Tehran Apologizes for Gulf Arab Strikes as Missile Capability Crumbles

Iran’s armed forces attacked neighboring countries after losing their leadership and acting on their own initiative, President Masoud Pezeshkian said in a televised address on March 7, 2026. He also vowed to halt all such attacks.
“I must apologize to the neighboring countries that came under attack from Iran. … I express regret,” Pezeshkian said. “With their commanders gone, our armed forces—ready to sacrifice their lives—acted on their own initiative and carried out the necessary measures, defending our homeland with honor.”

Pezeshkian also rejected President Donald Trump’s demand for unconditional surrender. “The enemy should take such dreams to the grave if they imagine that we would surrender unconditionally,” he said, adding that international law must be respected.

Meanwhile, bombardment by the United States and Israel continued overnight, particularly in western Tehran and around the old international airport at Mehrabad, which also hosts military facilities. One Tehran resident wrote early in the morning that “last night saw unusually heavy airstrikes. Areas around Mehrabad, Lavizan, and Koohak shook repeatedly with the sound of explosions—blasts that continued deep into the night and kept the city on edge.”

Pezeshkian’s claim that Iranian forces acted independently after losing their leadership appears less convincing when compared with the scale and coordination of the initial attacks. Iranian forces began launching missiles and drones toward the United Arab Emirates almost immediately after hostilities began on the morning of February 28, 2026. On the first day alone, Iran reportedly fired 137 missiles and 209 drones toward the United Arab Emirates.

Such a large and coordinated salvo does not resemble the behavior of disorganized units acting on their own. Sporadic launches might have suggested confusion. Instead, Iran also targeted Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait within hours, pointing to a pre-planned regional operation.

It is true that Israeli and U.S. strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several senior commanders in the opening phase of the war. But the suggestion that Iranian forces lacked command and control on February 28 sounds more like political rhetoric than a realistic assessment. Tehran had threatened repeatedly before the war to escalate any conflict into a regional confrontation.

Pezeshkian said that a three-member interim leadership council—consisting of himself, the head of the judiciary, and a senior cleric—met on March 6 and decided to order the armed forces to stop attacks against neighboring countries, unless attacks originate from there. However, he did not mention the Strait of Hormuz, which remains the world’s most critical oil transit chokepoint. Roughly one-fifth of globally traded crude oil normally passes through the narrow waterway each day. Even the threat of disruption can send energy markets into turmoil. Since Tehran warned that it could target vessels moving through the strait, many ships have slowed or waited offshore for clearer security conditions, pushing oil prices higher and rattling global markets.

Pezeshkian’s remarks raise additional questions. Do they mean the political leadership has now regained control over the armed forces? If anything has changed since February 28, it is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has lost additional commanders and suffered losses at multiple bases. These developments strengthen the argument that command and control existed from the beginning, rather than being suddenly restored amid the fog of war.

What has clearly changed is Iran’s ability to sustain large missile and drone attacks. Persistent strikes by Israeli and U.S. air forces have steadily degraded Iran’s launch capabilities. During the first forty-eight hours of the war, Iran fired hundreds of missiles. In recent days, however, it has managed only a few dozen launches per day, most of which air defenses intercept.

Faced with these losses, Tehran now appears eager to portray restraint as a choice rather than a necessity. Since Pezeshkian’s announcement is conditional, Tehran can always launch harassing attacks against its Persian Gulf neighbors, claiming hostile fire from their territories. Despite dwindling capabilities, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps can always find a way to hit these countries to keep the region tense.