There has been much discussion about former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s support inside Iran. The only reliable poll on the question is two years old, which put his favorability at 31 percent, making him by far the most popular political figure in Iran, even if only with a plurality. Recent events suggest his approval has grown but this popularity is not as important as his ability to organize.
Majorities rarely determine outcome in revolutions. Political science literature is filled with debates over the right percentage to influence events. Some believe that 3.5 percent participation is enough for nonviolent movements to succeed. The Pareto principle states that 20 percent of the people determine 80 percent of outcomes. One political science paper argues that 4 percent of the population can determine 64 percent of the outcomes. These numbers fail to account for important contexts, such as the character of the political regime, age demographics, and that human nature and politics are not quantifiable. Still, they reveal a larger truth: Small, committed minorities often shape history.
Small, committed minorities often shape history.
The February Revolution of 1917 comprised less than 1 percent of the Russian population. Compared with other revolutions, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was widespread, with between 10 and 20 percent of the Iranian population participating. Among the participating factions, the Khomeinists were among the smallest groups, but the most committed.
The opposite also can be true. In 2009, the Green Movement mobilized 3 million people in Tehran alone in a single day, a fourth of the city’s population and 4 percent of the nation’s. Considering marches in other cities, the number was well above the 3.5 percent threshold. But the Green Movement, from its leadership to its foot soldiers, was disorganized, uncommitted, and timid.
There are no estimates of how many Iranians responded to Pahlavi’s call for protests in January 2026, but several million is likely the number, and popularity among more than a third of Iranians is much more than Alexander Kerensky or Ruhollah Khomeini ever mustered. Pahlavi has proven that he has the numbers for success. He now needs to prove his competence.
His task is not easy. He must make himself acceptable to factions and interested parties, all with distinct sets of values and sometimes conflicting interests. Chief among them are Iranians, who are diverse in their political views and divided between the diaspora and people inside the country. Both are important constituencies; people inside take to the streets, while the diaspora exerts pressure on Western political leadership and provides financial support.
Pahlavi also needs the approval of regional actors who influence the Trump administration, from Israel to Turkey to the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Most importantly, he must appease the U.S. government, and especially the Trump administration. Finally, he must be acceptable to regime insiders, whom he invites to join the revolution. His record is mixed. The U.S. administration is skeptical of him; the only publicly reported meeting occurred in January 2026 with presidential envoy Steve Witkoff. According to public reports, the only national leaders Pahlavi has met with are Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
To question [Pahlavi’s] legitimacy is a losing battle; he has name recognition and people increasingly rally to him.
Pahlavi’s biggest organizational claim is his defection campaign. On June 23, 2025, he announced a scheme to precipitate defections from within the regime. He subsequently boasted that 50,000 had reached out to him. On January 24, 2026, he told CNN’s Jake Tapper that the number had surpassed 100,000. Not all of these are legitimate claims, as the regime tries to clog the process through false claims. His organization says it is in the process of verifying them. Pahlavi has neither provided a timeline for verifying and mobilizing defectors nor disclosed his demands of them, such as whether they should stand down or turn their guns on the regime and foreign proxies.
Pahlavi has no shortage of critics, but too often they focus on the wrong thing. To question his legitimacy is a losing battle; he has name recognition and people increasingly rally to him. He has enough supporters to overthrow the regime if he can organize them and channel outside support.
It is not clear, though, that he is capable. Just this week, after days of not responding to emails, his representative haughtily turned down a forthcoming weekend conclave with U.S. senators, saying Pahlavi is too busy. Tens of thousands of protestors’ deaths should also remind that unarmed civilians will not be enough to overthrow the regime absent strategy. Aside from claiming that defectors are reaching out to him, Pahlavi has not presented any evidence of an organization within Iran, even privately. Skeptics should start probing him about what he has beyond the numbers.
Western policymakers must demand he get serious, even if it means cracking down on incompetent loyalists. For Pahlavi’s critics, however, this will be a bitter pill to swallow, as it requires a tacit acknowledgment that Pahlavi has the popularity other would-be leaders never will.
