There are reports about a potential normalization between Syria and Israel. Billboards in Tel Aviv even feature Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa alongside other Arab leaders, suggesting additional countries that may join the Abraham Accords.
Israeli officials describe back-channel communications with the Syrian government as being focused primarily on security arrangements along the border and unrelated to the broader Abraham Accords framework. Syrian officials, for their part, have shown some openness to peace with Israel, although they remain reserved about a full peace deal.
President Donald Trump has expressed a desire for Syria to reach a peace agreement with Israel. Such a development, however, remains unlikely in the near term given the complex political realities and unresolved tensions between the two countries.
While some attitudes may evolve, significant political and ideological obstacles still stand in the way of any real desire to make peace with Israel.
Al-Sharaa and his jihadist coalition seized power in Damascus in December 2024 without a popular mandate, and bold, attention-grabbing moves have marked their rule from the outset. These actions are part of a broader strategy to secure international backing and legitimacy. Pursuing peace with Israel could be an attempt to assert political credibility by a group that, until recently, many countries viewed as a terrorist organization.
This shift is particularly plausible given that many Syrians no longer regard Israel as an arch-enemy—especially considering the Assad regime’s widespread atrocities during the civil war, which have reshaped public perceptions of threat and enmity. In the aftermath of the Assad regime’s fall, a growing number of Syrians openly discuss Israel and the prospects for peace with the Jewish state.
Neither diplomats nor the White House should interpret these shifts in perception among Syrians, however, as approval for a comprehensive peace agreement. While some attitudes may evolve, significant political and ideological obstacles still stand in the way of any real desire to make peace with Israel. This is especially true among al-Sharaa’s own radical supporters, many of whom harbor deep hatred toward Israel and Jews more broadly. These are not ordinary supporters, but powerful armed groups over which the new Syrian authorities lack full control.
Moreover, engaging in normalization with an interim government in Syria could prove challenging for Israel, especially when it comes to resolving longstanding disputes such as the status of the Golan Heights and the Shebaa Farms.
Israel would certainly benefit from a peace agreement with Syria, a country that has been an enemy since Israel’s founding in 1948. However, striking a deal during Syria’s volatile transitional period could backfire, especially given the fragile nature of al-Sharaa’s regime and its uncertain future. A government that cannot make peace with its own population, including the Alawites, Christians, Druze and Kurds, cannot be trusted to negotiate sincerely with external parties.
Instead, al-Sharaa’s cynicism may be at play. He and his inner circle may be more eager to pursue normalization with Israel to win external recognition and to become indispensable in order to gain external protection against rivals within Syria.
A government that cannot make peace with its own population, including the Alawites, Christians, Druze and Kurds, cannot be trusted to negotiate sincerely with external parties.
While Syria’s Islamist authorities celebrate the lifting of all U.S. sanctions, they also recognize that signaling openness to peace with Israel could improve their chances of gaining further support from the Trump administration. Rushing peace, however, absent adequate time for the Syrian people to adjust, could risk a backlash that could set peace back decades and enable more extreme elements to retrench. Arguably, this was the lesson of the 1982 peace between Israel and Lebanon that collapsed after Bachir Gemayel’s assassination. Not everything can revolve around a Washington political calendar.
In the short term, the most realistic outcome of current talks between Israel and Syria would be an understanding to de-escalate along the border and to buy time for Syria to consolidate control over its territory during its current transitional phase.
Indeed, if a solid and long-lasting peace is the goal, Washington should focus on laying the groundwork for lasting peace with Israel by supporting the establishment of an inclusive government and a participatory political system that represent all ethnic and religious groups. The United States and Israel should stand with regional minorities, rather than accept any order in which they are thrown under the bus for convenience. If al-Sharaa is truly a man transformed with the power to deliver, he should not object. If he does, then Washington and Jerusalem would be pinning their hopes on a mirage.
