What Kalın’s Visit to Greece Means as Turkey Prepares for War

Turkey’s Intelligence Head Delivered Erdoğan’s Demands Concerning the Greek Islands, Israel, and the Eastern Mediterranean

İbrahim Kalın, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization.

İbrahim Kalın, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization.

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On August 28, 2026, İbrahim Kalın, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT), visited Athens without prior announcement to meet with his Greek counterpart, National Intelligence Service (EYP) Director Emeritus Themistoklis Demiris. Kalın’s presence, however, acquired greater significance when he then met privately with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis at the Maximos Mansion, the official seat of the Greek premiership.

Turkish media subsequently revealed the purpose of Kalın’s mission. The pro-government newspaper Yeni Şafak reported that the MİT chief had spoken “openly and clearly” in Athens and delivered four messages: Turkey would not retreat from its positions; it would not allow Greece to create “faits accompli” in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean; it would not accept strengthening Greek islands’ defenses; and it regards Greece’s strategic partnership with Israel as the “wrong path.” This was effectively a Turkish ultimatum.

Turkey fears a deterrence architecture that would restrict its ability to intimidate Athens, Nicosia, and Jerusalem separately.

The timing of the visit was also significant. It took place as Greece and Israel were advancing an agreement on the “Achilles Shield,” a multi-layered air and missile defense system. At the same time, the Republic of Cyprus is strengthening its defenses with Israeli-made Barak MX systems, while the prospect of integrating the defensive shields of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel has come to the forefront once again.

Turkey fears a deterrence architecture that would restrict its ability to intimidate Athens, Nicosia, and Jerusalem separately. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan urged Greece not to deploy new weapons systems on the islands, adding that history is “a very good guide for those who draw lessons from it.” Mitsotakis responded that Greece does not accept instructions on how to defend its national sovereignty.

While Kalın spoke in Athens of a “good-faith approach,” Turkey continued preparing for the possibility of a major conflict. Its plan to create 40 commando brigades is forming a military arc stretching from Eastern Thrace and the Anatolian coast to occupied Cyprus. Meanwhile, the construction of shelters and civil defense infrastructure across all 81 Turkish provinces shows that Ankara does not regard war as an abstract possibility.

In the air, a Turkish Akıncı unmanned aerial vehicle carried out a mission over the area of Turkey’s unlawful marine park in the northern Aegean, between the Greek islands of Samothrace and Lemnos. Farther south, the research vessel TÜBİTAK Marmara appeared near Kastellorizo, in the area of Turkey’s second illegal marine park, which seeks to encircle the Greek island and undermine its maritime rights.

The Great Sea Interconnector could become the next flashpoint. Following the agreement with France’s Meridiam, Greece must demonstrate on the ground that its delimited exclusive economic zone with Egypt does not exist only on maps.

The 2024 Kasos incident demonstrated what happens when resolve gives way to fear of escalation. The Greek government appears to have realized—belatedly and under electoral pressure—that appeasement has not changed Turkey. It has merely given Ankara time, space, and the conviction that its pressure tactics work.

The Greek government appears to have realized—belatedly and under electoral pressure—that appeasement has not changed Turkey.

The prime minister’s recent references to extending Greece’s territorial waters south of Crete, along with Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis’s position that extending them to 12 nautical miles is an inalienable Greek right, indicate a shift in public rhetoric. The question, however, is whether action will meet rhetoric.

Against this backdrop, the United States must decide what kind of regional order it supports: the one being built by Greece, Cyprus, and Israel on the foundations of international law and mutual security, or the one Turkey is attempting to impose through threats, unlawful maps, and military faits accompli.

U.S. Ambassador and businessman Tom Barrack’s attempt to portray U.S. sanctions against Golden Global Yatırım Bankası—a bank that facilitated transactions linked to Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—as an action that should not be interpreted as targeting Turkey sends the wrong message to Washington’s genuine allies.

Greece has paid a price for its retreats: Cyprus in 1974, Imia in 1996, and the loss of several pilots in the line of duty. This cycle must end. Peace is not secured by leaving the islands defenseless or by seeking Turkey’s permission to exercise Greek rights; it is secured through strength, alliances, and determination.

Christos Konstantinidis is a journalist, editor-in-chief of Geopolitico.gr, co-owner of PontosVoice.com, and a member of the International Institute of Strategy.
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