Despite the rhetoric coming out of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iranians within and outside the regime view the Twelve-Day War as a defeat. The Islamic Republic’s weakened state has brought sidelined moderates and reformists out of the woodwork with open critiques of the status quo. Theirs is a policy dispute, but like every policy dispute, it is also illustrative of a power struggle as 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei nears his death.
Since the war, [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei no longer holds such a strong hand.
Khamenei reportedly ordered the formation of a committee to find his successor. Khamenei likely sought a three-man council to succeed him. The committee sought three candidates and has found two: Mojtaba Khamenei and Hassan Khomeini, respectively, the son and grandson of the regime’s only two supreme leaders. The third candidate was probably President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash more than a year ago: Raisi would appease the security forces, Mojtaba Khamenei would placate conservative clerics, and Hassan Khomeini would both please the old guard and be a bone to the reformist and moderate faction, including many senior clerics. Such a ploy would have put two hardliners on top to ensure that Khomeini’s influence would be limited.
Since the war, Khamenei no longer holds such a strong hand, though. Former officials whom he sidelined immediately after the war are using language unacceptable only months ago to advocate for different policies.
On August 12, 2025, former president Hassan Rouhani published a 35-minute video. His speech struck Iranians like an audition for supreme leadership, which rumors hint he covets. Rouhani stated that Iran’s “weakness” after October 7, 2023, “provoked” the war. He also argued that the cleavage between the regime and the people is also a weakness and, finally, he pointed out that Europe did not support Iran because of its support for Russia during the Ukraine War.
Rouhani’s prescriptions are telling. Building a popular support base, closer relations with the world and “even America,” liberalizing media, and purging the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from the economy are common talking points among moderates and reformists. But he caveated these with “the Israel matter is different [and] Israel is nothing on its own.” Likely, this is both a personal conviction and an assurance to the conservative base of the regime that Israel is the one issue on which Supreme Leader Rouhani would not compromise.
Two days later, the Reform Front issued a lengthy statement, headlined, “The only way of saving the country is via returning to the people.” The statement argued for a “national reconciliation,” abandoning hostilities with the people and foreign nations, and “returning to the principle of rule by the people.”
Israel’s strategic success in the June 2025 war has forced a political reckoning with limited promise.
On September 7, 2025, for example, Abbas Akhundi, a minister in the Hashemi Rafsanjani and Rouhani administrations, criticized half a century of “unrealistic foreign policy.” “In the end, the most fundamental change we should accept is that we must work within this order,” he said. “We cannot disrupt an order based on $106 trillion gross domestic product [worldwide] with $400 billion gross domestic product.” On the same day, responding to a post on X about the high rate of virtual private network use in Iran, he used a Persian proverb, “Someone with a self-inflicted wound should not complain.”
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, still popular within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has also reached out to his contacts in the force after the war to promote Grand Ayatollah Javad Alavi-Boruojerdi, the most liberal living marja’ and likely an opponent of rule by the jurist doctrine, to succeed Khamenei.
Six months ago, Khamenei’s design for succession looked strong, but Israel’s strategic success in the June 2025 war has forced a political reckoning with limited promise. All factions want to preserve the Islamic Republic, which in any form will be unacceptable to most Iranians, be an enemy of Israel, and, at best, antagonize America.
These internal rivalries matter nonetheless. After Khamenei, each member of a three-man council that cannot reach a consensus will rely on its base of support to get his way, weakening the regime through disunity. If one of those members relies on popular support, he could unintentionally start a revolution.
In the coming months and years, the primary objective of U.S. policy should be furthering these divisions and ensuring that no single man will succeed Khamenei. Reformists are untrustworthy, but they have found their voice again and are criticizing the weakened Khamenei. There is utility in cynically promoting them to divide the regime.
