Shortly after the Assad regime collapsed in December 2024, the interim Syrian government led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham abolished mandatory military service, ending a practice in place since Syria gained independence from France in 1946. The rationale behind the decision was that Syrians no longer trusted the military system, which the former regime had used as a tool to commit atrocities throughout the country’s fourteen-year civil war. It was also a way to incentivize the return of men who had fled to escape conscription.
During military parades marking the first anniversary of Assad’s fall on December 8, soldiers of the new Syrian military exhibited the exact opposite of what a professional army looks like.
A year after that decision was made, however, what has replaced the system may prove even more troubling in the years ahead. During military parades marking the first anniversary of Assad’s fall on December 8, soldiers of the new Syrian military exhibited the exact opposite of what a professional army looks like. In one parade, troops chanted slogans in support of Gaza; in another, they issued explicit threats against Jews. In a separate rally, a military commander threatened to use a sword against Kurdish forces in the northeast, while another notorious militiaman, who now heads an army division, expressed his readiness to attack Kurdish areas.
One year may not be enough to build a professional army. After all, Assad’s military institutions, which dissolved after his fall, had been designed to protect the Assad dynasty, relying on loyalty rather than national doctrine. But the country’s new Islamist authorities are no different. Since taking power, the patchwork of rogue Islamist and jihadist factions that participated in the offensive to topple Assad, and now form the core of the new military, have been involved in massacres against Alawis and Druze, and continue to commit violations across areas under government control. Militiamen sanctioned by the United States and other countries for crimes against civilians have now been promoted to senior positions within the new military. With clear impunity, they continue to run their units with a militia-like mentality.
Abolishing conscription means that interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government now decides who can enlist. The authorities have launched an advertising campaign to encourage young men to sign up for the military, but it is unclear how many have joined, as the defense ministry does not release such data. In February, al-Sharaa claimed that “thousands” were joining his military. While exact figures are difficult to verify, the new recruits are mostly Sunni Arabs.
The prospect of building a neutral and professional military in Syria remains remote, as al-Sharaa continues to consolidate his grip over key parts of government and state institutions.
If the recent violence and other incidents indicate anything, it is that the military not only lacks discipline but is also being indoctrinated in ways that antagonize those who do not align with al-Sharaa’s style of governance. The prospect of building a neutral and professional military in Syria remains remote, as al-Sharaa continues to consolidate his grip over key parts of government and state institutions. Since taking power, he has shown a firm determination to establish a state system loyal to him and his Islamist group. In addition to the presidency and command of the armed forces, he has inducted himself as head of government and head of the national security council, while also granting himself the authority to directly appoint one-third of Syria’s interim parliament—the remainder of which was elected through committees selected by al-Sharaa’s high election commission. With his evident obsession with power, al-Sharaa seeks to build a military that serves as an instrument for projecting his authority and intimidating opponents rather than a national force dedicated to protecting the country and its people.
In its current form and character, Syria’s military poses not only a threat to internal security dynamics and social cohesion but also to regional stability. Domestically, the fact that it is dominated by radical Islamist factions undermines any prospect for dialogue and reconciliation. Regionally, its aggressive rhetoric risks inflaming tensions with neighboring states. For now, this rhetoric might be dismissed as mere words, but as the military receives more support and consolidates power, it could translate into actions with serious consequences.
Under the current circumstances, it would be difficult for U.S. Central Command to build a long-term partnership with the Syrian military, especially now that Syria has joined the global coalition against the Islamic State. Although this partnership is currently limited in scope, it remains constrained by the Syrian military’s unprofessionalism, internal fragmentation, and ideological orientation.
