Turkey has built one of its deepest partnerships in Africa in Somalia. It trains Somali forces, maintains its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, supports maritime security, and has expanded into offshore energy exploration. The relationship took another step forward in early October, when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Turkey had begun building a spaceport in the country. Yet the depth of this partnership does not necessarily translate into political alignment.
Mogadishu reaffirmed its support for the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
A recent dispute over Cyprus illustrates this. Somalia’s new parliament speaker Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur thanked Turkish Cypriot official Ziya Öztürkler for congratulating him on his election and referred to him as the speaker of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” the Turkish-backed entity in northern Cyprus recognized only by Turkey. Abdulkadir later deleted his post. Somalia’s Foreign Ministry then issued a formal clarification stating that the communication did not represent a change in foreign policy or recognition of a separate entity in northern Cyprus. Mogadishu reaffirmed its support for the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
The decision to clarify its position is notable given Mogadishu’s relationship with Ankara, which has spent years strengthening the country’s security institutions, while a ten-year defense and economic cooperation agreement has deepened that partnership and committed Ankara to helping build and equip Somalia’s navy.
Yet the country’s position on Cyprus did not come at the expense of its partnership with Turkey. On September 10, 2026, Turkish and Somali officials met in Mogadishu for a forum on their strategic relationship. Later that month, Somalia’s defense minister met with the commander of the Turkish training base TURKSOM and a Turkish military delegation to discuss further cooperation and training. By early October, the relationship was moving into another area. Turkey’s new ambassador and the commander of TURKSOM visited the region where Ankara is developing its space facility, shortly before Erdoğan announced that construction had begun.
This makes Somalia’s response on Cyprus more significant. One of Ankara’s closest African partners made clear that reliance on Turkish security assistance did not translate into rubberstamping Turkish foreign policy.
Somalia had strong reasons to act quickly. Recognizing the Turkish-controlled north would create problems for its own territorial integrity. Mogadishu rejects Somaliland’s independence and seeks international support for maintaining Somalia’s existing borders. Supporting a separate entity in Cyprus would make that position harder to maintain consistently.
That concern remains current. In early October, Somalia joined Egypt, Eritrea, and Sudan in rejecting recognition of or support for Somaliland. Territorial integrity remains an immediate foreign policy concern for Mogadishu, rather than simply the legal argument it used to respond to the Cyprus episode.
Defense agreements, military training, commercial investment, and infrastructure have given Ankara a larger role across the continent, but Somalia illustrates the constraints of this approach.
Somaliland had already exploited the contradiction. After Abdulkadir’s post, Somaliland authorities called on Greece and Cyprus to consider recognizing Somaliland and accused Somalia of applying different standards to Cyprus and its own territorial dispute. Nicosia continues to support Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and has not recognized Somaliland.
The same question extends beyond Somalia as Turkey expands its presence elsewhere in Africa. Defense agreements, military training, commercial investment, and infrastructure have given Ankara a larger role across the continent, but Somalia illustrates the constraints of this approach.
This dynamic creates opportunities for Washington to engage with governments that have forged close partnerships with Turkey. Turkish influence in Africa—especially its drone exports—are destabilizing and often undermine U.S. interests. But if Turkey’s top ally on the continent can say no to Turkey, it behooves the State Department to more aggressively blunt Turkey’s reach by illustrating how Turkey’s positions often undermine the national interests of those countries Turkey prefer to treat as virtual colonies.
