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, both of whom are relatively pragmatic and trying to reach an agreement with the U.S. They must know that the new supreme leader is not independent, but it makes no difference. Iran is an “Islamic Republic.” Constitutionally and in the eyes of many Iranians, “The Rule of the [Islamic] Jurist” (velayat-e faqih), the legacy of former Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, is still binding. The supreme leader speaks for the Mahdi, the “absent” and “expected” redeemer. All legitimacy flows from him.

Daftar-e Magham-e Moazzam-e Rahbari, also known as the House of the Leadership (Beit-e Rahbari), was the official residence and bureaucratic office of the supreme leader (rahbar) from 1989 until it was destroyed by the Israeli Air Force on February 28, 2026. Its structure was a mixture of traditional Beit, “House,” a religious office of a senior cleric (Marja’) and bureaucracy. The institution is located in central Tehran and was run since 1989 by “Authority on Islam” (Hujjat al-Islam) Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani. He is believed to have died together with Khamenei.

While Golpayegani was an administrator, Mojtaba Khamenei was the real power behind him, and the most powerful figure in the House. In 2026, it was estimated that 4,000 people were working for the House, as well as another 40,000 agents spread throughout the Iranian government’s offices. The House was the tool that enabled the supreme leader to know and control what was going on everywhere in the country. The government was running the day-to-day affairs of the state; the House was monitoring it. While the building complex was destroyed and some of the staff died, the House still functions.

The most influential adviser to Mojtaba Khamenei and, currently more importantly, the closest mentor to IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi, is the Office Counselor Mohsen Rezaee. He served for 16 years (1981-1997) as commander-in-chief of the IRGC and is a staunch hardliner. Yet, while strongly opposing a ceasefire with Saddam Hussein even after the latter withdrew his troops from Iranian soil in 1982, in 1988 he advised Khomeini to end the war. This suggests he can be more pragmatic.

On March 14, 2026, Mr. Rezaee declared: “The end of the war is in our hands. We will consider ending the war only when, first, we receive full compensation for all our damages from the United States, and second, we obtain a 100 percent guarantee for the future, which is not possible without the withdrawal of the U.S. from the whole Persian Gulf.” This summed up the most ambitious, rather than the most realistic Iranian goals in the negotiations: Without American forces in the Gulf, Iran would reign supreme. By late May 2026, Mr. Rezaee was convinced that the U.S. would cave in and, therefore, there was no need for concessions.

Since 2016,the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters is the highest node between the regular army (Artesh) and the IRGC. No military operation is possible without their approval and coordination. In the absence of an active and deeply involved supreme leader, the IRGC had to secure their approval before they launched Operation True Promise 4 against the Gulf Arab states and Israel in April 2026, and before they closed the strait. They are deeply involved in the political decision-making in negotiations with the U.S.

After its commander and his deputy were assassinated in the Twelve-Day War of June 2025, Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi became its commander. His deputy is Brigadier General Mohammad Jafar Asadi. Both of them are ex-IRGC senior officers, Iraq-Iran War veterans and hardliners.

This is the highest political planning body advising the supreme leader on economic, security, foreign, social and even cultural affairs. Naturally, when the supreme leader is incapacitated, as seems to be the case, its actual authority is held in question. Still, because it includes the top political and security players, it must not be ignored.

The most important military member is the commander of the IRGC. Others are the chief of general staff and the commander of the regular army. Five civilian members are potentially just as important: President Pezeshkian, a reformist; the foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, also a reformist; the new secretary of the Council, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a staunch hardliner; the speaker of parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a hardliner-turned-pragmatist; and finally, Chief Justice Ayatollah Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Eje’I, a hardliner upon whose orders thousands of political protesters were executed. In the protests of December 2025 and January 2026 he was one of the most influential voices that pressured the supreme leader to order the Basij militia to open fire.

Currently, the president, speaker and foreign minister are taking a back seat, though they represent a hugely important aspect of the constitution. President Pezeshkian won a popular vote by a large margin, and Speaker Ghalibaf was elected by the parliament that, in turn, was elected in general elections.

Iran is anything but a democracy, yet since Ayatollah Khomeini’s days the regime proudly maintains some semi-democratic trappings. Under Ali Khamenei, despite occasional disagreements, no president was ever impeached, because impeachment would be seen as nondemocratic. Moreover, even though the president and his government, as well as the speaker, have been sidelined after the assassination of Ali Khamenei, none of them have been dismissed.

President Pezeshkian and Speaker Ghalibaf have been very prominent in the media, leading pro-regime demonstrations in the streets of Tehran. The foreign minister has been seen leading the negotiations process with the U.S. Because the regime presents these figures as representatives of both the popular and the supreme leader’s will, the IRGC need them to win legitimacy in the eyes of the 20 to 40 percent of the population that still support the regime. Otherwise, they will be seen as having pulled off a military coup d’etat. To supporters of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution, this is an anathema.

