Saudi Arabia’s growing role in Turkey’s energy sector took a step forward in February 2026, when ACWA Power reached an agreement with Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and state utility EÜAŞ for investment and purchase regarding a proposed five-gigawatt renewable-energy program. The initial phase involves two one-gigawatt solar plants in Sivas and Taşeli.
A later, three-gigawatt stage will bring together wind and solar power with energy storage. Both Riyadh and Ankara view this deal as a step to guide Turkey toward achieving its 2025 goal 120 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity.
The project’s importance extends beyond the additional capacity it will bring online. The agreement points to a broader expansion of Saudi economic interests in Turkey and raises a more consequential question: whether sustained investment could give Riyadh greater leverage over Turkey’s strategic choices.
Both Riyadh and Ankara view this deal as a step to guide Turkey toward achieving its 2025 goal 120 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity.
Turkey has reason to welcome this investment. Its energy transition requires new capital, while the country also needs to expand electricity supply, strengthen its power infrastructure and reduce its exposure to imported fossil fuels.
ACWA Power brings project-development expertise and access to Gulf Arab and international finance, alongside the ability to take on large project supported by long-term power-purchase deals. Saudi Arabia also gains the opportunity to expand ACWA’s international operations and direct capital into a key regional economy.
ACWA’s company ownership structure makes this expansion relevant to Riyadh’s economic ambitions. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund owns 44 percent of ACWA, tying the company’s international activities to a broader state-backed investment strategy.
The significance of state-backed Saudi investment lies in what sustained investment could produce: Companies that finance, develop, and operate major energy assets acquire an enduring position in the sector. Their activities can bring them into discussions over regulation, grid development, investment priorities and the design of future tenders.
A deeper Saudi presence would give Riyadh a greater stake in Turkey, and a more stablished position within an industry central to the country’s development. Storage, transmission, and cross-border electricity infrastructure could give Saudi-backed companies an important place within Turkey’s energy system.
Investment across generation, storage, transmission and potentially cross-border electricity infrastructure could give Saudi-backed companies an increasingly important role in Turkey’s energy system.
The extent of Riyadh’s leverage depends on how much Turkey relies on Saudi capital. Presently, Ankara has several alternatives: Turkish companies, European banks, Chinese suppliers and other Gulf Arab-based investors can all offer capital and expertise. Turkish regulators continue to determine the conditions under which the energy market operates and state-owned EÜAŞ remains an important factor in power-purchase arrangements.
Saudi investment therefore offers Riyadh greater access and a stronger commercial position over Turkish energy policy. More impactful leverage would arise only if Saudi financing became sufficiently important that withdrawal, delay or redirection of its capital could disrupt Turkish energy projects or impact wider economic decisions.
The expansion of renewables will require investment beyond individual power plants; Turkey also needs improvements to the wider grid.
Turkey’s continuing need for infrastructure finance makes that possibility worth monitoring. The expansion of renewables will require investment beyond individual power plants; Turkey also needs improvements to the wider grid. Gulf Arab investors have an advantage in this environment because state-linked institutions can mobilize significant capital and move more quickly than other sources of finance.
Should Saudi-backed companies secure an increasingly large share of these investments, Ankara could gain stronger incentives to preserve favorable relations with Riyadh, even at the cost of diplomatic adjustment.
The program also faces practical obstacles. There is no guarantee that all projects will secure financing, let alone begin generating electricity. Currency volatility and high borrowing costs can complicate project finance and raise construction expenses. Developers must also navigate land acquisition, permits, corruption and environmental approval. Grid capacity presents a further challenge. Rapid growth in renewables requires investment in transmission, storage, and balancing capacity, particularly when facilities are far from demand centers.
While ACWA’s current role does not give Riyadh decisive influence, the question is whether Saudi investment will translate into greater leverage. If Saudi-backed capital becomes embedded across Turkey’s energy system, commercial influence could acquire greater diplomatic and political weight.
