On November 17, 2026, North Macedonian and Greek security services dismantled an Iranian-directed assassination plot that exposes a growing security blind spot in southeastern Europe. Working together since early 2026, North Macedonia’s Agency for National Security and Greece’s National Intelligence Service arrested five North Macedonian citizens—four in Skopje and one in Greece, whom they later extradited—while a sixth suspect remains at large. Operating under direct instructions from Iranian national Edris Jahangiri Mavaneh, a state collaborator linked to drug lord Naji Sharifi Zindashti, the cell conducted preparatory logistical work to assassinate an Israeli executive of a Greece-based company. Upon raiding the suspects, authorities seized weapons, ammunition, handwritten notes, and maps marking specific target locations.
Cyprus hosts almost 20,000 Israelis who regard the island as home, with 3,851 property transfers and sale contracts involving Israeli buyers recorded between 2021 and 2024 in Larnaca, Paphos, and Limassol alone.
This disrupted plot is not an isolated incident, but the latest operational use of a decades-old foothold. Iranian operatives originally exploited Balkan territory during the 1992–95 Bosnian War, when IRGC units shipped around 14,000 tonnes of arms through Croatia to Bosniak forces between May 1994 and January 1996. Through those wartime smuggling routes, Tehran built lasting intelligence and criminal networks that regional authorities never fully dismantled.
Today, expanding Israeli communities sit directly inside this vulnerable geography. Cyprus hosts almost 20,000 Israelis who regard the island as home, with 3,851 property transfers and sale contracts involving Israeli buyers recorded between 2021 and 2024 in Larnaca, Paphos, and Limassol alone. Another 10,000-plus Israelis relocated to Greece amid post-2023 departures from Israel. These populations live astride NATO and EU territory that Iranian intelligence treats as permissive operating space, relying heavily on criminal proxies for plausible deniability. Across Europe, this outsourced terror model is accelerating: researchers documented 54 Iranian external operations between 2021 and 2024, sixteen of which used criminal perpetrators. In the United Kingdom alone, MI5 recorded 25 Iranian-backed plots targeting residents since January 2022, leading to more than fifty related arrests in the past twelve months.
Beyond the immediate threat to civilians, the region holds vital strategic value for Western defense. Balkan states control critical air and land corridors between the Eastern Mediterranean and Central Europe, while Greek and Cypriot bases host key NATO assets. Deeply embedded criminal structures in countries like North Macedonia supply ready-made cutouts for Tehran, as the November 2026 plot proved. While Mossad and its partner services have shown operational effectiveness in discrete cases, the lack of a standing, institutionalized mechanism leaves dangerous gaps that Iranian operatives routinely exploit across borders.
To close these intelligence seams, Mossad should establish a permanent Balkan Counter-Proxy Fusion Cell headquartered in Nicosia. Staffed by niche expert liaison officers from Mossad, Greece’s EYP, Cyprus’s KYP, North Macedonia’s ANB, and selected services from Albania, Serbia, and Bulgaria, this hub would transform regional coordination. This cell must maintain a real-time shared watchlist of Iranian-linked criminal enablers, fuse travel, financial, and communications data under mutually agreed protocols, and trigger coordinated interdictions within hours, not months. Participating services should also rotate officers through joint training cycles focused on proxy detection and criminal-network mapping, converting episodic cooperation into a standing geostrategic capability.
Alongside intelligence fusion, partner services should create Joint Proxy Disruption Units that treat Tehran’s criminal intermediaries—figures such as Zindashti and their local associates—as primary targets. These units must compile a shared database of the financial flows, property holdings, and logistics networks used by Iranian proxies, then execute simultaneous asset freezes, travel bans, and arrests under coordinated legal frameworks. Under this division of labor, Mossad supplies technical collection and targeting support while Balkan services lead domestic arrests, raising the operational cost of proxy use and stripping Tehran of its coveted deniability.