The Iranian parliament has little clout, because any law it enacts may be revoked by the supreme leader or the Expediency Council. Yet, because it is a popularly elected body, it sways the political atmosphere and can claim to represent the electorate’s mood. Most of the parliament’s 290 seats are occupied by hardliners.

The biggest party is the Islamic Revolution Steadfast Front (Paydari), which has 27 percent of seats in the parliament and is the most extreme ideological Islamist legal-political party in Iran. Immediately following the 2026 ceasefire, Saeed Jalili, their most prominent leader who was a 2024 presidential runner-up, led a large demonstration in Tehran against negotiations. Their patron before the war was believed to be no other than Mojtaba Khamenei. Whenever the IRGC diehards need support for their rejectionist position, Mr. Jalili and the Paydari Party will be happy to oblige.

The U.S. is opening a safe route in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s response will be opening fire on the United Arab Emirates, possibly Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as well. The Iranians think in equations: If the U.S. escalates, they too will escalate. The U.S. may warn Iran that this time any such attack will result in the destruction of Iranian civilian infrastructure. The IRGC is likely to shoot anyway.

If the U.S. (and very likely Israel) resume a limited, symbolic kinetic campaign, so will Iran. Oman and Qatar will be spared, but other Arab Gulf states will be targeted, the UAE first. If the American attack is heavy, targeting much of the infrastructure, the Iranian response will be, too. The IRCG say that if Iran’s civilian infrastructure is attacked, they will destroy the oil industry and other civilian infrastructure of Israel and the Arab Gulf states. On April 26, 2026, the IRGC’s media reported that Iran will tear the submarine communication cables lying at the bottom of the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran is threatening to reactivate the Yemeni Houthi threat to traffic in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea. These are not idle threats. In such a case, the damage to the international economy will be substantial. At the same time, Iran will find itself with very little electricity, gas, fuel and revenue. A severe water crisis will be unavoidable; last summer, even before the war, Iran went through unprecedented water scarcity.

A middle course may be a massive repeat of the attack on Iran’s military targets, with the intent of knocking down Iran’s teeth. This will erode regime support within the Artesh, Iran’s regular army. IRGC reaction will be attacks on the Gulf Arabs and Israel as they did in the last war.

The U.S. has another option: Rather than resuming the kinetic war, it can stick to the blockade of Hormuz and wait. This will be very challenging for Washington for domestic and international reasons, but it will be far more difficult for the Iranian regime. In such a case, the IRGC will not open fire but, rather, choose to play a waiting game with the U.S. Currently, they believe that in such a case the Americans will blink first. The Iranian regime can protect the elite and some of their power base from the travails of a few months of blockade. However, it cannot protect all 20-25 million of its supporters (assuming that about one quarter of the population still supports the regime). Perhaps the IRGC servicemen and the Basij regulars can be looked after, but not the more than 1 million Basij irregulars, 250,000 policemen and 350,000 regular army (Artesh) soldiers and their families, let alone the millions of many privileged civilian supporters.

If, as some think, the IRGC are fanatics, preferring martyrdom over concessions then the only outcome will be deepening misery and devastation in Iran. The U.S. is not likely to invade Iran to topple the regime, and the IRGC will always have enough drones, missiles and mines to block the strait for a long time. Washington will surrender or wait further for the Iranian people to rise again soon, but it is far from certain that they will. If it waits, the world will find ways to circumvent the strait and the world economy, though not Iran’s, will recover. However, at a certain point the U.S. and the West will no longer be willing to wait. They will have to bust the Iranian siege of the Persian Gulf.

However, at least as their modus operandi in the past suggests, the IRGC are not risking self harm. If U.S. President Donald Trump is able to persuade the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan and the Arab Gulf states, maybe even China, to join him in pressuring Iran to open the strait, the IRGC will not be able to ignore it. But as of now, they believe that they are victorious and that there is therefore no need for compromises.

When push comes to shove, they will look for a compromise that will not humiliate them beyond repair. For Washington, the nuclear issue and the opening of the strait are the top priorities. On May 3, the Iranian side was reported to have agreed to surrender the enriched uranium and cease all enrichment for 15 years. For this to happen, the supreme leader will have to use his father’s principle of “heroic flexibility” and force the IRGC to make concessions. In fact, the IRGC might even quietly recommend to the supreme leader to show flexibility, as they advised Khomeini in 1988 to end the Iraq-Iran War. The president, his foreign minister and the parliament speaker will take the blame for those concessions.

A true change of regime in Tehran that empowers moderates to abandon Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its territorial claim to the strait and its support for the Islamist proxies, is less likely anytime soon. The opposite is more likely: To keep down a deeply disgruntled population, the regime will be more oppressive. However, if President Trump insists on zero enrichment and an open strait, and the present regime rejects these demands, it will be hurling Iran into a brick wall.

If it continues with its embargo, then given its present degree of institutional corruption and economic inefficiency, support for distant proxies, huge security-related expenses and the added heavy burden of the 40-day war of 2026, this regime cannot survive for more than a few years. Even within months, when the Basij disobey shooting orders, the masses will rise.

Published originally on May 20, 2026.