Israel must shatter the Palestinians’ hope of defeating it through violence. No lasting resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be possible until the Palestinians and their supporters recognize that violence against Israel cannot bring them victory or advance their goals. In his recent Middle East Forum policy paper, “Shattering the Palestinians’ Hope of Defeating Israel,” former Israeli National Security Adviser Meir Ben-Shabbat, one of the architects of the Abraham Accords, outlines a strategy for achieving this fundamental shift in Palestinian perceptions of the conflict.
In this interview with the Middle East Forum Observer, Ben-Shabbat presents his policy recommendations for Gaza, the Palestinian Authority, and Israeli settlements, drawing on the lessons of the war. He also proposes approaches to U.S. policy, the threats posed by Iran and Turkey, relations with Lebanon and Syria, and the expansion of the Abraham Accords, including normalization with Saudi Arabia.
MEFO: What does a cognitively defeated Palestinian society look like, and how would Israel know it had gotten there?
Ben-Shabbat: In a reality of cognitive defeat, Palestinian society conducts its daily life and even its conflicts in the recognition that Israel cannot be defeated; that its will cannot be imposed on Israel through violence; and that Israel cannot be eliminated. This is a deep and enduring recognition that continuing the armed struggle will not advance Palestinian goals but will exact a heavy price. As happened in past relations between Israel and Arab states, such recognition would channel those who seek change toward paths other than violent struggle.
The understanding that such a defeat has been achieved would not result from a single event, but from identifying a consistent change in the conduct of the leadership, the education system, religious rulings, the Palestinian media, public discourse, and public opinion. The delegitimization of terrorism, the dismantling of armed infrastructure, and recognition of the Jewish people’s right to a nation-state in their historic homeland would be the first practical expressions of such a change. The test of this defeat would lie not only in what Palestinians say, but above all, in what they do over time.
Three years after October 7, what evidence is there that Palestinians have stopped believing Israel can be beaten? If there is none, what did the war fail to do?
I do not claim that cognitive defeat has been achieved already. On the contrary, one of the central arguments of my paper is that Israel’s impressive military achievements have not yet been fully translated into a change in the consciousness of its enemies. Nevertheless, the first signs of change can be identified. The religious ruling issued by Professor Suleiman al-Daya against the October 7 attack, and his subsequent religious determination, in light of the price of the war, that jihad should not be undertaken under conditions similar to those in Gaza, are the beginnings of such a change.
Israel’s impressive military achievements have not yet been fully translated into a change in the consciousness of its enemies. Nevertheless, the first signs of change can be identified.
In January 2025, veteran researcher and political writer Majed Kayali published an article in the respected magazine Al Majalla titled, “The Collapse of the Military Option Against Israel Among Both Palestinians and Arabs.” He assessed that October 7, 2023, marked the end of an era in the Palestinian national movement—one that, in his view, began with Fatah’s first sabotage operation in 1965, which marked the beginning of the Palestinian armed struggle. Kayali further assessed that armed resistance had run its course. In his view, just as the October 1973 war marked the end of the military option in the Arab-Israeli conflict at the state level, the “Al-Aqsa Flood” and the war in Gaza herald the end of the military option in the non-state, or militia-based, conflict against Israel.
Thus, even if these processes have not yet been completed, there is considerable evidence that Israel can still bring about a change in how its enemies, adversaries, and competitors—states and non-state actors alike—perceive it.
Moreover, a Palestinian poll from August 2026 recorded a significant decline in support for Hamas, alongside growing doubts about the benefits of the armed struggle in light of the destruction in the Gaza Strip. These are important developments, but their significance should not be overstated. In the same poll, 72 percent of respondents still opposed disarming Hamas before a full Israeli withdrawal.
This does not mean the war has failed. Military defeat is a necessary condition for cognitive defeat, but it is not sufficient on its own. A terrorist organization can portray its very survival as an achievement, even after suffering severe blows. Moreover, when the international community advances recognition of a Palestinian state after the heinous October 7 attack, it reinforces the message that violence pays. Israel’s challenge is to complete all its military objectives and ensure that they become firmly etched in the consciousness of all the actors around it.
Who runs civilian life in Gaza once Hamas is gone? If the answer is Israel, for how long?
As long as Hamas retains its weapons, operates mechanisms of control, and preserves its influence over the population, changing names or establishing committees will not create a new reality. First, Hamas must be dismantled, the Gaza Strip demilitarized, and the conditions for change in the public sphere established. I do not believe it is right to determine in advance who will administer civilian life, when, or how. Israel’s involvement should be determined by the security reality and by the ability to ensure that the change is genuine and lasting.
Does your model require dismantling the Palestinian Authority? Take Hebron or Nablus: Who runs the city the day after?
The Oslo concept has collapsed, but not before exacting a very heavy price from us. In practice, everyone recognizes this, yet they refuse to issue its death certificate. The alternative I propose is based on a different division of responsibilities: civilian administration by Palestinians, through local or regional administrations with broad powers, and security responsibility exclusively in Israel’s hands.
In Hebron, for example, one could examine the initiative put forward by local clan leaders and sheikhs to establish an independent administrative framework that would manage residents’ affairs and maintain direct ties with the Israeli authorities. A similar model could be considered in Nablus, adapted to its social structure and local conditions. The change should be gradual and controlled, under full Israeli security control.
Critics say settlement expansion hardens Palestinian hostility. What evidence shows it reduces their hope of winning instead?
Our very existence apparently also hardens Palestinian hostility. Every Israeli success and achievement hardens that hostility. Every preventive security operation Israel carries out adds to it as well. One could draw up a long list of things that harden Palestinian hostility. I hope no one thinks we should change our conduct in these areas because of that.
Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria creates a tangible reality that becomes increasingly difficult to ignore or reverse over time.
I do not disregard the possibility that settlement expansion will provoke Palestinian opposition and even increase the motivation to act against Israel in the short term. In my paper, I explicitly point to the diplomatic and security risks involved. But we must distinguish between an immediate reaction and long-term cognitive change. Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria creates a tangible reality that becomes increasingly difficult to ignore or reverse over time. It demonstrates that time does not necessarily work in favor of those expecting an Israeli withdrawal, and that neither resistance nor international pressure is enough to change the reality on the ground.
My argument is strategic and historical: A profound change in consciousness occurs when reality, over time, rules out the possibility of realizing certain aspirations. That is what happened in relations between Israel and Arab states, which gradually concluded that they could not destroy Israel. Settlement is connected first and foremost to our historical bond with these territories. Second, settlement also helps ensure security preparedness. Beyond that, in the context of our discussion, settlement is also a central element in creating the desired perception of this area. Of course, it must be accompanied by appropriate security preparations.
Where does Washington’s approach to Gaza and the Palestinian Authority work against Israel’s interests, and what should Israel refuse to go along with?
The United States is Israel’s most important ally, and it has played a central role in the achievements of the war and in efforts to shape the regional reality that follows it. Nevertheless, there is a danger in an approach that seeks to predetermine the political outcome of the war before its security objectives have been achieved. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, which adopted the framework of President Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza, refers to the possibility of the Palestinian Authority returning to govern the Strip after reforms, and even to opening a pathway to a Palestinian state. For Israel, these are not merely matters of diplomatic wording. They could create a process in which international pressure replaces the demand for genuine change.
Israel must make clear that it will not agree to transferring security responsibility in Gaza to the Palestinian Authority or any variation of it—and certainly will not agree, under any circumstances, to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Precisely because the United States and Israel are close allies, they need an honest dialogue in which Israel presents the lessons of October 7 and the red lines that follow.
If the Iranian regime falls, does the Palestinian war on Israel end?
The fall of the Iranian regime would be a strategic development of enormous significance for the entire Middle East. For decades, Iran has invested vast resources in building a network of armed organizations around Israel, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Striking at this source of support could substantially reduce their military capabilities, their sources of funding, and the sense of confidence they draw from belonging to a broad regional axis. The blows suffered by the Iranian axis during the war have demonstrated already how vulnerable this system is.
Even after fundamental change in Iran, it will still be necessary to confront the ideas driving the Palestinian struggle.
But it would be a mistake to think that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict originated in Tehran, or that it would disappear with the fall of the Iranian regime. Its roots go back much further and are linked, first and foremost, to the refusal to recognize the Jewish people’s right to a nation-state in their historic homeland. Iran exploited the conflict, fueled it, and intensified it. Therefore, even after fundamental change in Iran, it will still be necessary to confront the ideas driving the Palestinian struggle—particularly in light of the rise of an alternative Sunni axis led by Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Weakening the regional infrastructure of terrorism can help bring about cognitive defeat, but it is no substitute for it.
What would Israel have to see from Beirut and Damascus before signing anything?
Experience teaches us that diplomatic agreements cannot replace a stable security reality. Today, such a reality is achieved through effective security control, holding territory, and freedom of action to carry out proactive operations.
In Lebanon, Israel cannot be satisfied with statements from the government in Beirut while Hezbollah continues to maintain an independent military force, operate outside the authority of the state, and threaten communities in northern Israel. The test must be practical: dismantling the military infrastructure that threatens Israel, preventing renewed armament, and demonstrating that the Lebanese state can enforce its sovereignty. An agreement that fails to guarantee these conditions could become a temporary respite during which the enemy prepares for the next round.
In Syria, the situation is different, but the principle is similar. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa may have changed his clothing and manner of speaking, but he has yet to convince us of his true positions. His base still includes adherents of jihadist ideas.
Moreover, he is essentially a proxy of Turkey, which under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seeks regional hegemony and aspires to act as an Ottoman-style, Muslim Brotherhood-oriented power. Israel’s caution in this case is justified. Distrust, distrust, and distrust again. Our interests are clear: preventing Syria from becoming a base for forces hostile to Israel or a transit country for weapons, keeping the border areas free of threats, and protecting our other interests in that country. At present, Israel can achieve this only by maintaining our presence at the positions where the Israel Defense Forces are deployed and ensuring freedom of security action. Changes in the regional balance of power may open new opportunities. But a stable security reality will not emerge merely from signing agreements.
Will Riyadh normalize without a path to a Palestinian state, and should Israel pay that price?
The Abraham Accords proved that peace and cooperation between Israel and Arab states can be advanced without making every step conditional on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That was one of the important innovations. Countries in the region began to assess their relations with Israel on the basis of shared interests in security, economics, technology, and regional stability. Saudi Arabia also has significant strategic interests in relations with Israel, and I believe those interests have not disappeared because of the war. Nevertheless, I do not presume to predict what conditions the Saudi leadership will set, or which of them it may be willing to compromise on.
Israel should seek to expand the circle of peace, and certainly to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia, but it must not pay for it by creating a grave security threat to itself. After October 7, the establishment of a Palestinian state cannot be treated as a diplomatic gesture intended to enable regional normalization. Such a move instead could reinforce the Palestinian perception that violence brings gains. Peace with Arab states should rest on mutual interests and recognition of the regional reality—not on an attempt to impose on Israel a solution whose underlying security assumptions have collapsed.
