The Assassination of Ali Khamenei Led to a Revolution That Only Strengthened Iran—And Israel Is in a Pickle

The “memorandum of understanding” between the United States and Iran grants, for the first time, international recognition of the link between the Gulf and Lebanese arenas. Even worse, it recognizes Iran’s veto power in Lebanon. This is a very dangerous innovation for three countries: Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.

Now, the new regime in Tehran, which we brought to power, sees this as a huge achievement. After we eliminated Iran’s veteran political leadership, Iran’s understanding of how to maintain the regime has undergone a revolution. Iran declares that for the sake of Hezbollah it is willing to take the risk of renewing the fighting.

This is a huge and unprecedented risk for them, but they see it differently: in their understanding, Trump will not risk renewing the fighting, and he will prefer to force Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and prohibit it from returning fire to Hezbollah. Even if he goes to war again, the Iranians believe that he will be defeated again. Therefore, in their eyes, the risk is small and Hezbollah can be saved.

This is the opposite approach to the one that was accepted by Khomeini and Khamenei, and against this background the question arises: What happened to the decision-makers in Tehran between the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the 40-day war (The Lion’s Roar or Whimper) in 2026?

In 1987, in support of Iraq, the United States entered naval battles against the Iranian navy to protect commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf. After several confrontations, Khomeini ordered his navy to cease any attack on international shipping. Although the United States was the “Great Satan” in his eyes, he forbade a confrontation with it.

The war ended in an Iraqi victory, and Iraq came out badly bruised, but Iran lost almost a million soldiers and its economy collapsed. Khomeini gave up on the vision of liberating the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf and agreed to a ceasefire. He said that for him it was “drinking the Kool-Aid,” or a chalice of poison. Indeed, about a year later, he died of a broken heart. The heavy price of the war against Iraq has left the leadership headed by Ali Khamenei with a new “Khomeinist” mentality. First, in order to save the revolution, the leadership must be ready to give in and retreat. Second, Iran must invest more in the “axis of resistance” that will serve as a ring of defense for Iran, in addition to being the spearhead against Israel. As commander of the Jerusalem (Quds) Corps, overseeing Hezbollah and the “axis,” a charismatic young officer, Ahmad Vahidi, was appointed. Today he is the commander of the Revolutionary Guards. He was followed by military prodigy Qassem Soleimani. For them, building the “axis” was a life’s work. But in the Supreme Leader’s view, the “axis” was meant to protect Iran if it was attacked, and if necessary the “axis” had to commit suicide for Iran, not the other way around.

The elimination of Israel was also not supposed to involve Iran directly. The plan was not a an Armageddon, but wars of attrition to be waged by the “axis” alone. Thus, the Galilee would be emptied, followed by Haifa, and only les misérables, the miserable, who could not escape the country would remain in Israel. Because the Iranians suspect that Israel is a nuclear power, Israel would not die in a bang but in a whimper. It would indeed happen with Iranian funding and assistance, but without the involvement and risk of Iran itself.

Therefore, Iran did not intervene directly after October 7, and fortunately, it even instructed Hezbollah not to storm the Galilee, but to settle for a war of attrition. Judging by his policy until the day he died, Khamenei would have continued Khomeini’s and his own carefully calculating policy. He would not have risked war with the United States, he would not have closed the strait, or attacked the Gulf Arab states.

All of this was reversed when Israel killed the Supreme Leader and his senior officials. The new regime is military, younger and more reckless, more extreme and arrogant, and more connected to the “axis.” That is why, after the February 28 assassination of Khamenei Iran took many more risks and, amazingly, they managed to subdue Trump. If the Israeli War Cabinet, the IDF Command, the IDF Military Intelligence, and the Mossad knew who was waiting in the wings in Tehran, and yet they agreed to eliminate the old elite without making sure that there would be a complete regime change, what happened to us? And if they didn’t know—what happened to us?

The IDF’s Airforce and intelligence kinetic achievements in Iran in the Forty-Day War, 1000-1500 miles away from their bases, are the stuff of legends. However, Israel initiated war against an enemy that is both sophisticated, well-armed, and manyfold larger than itself. Doing so without an in-depth political intelligence analysis of the likely changes at Iran’s top leadership, as well as the degree of commitment to the war on the part of Israel’s ally, was a strategic defeat waiting to happen.

Published originally on June 25, 2026.