Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addressed the nation on September 23, 2025. He was defiant toward foreign pressure, but his broader point was triumphalism.
Khamenei emphasized that Iran’s missile program is not negotiable. Externally, he looks exposed: Iran’s conventional and proxy forces are degraded and its airspace poorly defended. As Ari Cicurel, an expert at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, detailed, however, in the last days of the war, “Iran adapted with more sophisticated and frequent strikes, causing more damage in Israel, straining Israeli and U.S. interceptor stockpiles, and leaving Israel to heavily rely upon U.S. air defense support.”
The main reason for the supreme leader’s triumphalism, however, was Iran’s internal affairs.
The main reason for the supreme leader’s triumphalism ... was Iran’s internal affairs.
Khamenei began by speaking of public reaction during the war. “My first word is that the unity and cohesion of the Iranian people during the Twelve-Day War disappointed the enemy.” He continued, “The enemy’s purpose was not to hit the commanders. That was a means. The enemy had thought to itself that, if it hits the military commanders, if it hits prominent regime personnel, causing chaos in the country, [using its agents] to bring the people to the streets … against the Islamic Republic. This was the goal. Therefore, the Islamic Republic was the target.”
Khamenei is correct that regime change was an Israeli objective. That Iran did not erupt into protest bolsters his triumphalism. Khamenei’s renewed rigidity, therefore, rests on his belief that his regime is secure. In his eyes, the war was a test of regime durability, and he is vindicated against naysayers who preached compromise, concession, or reform.
Certainly, the Islamic Republic is as unpopular as ever, and even insiders now question the system. In conversations with Iranians inside Iran, there is one commonality: a disappointment that people did not come to the streets after the war. Often, Iranians cite the lack of others as reason not to go; few will risk themselves and their families by protesting alone.
The calm Khamenei ascribes to unity is actually a symptom of disorganization, lack of leadership, and fear of initiative. This is a theme in totalitarian societies, but it is also ingrained in the Iranian national character. Inside Iran, the government imprisons the few individuals who could become movement leaders. In the diaspora, there is no leadership.
There is a revolutionary movement alive in Iran. Just that, lacking leadership, it does not know how to move.
Two rare exceptions have been Ruhollah Zam, who organized the 2017 protests, and Masih Alinejad, who led the anti-hijab movement. The threats they posed to the regime are proven by the fact that both have been victims of attempted abduction; in Zam’s case, the regime kidnapped and executed him. However, in the most critical moment for the Islamic Republic, no such leader emerged, and one is unlikely to appear in the near future. There is a revolutionary movement alive in Iran. Just that, lacking leadership, it does not know how to move.
Khamenei’s speech is proof that he is too confident of his survival to abandon his nuclear and conventional ambitions; he simply does not have to. The only threats that could convince Khamenei to change his mind are to his regime or to his life. The social peace since the war vindicates him.
Israel can continue to treat the symptoms. If Cicurel’s report is correct, this policy could be much more costly the next time. Or it could cure the disease. This was Israel’s hope during the war, but hope is not a strategy.
