The Islamic Republic once promoted its nuclear program as a source of national pride. It now lies in ruins after devastating Israeli and U.S. airstrikes. While the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization insists that the regime strives to “prevent the halt of the nuclear program,” the extent of the destruction makes a near-term revival unlikely.
This raises a question: What has the Islamic Republic actually gained from decades of investment in nuclear infrastructure? Within just two weeks, much of that infrastructure—along with numerous senior military officials and nuclear scientists tied to weapons development—disappeared.
The regime’s only tangible civilian achievement remains the 1,000-megawatt Bushehr nuclear power plant.
The regime’s only tangible civilian achievement remains the 1,000-megawatt Bushehr nuclear power plant, which took two decades to complete because of repeated delays by Russia’s Rosatom. Since coming online in September 2011, the plant has delivered only 65 terawatt-hours of electricity to the national grid—worth less than $5 billion at regional market rates. That figure does not cover half the cost of building the facility.
Iran has yet to power Bushehr with a single gram of domestically produced fuel. This raises the question of why it must enrich uranium if it is bound to import the fuel from Russia. The Atomic Energy Organization’s latest report confirms that Iranian managers have replaced the reactor’s fuel ten times—all with fuel supplied by Russia.
Meanwhile, Iran has suffered under sanctions linked to its nuclear ambitions. In stark contrast, the United Arab Emirates partnered with South Korea’s KEPCO to build a 5,600-megawatt nuclear power plant—over five times the capacity of Bushehr—without pursuing enrichment. The Barakah plant cost just $32 billion, including fuel supply. On a per-megawatt basis, it cost less than half of what Iran spent on Bushehr.
To defend the costs of the program, Iranian officials have resorted to bizarre justifications. In April, Atomic Energy chief Mohammad Eslami claimed that Iran sells each ton of deuterated methanol—a heavy-water-derived chemical—for $1.2 million, while regular methanol goes for just $400 per ton. Iran’s Chamber of Commerce shows that the country does not export deuterated methanol at all. Global markets do not trade it in ton-sized volumes; instead, it is sold in milliliters or liters for niche scientific research. In fact, the entire global market for deuterated methanol in 2023 amounted to just $40 million.
The irony is stark. Iran holds the world’s second-largest methane reserves after Russia and had aimed to produce 30 million tons of regular methanol per year. Due to sanctions, actual output stands at 14 million tons, with 80 percent exported for about $2.5 billion annually. While Iran dreams of capturing a $40 million global market for deuterated methanol, it loses nearly $3 billion every year by failing to expand its regular methanol industry.
Estimates place the total cost of sanctions on Iran between $2 trillion and $3 trillion.
Estimates place the total cost of sanctions on Iran between $2 trillion and $3 trillion. Several key economic indicators reveal just how devastating these sanctions have been. OPEC and Kpler data show that from 2012—when nuclear-related sanctions began—until today, Iran earned around $600 billion from oil exports. Had it maintained its pre-sanctions export level of 2.5 million barrels per day, revenues could have reached $1.1 trillion. Additionally, Iran loses 20-25 percent of its oil income in circumvention costs, meaning sanctions have denied the country $620 billion to $700 billion in oil revenues.
Iran also has fallen short of its non-oil export targets. National development plans called for $120 billion in non-oil exports by the end of the previous decade. Instead, the country recorded just $58 billion in 2024—and under $50 billion in 2023.
Government officials admit that sanctions have driven up import costs by 20-25 percent. Since 2012, Iran has imported roughly $800 billion worth of goods. Except for the brief Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action window between 2015 and 2018, this additional cost has consistently burdened the economy.
Even without factoring in services, Iran has suffered $1.5 trillion in losses in oil and goods trade since 2012—roughly four times its projected gross domestic product in 2025. Foreign direct investment also has collapsed. United Nations Trade and Development reported that Iran attracted over $5 billion in foreign direct investment in 2017. Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018, annual foreign direct investment has averaged just $1.5 billion.
And this is only the surface of Iran’s economic crisis. Since 2018, electricity and gas production growth has halved, leaving the country grappling with severe shortages of electricity, natural gas, gasoline, and diesel.
Iran’s shrinking gross domestic product underscores the scale of damage.
Iran’s shrinking gross domestic product underscores the scale of damage. According to the International Monetary Fund, Iran’s gross domestic product rose from $366 billion in 2000 to $625 billion in 2011. Since then, it has contracted sharply and is expected to fall to $341 billion in 2025—smaller than it was 25 years ago.
By comparison, Turkey’s economy in 2011 was only 33 percent larger than Iran’s. Today, Turkey’s gross domestic product has reached $1.44 trillion—over four times Iran’s. Saudi Arabia, which was on par with Iran in 2011, is projected to surpass $1 trillion this year—nearly triple Iran’s output.
While Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may approach the nuclear program as a central pillar of Iranian legitimacy, he may not realize what an increasing number of Iranians do: The nuclear program is actually a stone, slowly sinking Iran’s potential and economy.
