Saudi Arabia once again returns to old habits. Impervious to any lessons since the start of Yemen’s civil war in March 2015, the Kingdom has empowered the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliate al-Islah across Yemeni provinces freed from Houthi rule. In December 2025, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ordered his Saudi proxies to move against Aidarous al-Zuybadi’s South Forces who had taken control of Hadhramawt province. To eliminate the perceived threat, Saudi Arabia not only launched air strikes against southern forces but also mobilized dozens of units led by Islah-affiliated commanders and Salafi leaders.
Saudi Arabia not only launched air strikes against southern forces but also mobilized dozens of units led by Islah-affiliated commanders and Salafi leaders.
Rebalancing the governing equation in February 2026 flipped the Saudi strategy on its head, dismantling not only the idea of coalition government under the Presidential Leadership Council, but also the idea of collective defense under the Riyadh Agreement of 2019. Saudi Arabia’s reversal reflected a series of failures to address Houthi intransigence and marginalized the southern issue, deepening the failure of the Riyadh Agreement, whose goal was to forge both a unified front among Houthi rivals and address southern grievances against decades of atrocities committed by the Sana’a regime.
Al-Islah’s defeat across southern Yemen had largely marginalized the group in November 2019 and relegated it to just one seat on Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council. As a consequence of Islah’s collapse in the south, the Riyadh Agreement recognized Aidarous and the Southern Transitional Council as legitimate representatives of the people in the south. Bin Salman reversed all this in a fit of pique that began with a conflict initiated by Hadramawt Deputy Governor Amr bin Habrish.
Although the southern council and the former ruling party, the General People’s Congress, have lost major ground, al-Islah could still emerge as the major loser despite Saudi Arabia’s effort to return it to power. First, the Trump administration might soon designate the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate. Second, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated no Yemeni faction should trust it.
While Islah may relish the gains made under Saudi patronage, it may have bitten off more than it can chew. Saudi authorities may have removed Aidarous and former Hadramawt Governor Faraj al-Bahsani from the Presidential Council, but Saudi Arabia dominates the new Supreme Military Committee.
There are some in Yemen who also believe Saudi Arabia would entertain a Houthi-Islah coalition rather than recognize the southern desire for independence.
Saudi Arabia, which has hosted Islah’s leaders since September 2014, endures a tense relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood since the Kingdom banned the organization in March 2014. Saudi Arabia may work with Islah, but only cynically, as a tool and under the logic of keeping enemies close. The crown prince likely recognizes al-Islah is dependent on foreign patronage, without grassroots support across Yemen, and so sees it as a tool to wield against stronger Yemeni factions, such as the southern contingent or remnants of the former ruling party. There are some in Yemen who also believe Saudi Arabia would entertain a Houthi-Islah coalition rather than recognize the southern desire for independence.
Saudi authorities are short-sighted. With its current mix of tribal, merchant, Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood elements, al-Islah remains a potential threat to Saudi Arabia’s monarchy. Were the Sunni Islamist party to emerge as a major political or military force along Saudi Arabia’s southern border, it could empower the Kingdom’s own Islamists. Although Aidarous and his allies weakened Islah politically, it continues to exert influence in Marib and Taiz, though the inability of Islah to rid the outskirts of both cities of Houthis for over a decade reflects Islah’s domestic weakness.
Tensions are sure to escalate in coming weeks across the south as masses continue to protest the banning of the Southern Transitional Council, a group not without critics but one that enjoyed widespread popularity. Saudi proxy and Islah forces have once again responded to demonstrations with live fire on unarmed protesters, making it likely that Saudi Arabia could provoke a major uprising, one for which Islah will pay the price.
