Responding to criticism of its blasphemy prosecutions, Pakistan frequently invokes its blasphemy laws, particularly, Section 295C of its legal code. Rhetoric around Section 295C not only impacts religious freedom but also impacts Pakistan’s foreign policy choices. For example, Pakistan mobilizes the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to push resolutions against “blasphemous” content abroad. However, this practice rests on weak foundations. Islamic scholars from diverse traditions assert that the contemporary system of blasphemy has little correlation with Islamic law. Blasphemy protests repeatedly have forced Pakistan to reverse, delay, or soften foreign-policy decisions to avoid domestic unrest.
The utilization of the blasphemy narrative in regard to foreign policy reflects a “blasphemy veto” in which clerics pressure the government by threatening mass protests against potential state actions. Clerics exercise this veto outside constitutional boundaries and influence state policies despite lacking any democratic mandate.
Blasphemy protests repeatedly have forced Pakistan to reverse, delay, or soften foreign-policy decisions to avoid domestic unrest.
Islamic jurisprudence does not justify such practices. A 1923 Hanafi fatwa held that a non-Muslim who insults the Prophet Muhammad does not lose protected status unless the behavior becomes persistent. Scholars also note that the Quran prescribes no worldly punishment for insulting prophets. Verses declaring “there is no compulsion in religion” underline the centrality of voluntary faith.
Research supports this conclusion. Colonial lawmakers created Section 295C, and President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization reshaped it. Despite its shallow doctrinal basis, Islamist groups have learned to deploy blasphemy agitation strategically. The blasphemy veto shows how activists raise political costs and pressure officials to adopt conservative stances.
The susceptibility of Pakistani foreign policy to street pressure fanned by the clergy is nothing new, although it does not always revolve around blasphemy. Take for example, Saudi Arabia’s fight against the Houthis in Yemen. While Pakistan normally supports Saudi Arabia unconditionally, clerics threatened nationwide protests. Because the Pakistani government feared domestic unrest and clerical accusations that the conflict could exacerbate sectarian tensions or endanger Mecca and Medina, Islamabad instead embraced neutrality as the least costly option given domestic constraints. The episode showed that fear of clerical mobilization shaped Pakistan’s stance more decisively than regional strategy. The Pakistani government realized that clerics raising concern about protection of sacred sites was just a step away from blasphemy-tinged accusations that could spin out of control.
The emergence of the conservative Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan party illustrates how similar pressures have also affected Pakistan’s foreign policy. In March 2021, for example, the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan party organized mass protest against France over caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan protests forced the government to consider expelling the French ambassador. The protests pushed Pakistan toward an unwanted diplomatic confrontation with France. France restricted engagement and issued advisories, proving that protests constrained Pakistan’s diplomacy. This was the reason the Pakistani government put Asia Bibi, a Christian farmworker whom a lower court sentenced to death for blasphemy in 2010, on the exit control list despite her 2018 acquittal. The government concessions during protests prompted Western diplomatic interventions and harmed Pakistan’s credibility.
Since the outbreak of Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan violence in 2021, numerous Pakistani administrations chose short-term solutions instead of the long-term reform. Even though the government banned the group in the same year after the violence, it resumed negotiations with it after militants took police officers hostage.
As unrest shapes foreign-policy choices, Pakistan loses credibility in regional forums.
Repealing Section 295C would reduce extremist influence over individuals, thereby decreasing the incidence of vigilante violence and increasing Pakistan’s legitimacy and credibility on the world stage. The state must introduce safeguards to block clerical interference over the policies and procedures of the government. Courts or parliament must review any governmental response to clerics’ fatwas.
The Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan’s 2021 protests and diplomatic friction with Europe and the United States demonstrates how blasphemy-driven unrest undermines Islamabad’s reliability. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan’s 2018 protests over a Dutch cartoon contest forced Islamabad to summon the Dutch ambassador and issue warnings. These dynamics push Pakistani policymakers to avoid diplomatic positions that might provoke agitation. Such pressure limits Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, forcing diplomats to prioritize domestic appeasement over coherent and predictable foreign policy.
As unrest shapes foreign-policy choices, Pakistan loses credibility in regional forums, limiting its ability to influence debates on security, trade, and Middle Eastern politics. If Pakistan enacts these reforms, it will help to decouple religion from statecraft. Only when reform limits clerical influence can Pakistan prevent protests from dictating its foreign policy choices, allowing for true stability in the region.
