Despite President Donald Trump striking an optimistic tone and hinting at “pretty good news” regarding Iran on April 17, 2026, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz escalated the next day, as at least two merchant vessels came under fire while attempting to transit the waterway. The incidents happened just hours after Iran announced it was reimposing military control over the Strait, citing continued U.S. enforcement of a naval blockade on Iranian ports and what Tehran described as repeated violations.
The move reversed a brief reopening agreed to days earlier under a temporary ceasefire framework and coincided with renewed warnings issued by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and media, underscoring the fragility of the current pause in fighting as its expiration approaches.
Trump has hinted that Tehran will give up its 60 percent-enriched uranium, which led to sharp reactions from Iranian hardliners.
In recent days, Trump has spoken of successful negotiations with some Iranian counterparts, centered around Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Trump has hinted that Tehran will give up its 60 percent-enriched uranium, which led to sharp reactions from Iranian hardliners. Some even called for the arrest and execution of negotiators, saying they engaged in treason.
Radical Islamist politician and former presidential candidate Saeed Jalili challenged earlier claims that the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has endorsed the talks and concessions to the United States. “If all these are commands from the leader, then he should record an audio or video message and issue it publicly,” he reportedly said.
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been directly heard from or seen in public since his father died in the first moments of the U.S.-Israel air campaign on February 28, 2026. Many Iranians and analysts assume he is either dead or incapacitated and that unknown elements—most likely from the Revolutionary Guard—are issuing written statements in his name.
Social media posts from prominent hardliners in Iran revealed shock and disgust over what Trump claimed were the tentative results of behind-the-scenes negotiations. Ghalibaf himself rejected Trump’s claims in a post that some observers noted was issued after the U.S. markets closed on April 17. Some claimed that even the timing of the denial was coordinated with Washington.
Ghalibaf said the U.S. president “made seven claims in one hour, all seven of which were false”; that the United States could not “win the war with these lies, and they certainly will not get anywhere in negotiations either”; and that if the blockade continues, the Strait of Hormuz will not remain open.
Targeting of oil tankers on April 18 was an indication that either Trump made optimistic assumptions or he put Ghalibaf in an embarrassing position by claiming what amounted to be an almost complete Iranian surrender.
Whether intentionally or not, Trump’s claims put the hardcore elements of the Iranian regime in disarray. “The handover of enriched uranium is not merely a technical nuclear concession; it is also a political-psychological blow to the pillars of deterrence and the prestige of the Velayat-e Faqih system,” an Iranian observer abroad noted.
There is also the possibility that the Iranian regime is again using “good cop/bad cop” tactics ... by having hardliners condemn any concession.
On April 17, hardline politician Alaeddin Boroujerdi declared that Iran will not retreat from its positions, asserting that Iranian missile strikes caused extensive destruction in parts of Tel Aviv and that Tehran hit U.S. bases during the war. He added that the United States and Israel had “begged” for negotiations early on and warned that Iran is moving to formalize measures over the Strait of Hormuz to turn it into a source of revenue.
There is also the possibility that the Iranian regime is again using “good cop/bad cop” tactics, as they did in the past during nuclear talks, by having hardliners condemn any concession. While then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was negotiating with the Obama administration, hardline figures—including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and conservative politicians—simultaneously issued threats, rejected concessions, and warned against trusting the West. During the negotiations, Revolutionary Guard officials publicly expanded missile tests and criticized the talks, while then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei alternated between conditional backing and sharp skepticism.
This dual-track messaging allowed Tehran to maintain negotiating space: Diplomats could appear pragmatic and open to compromise, while hardliners raised the cost of failure and signaled limits—effectively reinforcing Iran’s leverage at the table.
