Russia’s return to Syria after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime was inevitable. The October 15, 2025, meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Moscow did not make a reset or a recalibration of relations, but rather, a restart following a months-long hiatus. The visit was simply a culmination of a series of meetings between top Russian and Syrian officials in Moscow and Damascus in recent months.
During the meeting with Putin, al-Sharaa said his government would “respect all agreements signed with Russia” by the former regime. Militarily, this means Russia will formally retain control of its bases, including the Hmeimim airbase in the Alawi heartland of Latakia—although a small contingent of Russian forces has remained stationed there since Assad’s fall in December 2024. Russian military police are likewise expected to deploy in restive parts of the country, including the coastal region and potentially southern Syria. As a gesture of goodwill, al-Sharaa reportedly has pledged to Putin that he will hand over Islamist Chechen militants who recently integrated into the new Syrian military.
Al-Sharaa said his government would “respect all agreements signed with Russia” by the former regime.
Economically, Russian investors are set to resume operations across various sectors in Syria. For example, Stroytransgaz, a Kremlin-linked company sanctioned by the United States and European Union, holds a fifty-year agreement to exploit phosphate reserves in central Syria. The same company, which also has a forty-nine-year contract to operate the port of Tartus, should restart its investments there. How the latter arrangement will be reconciled remains unclear, as the interim government has signed an $800 million deal with an Emirati firm to redevelop and operate the port for thirty years.
In addition, Russia is expected to begin offshore oil and natural gas exploration and production in Syrian waters in the Mediterranean.
This development has rendered all speculation about a post-Assad realignment in Syria unfounded. Despite Moscow’s close relationship with the former regime, a post-Assad Syria couldn’t be separated from Russia—and Putin knew this. That explains why, in the days leading up to al-Sharaa’s takeover of Damacus, Russian forces coordinated with his Islamist rebels to avoid clashes, according to al-Sharaa himself. Putin was not willing to sacrifice an eighty-year relationship with Syria to save an unsalvageable Assad regime, especially given the shifting dynamics in the Middle East. For Russia, Syria remains a key strategic asset for its long-term interests in the eastern Mediterranean.
Al-Sharaa’s calculations for renewing ties with Russia are driven primarily by his desire to consolidate power. Syria’s military has long been trained and equipped by Russia, and its defense infrastructure remains dominated by Soviet-era weaponry. The interim president hopes that a Russian commitment to his military will help unify the patchwork of rogue Islamist and jihadist factions that currently make up his armed forces. Al-Sharaa’s older brother, Maher, who currently manages a significant portfolio at the Syrian presidency, is the main architect of Damascus’s approach toward Moscow. He was educated in Russia and is married to a Russian woman whose family has ties with the Russian government.
The interim [Syrian] government portrayed its engagement with Moscow as part of a broader effort to promote economic development and reconstruction.
Given Russia’s involvement in Assad’s crackdown on the Syrian people during the civil war, the interim government portrayed its engagement with Moscow as part of a broader effort to promote economic development and reconstruction. Importantly, it also framed al-Sharaa’s visit as an initial step toward securing the extradition of Assad and other top former regime officials from Russia. However, there is no indication that the Assad extradition was raised during the Putin-Sharaa meeting, and it’s unlikely that Russia will ever entertain that idea in the future.
The Syrian president also seeks to leverage the Russian presence in the country as a strategic deterrent to limit future Israeli operations, especially in the south. This assessment overstates Russia’s influence, as even under Assad—and despite a strong Russian presence—Israel did not hesitate to strike Syrian, Iranian, and Hezbollah targets across the country.
Alongside a military cooperation agreement signed with Turkey, these developments with Russia make it clear which direction Syria wants to align itself. If Washington hoped to keep Russia at bay in Syria, that task is becoming increasingly difficult. If anything, the current U.S. approach toward Syria, including the unconditional removal of sanctions, could end up benefiting Moscow.
The United States still prioritizes counterterrorism in Syria and has recently explored ways to engage Damascus as a potential partner in the fight against remnants of the Islamic State. Yet, given Syria’s renewed relationship with Russia, it is difficult to view Damascus as a reliable partner.
