Will Trump’s Gaza Coalition Repeat Bush’s Afghanistan and Lebanon Mistakes?

Washington’s Push for an International Force in Gaza Risks Importing the Same Coalition Failures That Empowered the Taliban and Hezbollah

Washington’s push for an international stabilization force in Gaza raises questions about whether coalition politics can deliver security—or repeat past failures.

Shutterstock

President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio want to create a new coalition to staff an International Stabilization Force for Gaza. The idea is simple: To replace or unwind Hamas‘s rule in Gaza, an international force will assume control for security. Trump’s peace plan also requires Hamas’s disarmament, which, given Hamas’s dependence on arms to exercise power, could lead to violent confrontation.

What looks good on paper, however, does not translate well to reality. Some countries, such as Turkey, seek a beachhead in Gaza, but Israel refuses. Jerusalem is right: Ankara seeks not peace, but Hamas empowerment. Welcoming Turkish forces into Gaza is akin to hiring an arsonist to be the forest ranger. It would be as self-defeating as bringing Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as peacekeepers on Israel’s border. While Israel is vocal about Turkey’s lack of suitability, Egypt is as nervous.

Welcoming Turkish forces into Gaza is akin to hiring an arsonist to be the forest ranger.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a Muslim Brotherhood acolyte; his negligence, if not active encouragement, allowed the Islamic State to explode in Iraq and Syria a decade ago. To welcome Turkish forces adjacent to Egypt’s Sinai would revitalize the local Islamic State affiliate and could empower the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdoğan’s antisemitism sets him against Israel, but his Muslim Brotherhood influence leads him to see Egypt, the most populous Arab country, as the big prize.

Trump and Rubio should not repeat the mistakes of Afghanistan, where Turkey, in theory, served NATO’s interests but helped fan Taliban interests with outreach and billboards preaching not democracy but Islamic solidarity.

Rubio’s latest effort to convince Pakistan to join the Gaza force compounds the Afghanistan mistake in two ways. First, if Pakistan supported the Taliban against the United States out of misguided Islamic solidarity and resentment toward the West, why would Washington trust it now? Pakistan’s terror-sponsoring intelligence service must backslap itself with glee over such naivete. Whether Turkey or Pakistan, diplomatic pouches would likely carry more plastique than post.

The second mistake Rubio repeats is his willingness to tolerate caveats. While former President George W. Bush cited the size of the coalitions he assembled for Afghanistan and Iraq, most national components put conditions on their participation and rules of engagement. NATO states entered Afghanistan constrained by more than 50 different conditions. German forces refused combat, for example, and only allowed Germans to fly on their helicopters. If an Afghan was wounded in battle and needed medevac, Germany’s contingent would rather he died than get blood stains on their helicopter. If attacked, Germans could fire back, but they could not pursue their attackers. Hungarian forces could not fight after dark. Norway provided F-16s but forbade their use in ground attacks.

NATO states entered Afghanistan constrained by more than 50 different conditions.

Today, Pakistani leaders say they will consider a deployment, but they refuse any role in disarming Hamas. To accept their participation, then, risks Pakistani forces becoming Hamas human shields, a presence that prevents Israeli counterterrorism operations but does not prevent Hamas from replenishing its hospital- and school-based rocket stockpiles.

Bush also fumbled over this problem in Lebanon. In 2006, war erupted between Hezbollah and Israel. Under the watchful gaze of well-paid United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon blue helmets, Hezbollah rearmed with an arsenal larger than most Middle Eastern countries. To end the conflict, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice struck a deal for an enhanced UNIFIL with more European contributors (and Turkey) that would prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament; salaries went up, but effectiveness did not. When Hezbollah renewed its attacks on Israel following the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre, UNIFIL proudly shielded Hezbollah by refusing to evacuate areas housing Hezbollah fighters and weaponry.

Trump’s peace agreement is already faltering as Hamas refuses to disarm, and Trump’s team compromises with terrorists to keep the illusion of peace alive. The White House and State Department may see this as sophisticated diplomacy, but it merely repeats the error of the past and promises a similar future: failure and more war. That is not the stuff of Nobel Peace prizes.

Published originally on December 23, 2025.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Turkey. His career includes time as a Pentagon official, with field experiences in Iran, Yemen, and Iraq, as well as engagements with the Taliban prior to 9/11. Mr. Rubin has also contributed to military education, teaching U.S. Navy and Marine units about regional conflicts and terrorism. His scholarly work includes several key publications, such as “Dancing with the Devil” and “Eternal Iran.” Rubin earned his Ph.D. and M.A. in history and a B.S. in biology from Yale University.
See more from this Author
Israel’s Break with Diplomatic Convention Opens a Strategic Opportunity for New Delhi in the Horn of Africa
The Decision to Bomb Southern Yemen Forces Suggests the Saudi Crown Prince Is Backsliding to a Pre-September 11, 2001, Saudi Posture
Although Resilient, the Islamic Republic Was Always More of an Anomaly than the Natural Apex of Iranian Political Evolution
See more on this Topic
Washington’s Push for an International Force in Gaza Risks Importing the Same Coalition Failures That Empowered the Taliban and Hezbollah
After Months of Silence, the Pro–Islamic State Group Reemerges by Claiming a Sectarian Attack on Alawites in Central Syria
Israel’s Break with Diplomatic Convention Opens a Strategic Opportunity for New Delhi in the Horn of Africa