The August 5, 2026, agreement giving France’s Meridiam a majority stake in the Great Sea Interconnector between Greece and Cyprus is both an investment and a geopolitical maneuver. Meridiam’s acquisition of a 66 percent stake with Greece’s Independent Power Transmission Operator, the remaining strategic shareholder and technical lead, brings a project back into play that Turkey sought to delay with naval brinkmanship. A parallel agreement with Nexans provides for the continuation of the bathymetric surveys. The next Navigational Telex, therefore, will not only concern a cable but also will measure the credibility of Greek deterrence.
Its purpose ... is to end Cypriot energy isolation as the only European Union member without an electricity interconnection. A second phase will extend it to Israel.
The European Union has included the Great Sea Interconnector, approximately 750 miles long and costing $2.2 billion, among its European Projects of Common Interest, with $761 million in funding from the European Commission. Its purpose, as Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis stated, is to end Cypriot energy isolation as the only European Union member without an electricity interconnection. A second phase will extend it to Israel.
In July 2024, the Italian survey vessel Ievoli Relume was conducting surveys south of Kasos and Karpathos. Turkey sent five warships, claiming that the area formed part of the Turkish continental shelf and that surveying required Ankara’s permission. The crisis de-escalated, but the work never returned to its original pace, as Turkey’s revisionist ambitions and military moves in the Eastern Mediterranean caused further delays.
Ankara has since sought to craft a new status quo. Following Meridiam’s entry into the Great Sea Interconnector, Turkey reiterated its demand for prior coordination. Turkish media presented Ankara’s consent as a “legal threshold” for the project’s implementation. In effect, President Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan seeks veto rights over a European project and Greek sovereign rights.
The tension surrounding the Great Sea Interconnector intersects with broader Turkish preparations for war. On August 10, 2026, a leaked classified document signed by Defense Minister Yaşar Güler revealed that state agencies are working in coordination on possible scenarios of “crisis, tension, and war,” with specific reference to Greece, the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean, and military cooperation between Athens and Jerusalem.
The same line, stripped of diplomatic pretense, was articulated by former Erdoğan adviser İbrahim Karagül, who issued threats in an article, writing that the Greek islands would “change hands within a week,” that a new map would be drawn in the Aegean and Western Thrace, and that in Cyprus, “what was left unfinished in 1974 will be completed.” If Turkish forces in the occupied northern part of Cyprus are hit, he wrote, Turkey would target Israelis in Cyprus and on the islands.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan himself described cooperation among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel as an example of Turkey’s “encirclement” and acknowledged that Turkey has issued warnings to those involved. The trilateral relationship troubles Ankara because it undermines the core of its neo-Ottoman strategy: to make Turkey the indispensable intermediary in the Eastern Mediterranean and give it a say in the decisions of its neighbors.
This is why Erdoğan’s statements from Ahlat on the anniversary of the 1071 Battle of Manzikert also matter. Against the backdrop of the Seljuk Turkish defeat of the Byzantine Empire and the capture of its ruler, Erdoğan declared that Turkey “will not allow” plans that seek to derail its own regional course.
The resumption of maritime surveys in coming months could provoke further naval harassment of the European survey vessel.
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan belongs to the same framework. Fidan described it as equivalent to NATO’s Article 5: An attack against one member is considered an attack against all. Ankara is thus building a second regional security architecture, combining Saudi financing, Pakistani military power, and Turkey’s defense industry.
The resumption of maritime surveys in coming months could provoke further naval harassment of the European survey vessel, competing navigational notices, a naval deployment, or a controlled armed incident in which the first hours could decide everything. The presence of Greek F-16s in Paphos and a frigate in the area shows that the danger is serious.
The Great Sea Interconnector must be laid. It requires European, French, Israeli, and Cypriot political backing, but above all credible Greek military deterrence and certainty that there is a willingness to use force. If Turkey repeats the Kasos episode and Greece again backs down, Turkey will have both stopped the Great Sea Interconnector and enforced the illegal Turkey-Libya memorandum and, by extension, established that no project in the Eastern Mediterranean can proceed without its permission.
