Iraq’s parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025, produced few surprises. With the Sadrists boycotting the vote, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s Shi’i coalition secured the largest number of seats in the 329-member legislature.
The other notable outcome was the strong performance of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the dominant force in the semiautonomous Kurdistan Region, which—running outside any electoral coalition—garnered more than 1.1 million votes. This made it the second-largest vote-getter and the largest as a single party. However, under Iraq’s new proportional voting system, the Kurdish party led by Barzani family secured only twenty-seven seats, placing it behind blocs that received fewer votes.
The ruling party in Iraqi Kurdistan has sought to build support beyond its traditional Kurdish strongholds in Erbil and Duhok.
Despite losing some seats in the disputed territories whose status Kurds and the central government contest, the Kurdistan Democratic Party maintained its dominance in the Kurdistan Region over its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which won eighteen seats. One reason for this was the higher voter turnout compared to the 2021 election, in which the Barzanis received just under 800,000 votes. But another critical factor helped propel Massoud Barzani’s party into the club of the top performers nationwide: The Kurdistan Democratic Party courted non-Kurdish voters.
In recent years, the ruling party in Iraqi Kurdistan has sought to build support beyond its traditional Kurdish strongholds in Erbil and Duhok. It has targeted Sunni Arabs, particularly those disillusioned with the country’s traditional Sunni leadership. During this election cycle, the Kurdistan Democratic Party invested in this strategy, rallying behind Arab candidates who are now formally members of the Kurdish party.
A notable example is its strong backing for incumbent parliamentarian Ikhlas al-Dulaimi from Nineveh Province. Bearing a last name associated with a major Sunni Arab tribe, al-Dulaimi crafted her messaging to appeal to Arab voters. Her campaign resonated well beyond Nineveh, gaining traction in other Sunni Arab-majority provinces. Al-Dulaimi’s political rhetoric centered on portraying the Kurdistan Democratic Party as an inclusive national force in Iraq, rather than merely a Kurdish party.
This is more than an election tactic; it appears to be part of a broader effort by the Kurdistan Democratic Party to position itself as a national force in Iraq. While the party has been a major player in Iraqi politics since the toppling of Saddam Hussien in 2003, this marks the first time it appears intent on expanding beyond its traditional Kurdish base.
Sunni Arab leaders are attentive to [Massoud] Barzani’s rising prominence among Sunnis.
The Barzanis maintain tight control over a conservative party that blends tribalism with a focus on economic development. Despite its chronic corruption, the party retains strong support among a unified base—a dynamic that also may explain its appeal to some non-Kurdish Iraqis. In the recent election campaign, Massoud Barzani, his son, Iraqi Kurdistan Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, and his nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Region, emphasized their government’s recent achievements, highlighting the construction of modern highways, electricity projects, technology initiatives, and high-rise developments.
While local Kurds have many grievances, some Iraqis still view these projects as major accomplishments, particularly those who follow young social media influencers visiting Kurdistan and then compare their experiences there with conditions in the rest of the country.
Sunni Arab leaders are attentive to Barzani’s rising prominence among Sunnis. Just before the election, Mohamed al-Halbousi, head of the largest Sunni party, al-Taqadum, in an interview—responding to a question about why many Sunnis view Barzani as their leader—refused to acknowledge Barzani as a Sunni leader, describing him instead as a Kurdish leader.
While Shi’i parties previously have tried to leverage Arab nationalism to appeal to some Sunnis and forge post-election alliances to counterweight the Kurds, the Kurdistan Democratic Party has taken a different approach. It reaches out to Sunni Arabs by emphasizing shared religious ties—most Kurds are Sunni—and highlighting a national agenda. It is a delicate balancing act that maintains the party’s Kurdish nationalist stance in Kurdistan while expanding its appeal elsewhere in Iraq.
It is clear that Barzani sees himself and his party in a stronger position.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party’s surge in popularity gives it leverage in intra-Kurdish dynamics, too. During a recent speech, Massoud Barzani said: “I hope that other Kurdish parties listen carefully: The conditions after the federal elections are not the same as before. Based on the electoral gains, each party should receive what it deserves.” This was a pointed message directed at the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and its firebrand leader, Bafel Talabani, that the Kurdistan Democratic Party no longer may accept the longstanding fifty-fifty power-sharing arrangement between the two parties. Barzani might pull this momentum to pursue the Iraqi presidency for his party, a post traditionally persevered for Kurds and held exclusively by a Talabani or Talabani loyalist since 2005.
While it remains unclear how these dynamics will shape the negotiations to form the new Iraqi government, it is clear that Barzani sees himself and his party in a stronger position. Even if the broader landscape remains unchanged for now, the Kurdistan Democratic Party appears to be pursuing a deliberate long-term strategy at the national level that is sure to shake the status quo.
