Revolutionary Guards Take the Reins in Iran

After the death of Iran’s supreme leader on February 28, management of the country and its war was officially transferred, as per the country’s constitution, to a trio: the president and two senior clerics. Yet in practical terms, control passed to the diehard command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) accompanied by two senior political figures: Ali Larijani and Muhammad Baqir Qalibaf. Both are retired generals of the IRGC, but may be defined as pragmatic hardline politicians, like the now deceased Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

While Khamenei has been struck down, his political legacy of pragmatic extremism remains and can still influence the decision-making of his successors, if they choose to let it. Yet, with him gone, it is far from certain that the Revolutionary Guards will make that choice. Their track record is unmitigated extremism, and their unrelenting grip on Iranian society and institutions is now near-total.

In 2013, Khamenei decided that, to save the Islamic Republic, Iran must enter negotiations with the five world powers on the nuclear issue. It was a weighty political concession, and one that Iranian extremists interpreted as a humiliating capitulation. Khamenei was no moderate: He was a radical Shia Islamist, but he could be pragmatic. Because of his fear of the inflexible diehards in the country’s leadership, he was obliged to give a convincing explanation.

In a meeting with the Revolutionary Guard’s senior command, he argued that in a medieval Arabic-language book he himself had translated into Persian, the esteemed author explained the motives of the second Shia Imam, Hassan bin Ali bin Abi Taleb, when he agreed to give up his right to the caliphate in favor of Muawiya, the head of the rival family. Such a concession, the book explained, represented narmesh-e qahremananeh (“heroic flexibility”) and saved the Shia community from extinction. Similar flexibility, Khamenei argued, was needed to save the Islamic Republic in Iran.

Since that year, this explanation has become an ideological milestone in Iranian political culture. In 2015, Khamenei approved the signing of the U.S.-led Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement using this argument.

On April 1, 2024, Israel attacked the Iranian consulate in Damascus. Among the dead was General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior figure in the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force and commander of operations in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli military intelligence assessed that Iran would not respond because Israel had assassinated senior Iranian officers in Syria before without major reprisals; but in this instance, they misjudged the situation in Tehran.

Khamenei was still the same pragmatic extremist, but then President Ebrahim Raisi, a senior cleric, and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, his foreign minister, were hardline extremists. Hossein Salami, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, was a hardliner too. Iran’s parliament – which has limited powers but can effectively stoke emotions – was controlled by extremist elements, especially the radical Paydari party.

Arguing (incorrectly) that a consulate abroad is Iranian territory, this alliance of extremists pushed hard for a military response against Israel. Khamenei relented. Unlike what many think, he functioned as a supreme arbiter balancing competing factions, rather than as a dictator like Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong or Saddam Hussein.

Close to midnight on April 13, 2025, Iran attacked Israel with a barrage of missiles and drones. On April 19, Israel responded symbolically. Khamenei understood that Iran was exposed and not yet ready for direct confrontation with Israel.

On May 19, 2024, an Iranian helicopter carrying the extremist President Raisi and his radical foreign minister, among others, crashed in the north of the country. All passengers and crew were killed. Many Iranians believe that it was an assassination. Some believe that it was planned by Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, to remove a strong candidate who could deny him his legacy as the next supreme leader. Some believe that Khamenei himself ordered the assassination because the late president nudged him again into a premature confrontation with Israel.

Khamenei’s subsequent actions were artfully planned and executed. He skillfully engineered the election of the reformist Dr. Masoud Pezeshkian for president on July 5, 2024. Mr. Pezeshkian campaigned with an emphasis on economic recovery. There is every reason to believe that he meant it.

On July 31, 2024, Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s political chairman, was assassinated at a secret residence of the Revolutionary Guards in Tehran. Israel never claimed responsibility, but the Mossad-style operation left little room for doubt who the perpetrator was. By then, the Israeli planners were fully aware that the assassination would trigger an Iranian response. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu consciously threw down the gauntlet. This time the target was truly Iranian territory. Iran’s honor was at stake. Khamenei picked up the gauntlet. Iran attacked, Israel responded.

With all his desire for reform, in such a fraught environment there was no way that Mr. Pezeshkian’s planned changes could succeed. The institutionalized corruption that provided a good life for the clerics, the political and security elites and their close supporters at the expense of the people could not be reformed. An economic crisis was inevitable. It came in December 2025, when rampant inflation accompanied by a violent fluctuation of the currency and severe shortage of water and electricity led to demonstrations, beginning, for the first time, with the bazaaris (the country’s mainstream merchant class). Until 2025 the bazaaris supported the regime, but now they were enraged. They were joined by students, union workers, even farmers.

President Pezeshkian and Khamenei tried to appease the public and failed. Mr. Pezeshkian and his government urged restraint; the Revolutionary Guards demanded that as much violence as necessary be used to quash the protests swiftly. On January 8, the IRGC were given what they wanted: Khamenei, assessing that their influence outweighed that of the president and his government, approved mass killings, taking the lives of tens of thousands of unarmed Iranians.

In two rounds of indirect negotiations in February 2026, United States President Donald Trump satisfied himself with demanding only an end to uranium enrichment. He relented on three additional American and Israeli demands: a cap on the range of Iran’s missiles; an end to support for terrorist proxies; and the regime’s commitment not to massacre its citizens.

Khamenei estimated that, because of pressure in the U.S. from Turkiye and the Gulf Arab states, President Trump would be ready for protracted negotiations that would erode his position. He sided with the extremists in refusing to acquiesce to Washington. The U.S. and Israel attacked.

After Khamenei’s death, Iran launched barrages of missiles and drones at 12 neighboring states. Judging by his record, the deceased supreme leader would not have authorized the attacks, least of all against Oman, which made every effort to mediate and prevent war, and Turkiye, a powerful and very useful “frenemy.”