Flagging high-risk movements before operatives ever reach Greek or Cypriot territory would enable preemptive disruption rather than post-plot arrests, safeguarding both Israeli residents and vital regional infrastructure.
Finally, the Jewish state and its Balkan partners should also deploy a predictive Balkan Periphery Shield to stop threats before they materialize. This initiative would combine pre-positioned rapid-response teams with AI-driven anomaly detection monitoring border crossings, maritime traffic, and financial transfers between Iran, Turkey, and the region. At the same time, a permanent Mossad-Balkan Red Cell would run quarterly war games on Iranian proxy scenarios, inject realistic exercise data into local services, and refine early-warning indicators. Flagging high-risk movements before operatives ever reach Greek or Cypriot territory would enable preemptive disruption rather than post-plot arrests, safeguarding both Israeli residents and vital regional infrastructure.
Tehran exploits the Balkans as a cheap, deniable backdoor into the West only because Jerusalem and its allies still treat counter-proxy defense as a reactive afterthought. Unless Mossad and its Balkan partners institutionalize forward deterrence from Nicosia to Skopje now, the next Iranian hit squad will succeed in killing Israelis.
Jose Lev Alvarez is an American-Israeli scholar specializing in International Security Policy. A multilingual veteran of the Israel Defense Forces’ Special Forces and the U.S. Army, he holds a B.S. in Neuroscience with a Minor in Israel Studies (The American University-Washington, DC), a Medical Degree (CUCOM), and three Master’s Degrees in International Geostrategy and Yihadist Terrorism (INISEG-Madrid / Pegaso University-Napoli), Applied Economics (UNED-Madrid), and Intelligence and Security Studies (Bellevue University-Nebraska). He is currently completing a Ph.D. in Intelligence and Global Security at Capitol Technology University in Laurel, Maryland. His dissertation is titled “From Periphery to Core: Inverting Israel’s Doctrine of the Periphery Through an Emerging Abrahamic Security Network.” Alvarez is a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum, a columnist for Homeland Security Today, a contributor to the Washington Examiner, a blogger for The Times of Israel, and a member of the Association for Israel Studies. He regularly provides geopolitical analysis on Fox Noticias, NTN24, Telemundo, Univision, and other Spanish-language media outlets serving audiences across Latin America.
How an Israel-Venezuela Pact Can Curb Iran’s Reach
Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Arab oil embargo, Israeli leaders—under the periphery doctrine—deliberately cultivated non-Arab partners to secure energy supplies and deny adversaries strategic depth. Today, that same cold-eyed calculation points directly to Venezuela. Throughout 2024, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez repeatedly condemned Israeli operations in Gaza and described them as “genocide,” a “systematic plan of extermination,” and “Zionist fascism.” Yet after she assumed power following the January 2026 U.S. operation that removed dictator Nicolás Maduro, Caracas’s behavior shifted dramatically. First, Venezuela shipped its first crude cargo to Israel’s Bazan Group refinery in Haifa since 2020. Next, when double earthquakes of magnitudes 7.2 and 7.5 struck the Caribbean nation on June 24, 2026, Israeli Home Front Command engineers and aid teams were allowed to deploy to assess damaged buildings and transfer recovery protocols, prompting Rodríguez to thank the mission publicly. Building on this goodwill, the two governments restored consular services after a 17-year rupture dating back to 2009. Then, on November 16, 2026, a Venezuelan technical delegation arrived in Israel for the IPRED VII conference, marking the first official Venezuelan presence in the country since Hugo Chávez’s regime severed ties.
To lock in these strategic and economic gains, Israel should restore full diplomatic relations by reopening its embassy in Caracas, appointing an ambassador, and stationing military attachés.
This diplomatic opening arrives at a critical economic moment, as Israeli drivers currently pay among the world’s highest petrol prices. Specifically, mid-November 2026 figures place Israel fourth or fifth globally, with pump prices near $2.55 per liter (roughly 185 pence)—more than 60 percent above the global average and the highest in the Middle East. Consequently, securing preferential access to Venezuelan heavy crude has the potential to reduce this acute economic burden that consistently affects the lives of Israelis.
