Greece and Egypt have steadily deepened ties in the Eastern Mediterranean, mainly based on delineated maritime boundaries and joint security. Their 2020 agreement on exclusive economic zones challenged Turkey’s deal with Libya and brought Athens and Cairo into closer alignment. Yet, as Turkey has deepened its role in Libya—including outreach to eastern authorities—the limits of Greek-Egyptian cooperation have become clear.
Egypt’s warmer ties with Ankara show that agreement on maritime issues does not always mean the two countries share a broader approach to Turkey’s regional ambitions.
Turkey can now build ties with both sides in Libya, making it harder for Greece and Egypt to use their old relationships to counter Turkish influence.
Recent developments demonstrate this shift. On October 15, 2026, Greek and Egyptian officials met in Athens to talk about Libya’s future, security, and maritime disputes. Five days later, Libya’s Benghazi-based House of Representatives, which earlier had rejected the deal, approved the maritime memorandum Turkey signed with Tripoli in 2019. This marks a turning point: Turkey can now build ties with both sides in Libya, making it harder for Greece and Egypt to use their old relationships to counter Turkish influence.
Athens and Cairo have gone beyond issuing diplomatic protests. Greece argues that the Turkish-Libyan memorandum ignores the maritime rights of Crete and other Greek islands, while Egypt contends that it violates its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. On October 22, their foreign ministers agreed to keep discussing an eastward extension of their 2020 maritime delimitation agreement—a sign of ongoing partnership and coordination. However, the extent of any extension remains unclear, especially near Kastellorizo, where maritime claims are particularly sensitive.
Egypt is also preparing a legal challenge to the memorandum, even as it continues to improve relations with Turkey. On October 23, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Istanbul and reiterated Egypt’s opposition to the agreement. The meeting kept lines of communication open: Fidan acknowledged Egypt’s concerns and backed more talks. Cairo continues to push back on Ankara’s maritime claims, while simultaneously working to improve bilateral ties.
Egypt’s approach is shaped by practical concerns. Instability in Libya—on Egypt’s border—impacts its security. Cairo’s relationship with eastern Libyan leaders is important, but Field Marshal Khalid Haftar’s support for the memorandum has complicated Egypt’s position. To protect its interests, Egypt often engages pragmatically, even with rivals like Turkey. As Turkish involvement in Libya increases, Cairo sees the benefit of staying engaged with Ankara rather than letting a single dispute overshadow the broader relationship.
Greece faces different priorities. The memorandum threatens Athens’ claims south of Crete, so blocking its acceptance is a top diplomatic concern. While Egypt cares about Libya’s stability and border security, it focuses on maintaining influence. Greece instead faces direct challenges to its sovereignty and needs to diversify its diplomatic efforts by building ties with all Libyan factions. As Turkey strengthens its foothold, Athens and Cairo must adapt—working together, where possible, while also pursuing independent outreach. Their partnership is durable, but its long-term success depends on flexibility, dialogue, and the ability to navigate competing interests.
These differences do not undermine the bilateral cooperation, but they do set its boundaries. Athens should focus on practical overlap, such as updating the maritime agreement, to keep coordination strong. At the same time, Greece needs to develop its own relationships with Libya’s rival authorities. Turkey’s deeper engagement in eastern Libya is a reminder that a broader, more flexible approach is essential.
Their partnership is durable, but its long-term success depends on flexibility, dialogue, and the ability to navigate competing interests.
The United States is also watching closely. After first calling for talks, the State Department called the memorandum’s ratification “provocative” on October 25. It urged Greece and Turkey—both NATO allies—to settle differences through dialogue.
Washington’s reaction shows it wants to avoid tension among allies. But this dispute isn’t just about Greece and Turkey—Egypt and Libya also have stakes. Uncertainty over maritime boundaries could slow energy exploration and investment. The U.S. wants negotiated solutions but shouldn’t ignore the rights of other countries affected by the agreement.
For Greece, U.S. diplomacy helps but cannot substitute for a broader regional plan. Washington also needs to realize that Turkey’s growing role in Libya affects several American partners, not just Greece, and its own interest in stability in the region as well.
The latest changes do not signal a crisis in Greek-Egyptian ties, as both governments still oppose the Turkish-Libyan memorandum and are seeking new ways to cooperate. Greece and Egypt can remain partners even if they approach Turkey differently. How they manage these differences, however, will determine what they achieve together in the region.
