The April 28, 2026, meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, came on the heels of increasing tensions among its six monarchies. Oman’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Badr al-Busaidi’s March 18, 2026, opinion essay asking “America’s friends” to help “extricate it from an unlawful war,” and his justification of Iranian attacks on non-combatant Arab states as “retaliation,” insulted his Arab neighbors. For Gulf Cooperation Council members coming under Iranian missile and drone fire, Al-Busaidi sounded like an apologist for Iranian aggression—a perception furthered by Oman’s April 25, 2026, welcome for Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Oman’s troubling relationship with Yemen’s Houthi rebels.
Oman has benefitted over other Gulf Cooperation Council states because its ports are situated outside the Strait of Hormuz.
The relationship between the Sultanate of Oman and the Islamic Republic of Iran extends beyond cordial friendship; it remains vital to Oman’s economy and security. Analysts point out that during the current conflict, Oman has benefitted over other Gulf Cooperation Council states because its ports are situated outside the Strait of Hormuz, unaffected by Iran’s aggression; Omani ports have reported seen a 117 percent increase in exports during the war. Al-Busaidi and Sultan Haitham bin Tariq’s embrace of Araghchi while the Islamic Republic’s chief diplomat was enroute from Islamabad to Moscow, suggests that Muscat—bitter about being caught off guard by the U.S. attack on Iran and seeing its mediator role collapse—now chooses Iran’s side.
Since start of the war on February 28, 2026, Iran has launched perhaps 4,000 drones, rockets, and missiles at neighboring Gulf Arab states, shocking economies and stressing air defense. Iranian missiles reportedly caused severe damage to military bases in the Gulf Arab states and Jordan, and targeted infrastructure facilities from oil and gas storage facilities to desalination plants. Gulf monarchies so far have tolerated Tehran’s aggression but pledged “their ‘defensive’ stance won’t last forever,” indirectly placing Muscat in an awkward position.
Oman will also come into the diplomatic, if not military, crosshairs as Iran’s plan to “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz cannot happen without Oman’s cooperation. Iran has hinted at a partnership with Oman to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and charge a toll per ship. Gulf Arab monarchies reject this plan and, in Jeddah, condemned treating freedom of navigation as a bargaining chip. Beyond collecting tolls on foreign vessels, Oman may seek to play a role in the post-war era as Iran’s expanded financial hub and to protect Tehran from future U.S. and European sanctions. Iran already offers Oman “preferential trade” status and, in September 2025, pledged to double bilateral trade to $5 billion.
If Oman shatters Arab unity in favor of Persian empowerment, its Gulf Cooperation Council partners likely will not forgive it.
Gulf Arab monarchies have demanded a seat at the table during any future peace talks with Iran, though it is unclear how meetings in Islamabad have advanced this demand. Tensions will remain high among Gulf Arab monarchies in a post-war period vis-à-vis Iran, but even more so vis-à-vis Oman as Gulf states will remain cautious over Muscat’s profiteering and relationship with Tehran. If Oman shatters Arab unity in favor of Persian empowerment, its Gulf Cooperation Council partners likely will not forgive it.
The Sultanate can neither unilaterally assist vessels to avoid Iran’s aggression nor side with Iran without consequence. Indeed, while the Gulf Cooperation Council formed in 1981 to augment Gulf Arab security against Iranian aggression on the philosophy that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, Muscat’s pivot toward Tehran in time of crisis may simply confirm Gulf Cooperation Council irrelevance and encourage Iranian leaders to become more even aggressive toward the Persian Gulf’s smaller Arab states like Kuwait, Bahrain, and perhaps even Qatar.
