The fuel crisis risk in the Middle East is not simply a crude-oil production issue. If a country does not have refining capacity, storage, secure supply routes, or financial resources to fund emergency imports, it can produce millions of barrels a day and still have empty fuel stations.
The governments of the region face two different threats. Import, inflation and subsidy costs all increase. Physical shortages mean empty stations, rationing, and disruptions to transport, power generation, agriculture, and industry. The countries with the least oil are not necessarily the most vulnerable, however. Instead, the vulnerable are the states that cannot readily replace lost supplies.
Recent fuel-market assessments show how quickly higher global oil prices can pass through to Lebanese consumers and businesses.
Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen face the most immediate danger. Lebanon relies on imported refined petroleum products for transport, backup electricity generation, and essential services. The country’s financial crisis, currency weakness, and political paralysis make it difficult for importers and public institutions to secure large emergency cargoes when international prices rise or shipping becomes more expensive. Lebanon’s dependence on maritime deliveries also leaves it vulnerable to disruption in the eastern Mediterranean. Recent fuel-market assessments show how quickly higher global oil prices can pass through to Lebanese consumers and businesses.
Syria combines damaged infrastructure, weak public finances, and dependence on external fuel supplies. Years of conflict reduced the reliability of oil production, refining, electricity generation, and distribution networks. The World Bank has documented repeated increases in fuel prices and the government’s shrinking ability to sustain subsidies. These pressures make Syria sensitive to any disruption in imported crude, refined products or transport routes.
Yemen remains even more exposed. Conflict has fragmented the country’s institutions, weakened its currency, and damaged ports, roads and energy infrastructure. The World Bank warns that fiscal strain, liquidity shortages, and fuel disruptions continue to deepen Yemen’s economic vulnerability. Any interruption affecting Red Sea ports or shipping routes could produce shortages rapidly, particularly in areas that lack functioning alternatives.
Iran presents a different form of vulnerability. It produces substantial crude oil and possesses significant refining capacity, but sanctions restrict access to finance, technology, equipment, and spare parts. High domestic consumption, subsidized prices, inefficient distribution, and fuel smuggling further reduce the system’s resilience. Iran can withstand a short disruption better than Lebanon or Yemen, but a prolonged crisis could expose serious weaknesses between crude production and the reliable delivery of gasoline, diesel and other refined products.
The International Energy Agency describes Turkey as a country with considerable energy diversification but continued dependence on imported fossil fuels.
Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq occupy a middle position. Turkey depends on imported oil and gas, exposing it to international price increases. However, its larger economy, established refining sector, modern ports, and access to Mediterranean and Black Sea markets give it more flexibility than many regional importers. The country can draw on multiple suppliers and transport corridors, although sustained high prices would still increase inflation and pressure the current account. The International Energy Agency describes Turkey as a country with considerable energy diversification but continued dependence on imported fossil fuels.
Jordan relies on imported energy but benefits from the Aqaba port and relatively stable external partnerships. Its exposure would rise if regional shipping routes became unsafe or if import financing weakened. Egypt has greater refining, storage and transport capacity, including the Suez Canal and Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline system. Nevertheless, high domestic demand, fiscal pressure, and dependence on international markets would make a prolonged product shortage costly.
Iraq illustrates the limits of measuring security through crude output. Iraq exports large volumes of oil but still struggles to capture its associated gas and meet domestic electricity demand. The International Energy Agency reports that Iraq relies on imported Iranian gas and continues to experience power shortages when those supplies decline. Refining improvements may reduce some product deficits, but weak electricity networks, high summer demand, and dependence on southern export infrastructure leave Iraq exposed to both domestic and maritime disruption.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess the strongest immediate buffers. Both maintain large production and refining systems, strong fiscal capacity, and alternative crude-export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The International Energy Agency estimates that Saudi and United Arab Emirates pipelines together provide roughly 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day of potential bypass capacity. That capacity cannot replace all Hormuz flows, but it gives both countries greater flexibility than Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, or Iraq.
In a two-week disruption, physical shortages would likely affect Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen the quickest.
Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain also have the advantage of domestic production, refining assets and financial reserves, but most are much more dependent on maritime access through Hormuz. The International Energy Agency said that in 2025, almost 20 million barrels a day of oil and about five million barrels a day of petroleum products passed through the Strait. It also says about 93 percent of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas exports and 96 percent of the United Arab Emirates liquefied natural gas exports pass through the waterway. In a two-week disruption, physical shortages would likely affect Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen the quickest. Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey would absorb the initial shock through imports, stocks, and alternative suppliers, but markets for diesel and liquefied petroleum gas could tighten rapidly.
A three-to-six-month crisis would raise the specter of rationing, economic paralysis, and humanitarian pressure. Turkey and Egypt would have to pay more for imports and products, and Iraq would be under pressure on fuel and electricity at the same time. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would have the most leeway on logistics and finance, but even they could not make up fully for normal Strait of Hormuz flows.
