Syria’s Islamist rulers make little effort to conceal their ambitions to reshape the country along Islamist lines. Unlike the Taliban’s rapid Islamization campaign in Afghanistan in 2021, however, they appear to be pursuing a gradual, incremental approach since seizing power in late 2024.
This strategy reflects an understanding of Syria’s complex social and sectarian diversity, where sweeping ideological imposition could provoke domestic and international backlash, as well as a recognition that regional and international support remains essential to consolidating the regime’s legitimacy.
Damascus appears to feel less constrained by non-Islamist alternatives as it advances toward its ultimate objective of Islamizing ... society at large.
Shortly after capturing Damascus, interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa moved swiftly to place trusted commanders from his Islamist Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in key senior positions within the interim government. At the same time, he embedded loyal jihadist allies, including foreign fighters, into the emerging defense establishment. In the fluid and chaotic environment of those early months, such consolidation did not take much effort. With the security apparatus consolidated, extending this strategy into the civilian governance structure became the next step. Al-Sharaa appointed loyal Islamists and family members across ministries and provincial administrations to ensure a methodical transformation at all levels of government.
The Kurdish liberal experiment represented a significant obstacle to al-Sharaa and his Islamist agenda. Now that it has largely been curtailed through military force, Damascus appears to feel less constrained by non-Islamist alternatives as it advances toward its ultimate objective of Islamizing not only state institutions but society at large.
Recent developments in the coastal province of Latakia illustrate this approach. Latakia is a diverse province, where Alawis make up a majority, alongside significant Christian and Sunni communities. The closure of alcohol-selling establishments during Ramadan, which was enforced through shop sealings and written pledges, signals a willingness by the authorities to align public space with religious observance. Similarly, a decision by Latakia’s governor to prohibit female government employees from wearing makeup during work hours reflects an attempt to regulate personal appearance in line with more conservative interpretations of public morality. While officials frame these measures as administrative or professional regulations, taken together they suggest a strategy aimed at embedding Islamist norms into everyday governance and social life.
There also have been instances of dress codes imposed on women on Fridays, along with other restrictions targeting students on college campuses across the country.
This incremental introduction of stringent laws appears designed to achieve two objectives: first, to test the limits of domestic and international tolerance and, second, to implement political and social changes in ways that may prove durable precisely because they unfold gradually rather than abruptly.
[Al-Sharaa’s] actions increasingly resemble those of a leader who is determined to alter social norms that many Syrians had long taken for granted.
While it may appear to threaten only non-Muslim and non-Sunni communities, the regime’s Islamization campaign primarily targets Sunnis itself. Sunni communities in major urban centers such as Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs are ideologically diverse. Although many are socially conservative, most do not subscribe to the Salafist orientation associated with al-Sharaa’s government. In this sense, the campaign is not only about redefining minority-majority relations, but also about reshaping the religious and social character of Sunni public life.
In March 2025, Syria’s foreign ministry announced the creation of the General Secretariat for Political Affairs, a body tasked with managing political activities in the country. The move was akin to similar centralization drives under the former ruling Baath party. Because such responsibilities do not normally fall under the mandate of the foreign ministry, the most plausible explanation is this unit represents an extension of the so-called “political affairs administration” operated by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which was headed by current Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani when the group governed an enclave in northwestern Syria. In Idlib, it was responsible for suppressing political dissent and issuing directives aimed at curtailing personal freedoms for those living under the rule of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. As was the case then, this unit appears to be responsible for overseeing and monitoring political activities, including those considered morally unacceptable by the Islamists.
There is no longer any illusion about the prospect of a genuine democratic transition in Syria under al-Sharaa, but his actions increasingly resemble those of a leader who is determined to alter social norms that many Syrians had long taken for granted, even under the Assads’ dictatorship.
Damascus has succeeded at weakening the liberal Kurdish forces in northeast Syria, where American troops are beginning to withdraw. More than ever before, al-Sharaa’s regime appears emboldened, creating the conditions to impose even stricter controls over both political and social life in the country.