An Iranian supreme leader is chosen by the 88 senior clerics of the Assembly of Experts. On March 8, Iran announced that the chosen cleric was Mojtaba Khamenei, the second son of the deceased leader.

According to the constitution, the supreme leader must be the most senior and highly respected clergyman, with a deep understanding of the affairs of the state. Mojtaba Khamenei, the extremists’ candidate, while of little public profile, is an experienced behind-the-scenes political actor. Yet, he is a junior cleric. He is believed to be only hujjat al-Islam, the lowest of the top three ranks of clerical authority. Above that level the Shia system has ayatollah, then ayatollah uzma (“grand ayatollah”). But as the country’s new rulers are, in fact, the Revolutionary Guards, as far as they are concerned, a supreme leader devoid of any significant religious prestige will be an asset, because they believe he will be weak and forced to accept their dictates.

The IRGC could not have allowed the election of a grand ayatollah like the 67 year-old pragmatic radical Ali Reza Arefi. Like Khamenei, he would have – to a certain extent − reined them in. The IRGC’s practice is reminiscent of that of the Roman Praetorian Guard that, beginning with Claudius in 41AD, often crowned those whom they believed they could control.

The commanders of the Revolutionary Guards have failed to defend the homeland in every confrontation with Israel and the U.S., but they are now the de facto rulers. They are reluctant to share power, they fear for their lives and are driven by a burning desire for revenge. Their decision to strike all neighboring countries is reckless, yet it shows the IRGC’s new line of total confrontation.

The regime and the IRGC have suffered considerable losses and yet, remain in control. It is reasonable to conclude that regime change is not in the cards any time soon, barring an unlikely nationwide civic uprising or an American ground war, which is possible but would come at great political cost for the U.S. president. Anything less and the regime will remain, the Iranian people will suffer even more and, despite the political and economic costs of the war, the U.S. and Israeli maximum war goals – regime change or regime surrender – will not be met. Eroding Iran’s military machine dramatically, however, will most likely be achieved.

The warring sides reach a point when the war becomes too costly, both politically and economically. In such a case, a ceasefire grudgingly becomes acceptable and both sides promptly claim victory. For the Iranian regime, survival may be described as victory; for the U.S., the huge damage to the Iranian war machine can be seen as victory. Oman will resume its mediation. In the meantime, the international embargo will stay in place. The Iranian nuclear and missile projects, as well as their proxies, will be in far greater difficulties than before, but the regime will resume its efforts to resuscitate all three. Recently Ali Larijani implied that ceasefire would be acceptable.

The regime has a few strategic advantages over the U.S.-Israel alliance. While the latter are making every effort to avoid Iranian civilian casualties and damage to critical infrastructure, the Revolutionary Guards are making every effort to hit Israeli and Gulf Arab civilians and civilian infrastructure. Much like during the recent protests in which the IRGC spilled so much blood, they perceive this as a do-or-die situation.

If there is a shortage of food, water, gasoline or electricity, they are ready to sacrifice millions of their own citizens to save themselves. The IRGC will secure the needs of the elite while allowing other Iranians to starve. This means that, while a long war of attrition is very problematic for the U.S. and Israel, as well as for the Gulf Arab states and the oil market, the regime can endure it. Recently IRGC sources hinted at such strategy.

Even more than before, the regime will act like a parasite that thrives while the host, most of the Iranian people, withers. When the people have no food, water or energy, they may change their minds: They may begin to criticize the U.S. and Israel and support the Islamic Revolution. The international humanitarian community will condemn the U.S. and Israel, and start providing humanitarian aid to Iran, as it did to the Houthis in Yemen. The embargo will fizzle out and the regime will recover.

The U.S. and Israel hope that the Iranian people will come out against the regime and have issued calls to action. Otherwise, short of American or Israeli engagement on the ground, it is difficult to see how their bombings, as damaging as they are, can dislodge the regime. There are a few thousand Kurdish and Baluch fighters in the north and southeast, respectively, but without coordinated land and air support they are no match to the Iranian war machine. No alternative leadership or opposition army is emerging. The regime is desperate, so it will use full force against insurgents.

A possible development is a rift in the Iranian leadership that will undermine the regime, something akin to Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power in the Soviet Union. If the pragmatists prevail, to legitimize concessions they will be able to use Khamenei’s legacy of “heroic flexibility.” This may change the regime profoundly. The first sign became evident when, on March 7, President Pezeshkian apologized to the Gulf states for the Iranian attacks. However, within hours the attacks were resumed. The Revolutionary Guards demonstrated who was calling the shots. Following the election of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader, such a possibility is unlikely.

The U.S. and Israel decide to land ground troops in Iran. A highly focused, small commando operation to recover the 400 kilograms of 60 percent-enriched uranium is possible, but will be very dangerous because the Iranians expect it. So far there are no observable preparations for a full-scale march on Tehran. Because it will generate bitter opposition in the U.S. and Israel, such a full-fledged invasion is highly unlikely. Its discussion here, therefore, while unavoidable, is theoretical, as a military history lesson from the 2003 Iraq war.

If the combined armies find a good point of entry, like the case of Iraq in 2003, a ground campaign will take place with full control of the air and will last a few weeks. The IRGC and basij paramilitary will not be able to stop it. The artesh, the regular army, may not fight. In the Iraq March-April 2003 campaign the allied forces had few casualties. It was the subsequent occupation of Iraq that cost them over 4,000 lives and many more wounded. This means that the invading troops will have to leave immediately after toppling the regime. The Iranian people will have to pick up the pieces and build a new order.

Published originally on March 12, 2026.