U.S.-Israeli Strikes Expose Scale of Iran’s Missile Infrastructure

The Iranian response to the March 2026 U.S.–Israeli air campaign underscores the scale and resilience of Iran’s missile capabilities. It has taken thousands of combat flights and hundreds of strikes on missile-related targets to begin degrading Tehran’s ability to project force across the Middle East and beyond.

The sheer extent of Iran’s missile infrastructure, much of it buried underground, is now becoming clear. One site southwest of the central city of Yazd is reportedly embedded in a granite mountain, with sections reaching depths of up to 1,500 feet. The complex is said to include rail tunnels capable of moving missiles to launch points and then withdrawing them into a maze of underground passages. Reports indicate that the site has been struck multiple times, with some damage inflicted but the core structure remaining intact.

Another major “missile city” lies between Tehran and Karaj. Satellite imagery suggests a footprint comparable in size to Karaj itself, an urban area of nearly two million people.

According to available estimates, Iran maintains around ten major missile cities, alongside at least seventeen additional missile bases. Many are concentrated in western Iran, offering shorter flight times to Israel, and in the south along the Persian Gulf. These sites are believed to house between 2,500 and 6,000 ballistic missiles, in addition to an unknown number of cruise, anti-ship, and shorter-range systems capable of striking targets within a few hundred miles.

For years, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps showcased images of these underground complexes, often featuring senior commanders touring vast tunnel networks. Many Iranians dismissed these displays as propaganda, assuming the same facilities were being recycled to project strength.

That assumption now appears to be wrong. Analysts long believed that Tehran had imposed a range ceiling of roughly 1,500 miles, sufficient to target Israel. Yet the launch of missiles toward the joint U.S.–British base at Diego Garcia—over 2,600 miles away—suggests the existence of longer-range systems, bringing much of Europe within Iran’s reach.

This realization has fueled domestic frustration. Many Iranians are increasingly critical of the resources devoted to missile infrastructure while the economy has deteriorated over the past two decades. Poverty has expanded significantly, particularly since 2018, when renewed U.S. sanctions followed Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement. Despite mounting economic pressure, the government continued to prioritize military capabilities and regional influence, including support for allied armed groups.

The financial scale of the missile infrastructure alone is substantial. European Commission estimates suggest a tunnel built in hard rock can cost up to $40 million per kilometer, or more than $60 million per mile. With special military hardening and operational support, the cost can climb to $80 million per kilometer. Just one of the main Iranian subterranean missile cities is said to have thirty miles of tunnels. Therefore, one complex could have easily cost at least $4 billion. So, Iran spent more than $100 billion just on twenty-seven underground missile facilities, without considering the money needed to develop and produce thousands of ballistic missiles.

There are no official figures for the total cost of Iran’s missile program. However, given the importance of the missile program for Tehran, it can be inferred the regime directed as much as 30 percent of military spending over the past three decades toward missile capabilities. Iran’s official defense budget, typically around $7–8 billion annually, captures only part of the picture. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated institutions draw on significant off-budget resources, including oil allocations, contracting networks, and extensive holdings in sectors such as construction, energy, and telecommunications. These parallel revenue streams allow the state to fund strategic programs beyond formal budget constraints.

In the most recent budget, the Revolutionary Guard reportedly was allocated up to 600,000 barrels of oil per day for export, potentially generating around $15 billion in revenue. If total Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-related military spending is conservatively estimated at $18 billion annually, with roughly one-third devoted to missiles, the cumulative investment over thirty years could approach $200 billion, or perhaps $300 billion when including underground infrastructure and related facilities.

For context, Iran has earned roughly $1.4 trillion from oil exports over the same period, suggesting that missile development and associated infrastructure may have absorbed more than one-fifth of those revenues.

But missiles are only one component of Iran’s broader strategy. The government has also invested in its nuclear program, regional proxy networks, religious outreach, and domestic security. International sanctions have accompanied these expenditures, further constraining economic growth.

Taken together, these priorities help to explain a central paradox: Despite its vast natural resources, including major oil reserves and the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves, living standards in Iran have declined. Regime propaganda may blame sanctions or outside powers, but the money the Iranian leadership has invested in covert programs suggests a different reality.