To lock in these strategic and economic gains, Israel should restore full diplomatic relations by reopening its embassy in Caracas, appointing an ambassador, and stationing military attachés. Rather than policing Venezuela’s domestic political arrangements, Jerusalem should focus exclusively on measurable, enforceable deliverables. Under a proposed five-year offtake agreement, Venezuela must commit to delivering at least 60,000 barrels per day of heavy crude FOB to Haifa (or an agreed intermediate port), priced at a fixed $8–12 discount to dated Brent and verified by joint independent inspection at both loading and discharge. In exchange, the Jewish state should supply modular construction equipment and dual-use AI systems to accelerate post-earthquake reconstruction. Simultaneously, Israeli trainers should replace aging Russian and Chinese inventories—specifically coastal radars, older air-defense radars, and basic UAVs—with advanced Israeli systems in electronic warfare, persistent surveillance drones, and precision munitions, while standing up two interoperable coastal and counter-narcotics units. Crucially, failing to meet volume or inspection thresholds for any two consecutive months would automatically suspend further equipment deliveries and training rotations until compliance resumes.
Beyond energy and defense hardware, any bilateral pact must dismantle Tehran’s regional foothold. Accordingly, Caracas must expel all remaining Iranian, Hezbollah, and Hamas networks that have long treated Isla Margarita’s duty-free zone as a logistics and training node, while extraditing individuals wanted for terrorism offenses to Israeli or allied jurisdictions. Once Israeli special-operations advisors and intelligence liaison officers clear those networks, they should establish a permanent joint interdiction cell on Margarita itself. Operating on the ground, this initiative would conduct continuous maritime surveillance of the island’s approaches, execute joint document and financial investigations, and command a small, Israeli-trained Venezuelan rapid-reaction unit dedicated to countering smuggling and proxy financing. To prevent backsliding, Israeli personnel would retain independent access to the surveillance feed alongside the unilateral right to pause cooperation if designated terrorists remain on the island.
Ultimately, these coordinated steps extend Israel’s classic periphery doctrine into the Caribbean without requiring Jerusalem to endorse any domestic Venezuelan political outcome.
To ensure Caracas can uphold these commitments without fearing internal coups or Iranian retaliation, Israel would also install a compact protective architecture for senior Venezuelan leadership—replacing the low-capability Cuban detail that failed to protect Maduro with a system that improves upon earlier Israeli programs designed for Morocco’s king and Cameroon’s Paul Biya. Specifically, former IDF officers and specialized contractors should deploy a Continuum Lattice integrating three core layers: a persistent high-altitude pseudo-satellite network fused in real time with a ground sensor mesh of acoustic, seismic, and optical nodes; AI behavioral classifiers trained on Israeli close-protection datasets to flag anomalous movement around protected principals; and three pre-positioned, Israeli-led rapid-reaction cells equipped with organic medical and extraction capabilities. Furthermore, this lattice must operate under a dual-key protocol with CIA counterparts, allowing either side to trigger an elevated alert or an immediate extraction without prior public coordination. By maintaining continuous sensor coverage and automatic escalation thresholds, the Continuum Lattice would also provide dual-use capabilities that bolster national disaster response.
Ultimately, these coordinated steps extend Israel’s classic periphery doctrine into the Caribbean without requiring Jerusalem to endorse any domestic Venezuelan political outcome. By securing guaranteed crude volumes from the country with the biggest oil reserves in the world, physically uprooting Iranian proxies from a vital hemispheric soft underbelly, and replacing Chinese and Russian hardware with Western-aligned systems, the State of Israel advances its most concrete national security interests. In international politics, states that lock in tangible, verifiable gains steadily expand their strategic options, while those paralyzed by past rhetoric remain dangerously exposed to both price shocks and distant threats. Jerusalem must act now in Venezuela.
Published originally on November 18, 2026.