Three days after an airstrike killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, it remains unclear who is truly in control in Tehran—the newly appointed three-member political leadership or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Although the Revolutionary Guard has suffered significant losses, it remains the most powerful force within the system.
The interim leadership trio ... does not include figures known for shaping foreign or military policy.
The most consequential question concerns Mojtaba Khamenei, long seen as his father’s heir apparent. Initial reports suggested he was killed in the same strike on February 28, 2026, but speculation inside Iran now holds that he may be alive. If he survived, it is possible he was wounded, especially since the regime announced the death of his wife. If he is alive, his prospects of becoming supreme leader would increase. The clerical establishment and the Revolutionary Guard may prefer to preserve continuity as a way of honoring his father’s legacy.
Previously, many Iranians believed the regime would hesitate to elevate Mojtaba as supreme leader, given widespread public resentment toward his father. Now, with Khamenei dead and after the regime has crushed protests at enormous human cost, there may be fewer political inhibitions.
Where does the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps stand after Khamenei? On March 1, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that at least some Revolutionary Guard units are operating independently, though the remark may have been intended to deflect responsibility for strikes targeting neighboring Arab states.
The interim leadership trio—President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Mohsen Ejei, and hardline cleric Alireza Arafi—does not include figures known for shaping foreign or military policy. However, Arafi could emerge as a credible candidate for supreme leader, but none of the three has been a central actor in strategic decision-making. Arafi is a religious ideologue, trusted by Khamenei but involved more in spreading Shi’ism abroad.
That leaves former parliament speaker Ali Larijani as a pivotal civilian figure. Long embedded within the system and closely linked to the Revolutionary Guard, Larijani was reportedly elevated in contingency war planning shortly before hostilities erupted. Although not formally part of the interim trio, Iranians and outside analysts assume he remains influential in military and foreign affairs.
The leadership has yet to hold a funeral for [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei—a striking delay.
Whoever is in charge, the leadership has yet to hold a funeral for Khamenei—a striking delay, given that Islamic tradition calls for burial as soon as possible. The establishment would likely seek a ceremony rivaling that of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, which drew millions of mourners. Yet in wartime conditions, organizing such an event may be difficult and risky for a weakened regime. A poorly attended funeral would be politically damaging, particularly after videos showed Iranians celebrating news of Khamenei’s death.
Another telling development is media access. Since March 2, only the Revolutionary Guard-affiliated Tasnim news website has remained consistently accessible from abroad; even the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency has gone offline. Despite widespread internet disruptions, Tasnim loads instantly—a possible indication of the Revolutionary Guard’s technical control or access to external hosting infrastructure.
With information flowing irregularly from inside Iran in wartime, assessing the internal balance of power remains difficult. What is clear, however, is that the regime appears unstable and its command structure uncertain. To be sure, factional competition must be taking place, and it will be interesting to see who rises from the thinning ranks of the Revolutionary Guard as a strong figure.
