To understand what US President Donald Trump’s invitation to Russian President Vladimir Putin to join the proposed Board of Peace for Gaza truly means for Israel, one must step back and examine the broader strategic picture. This is not merely a diplomatic gesture toward Russia, nor is it only about Gaza. It is about structure, power, and a deliberate attempt to reshape the global order.
Putin’s invitation is part of a much wider outreach. Trump reportedly invited around 60 heads of state from Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Oceania. Among them are major players such as Germany, Saudi Arabia, and India, alongside smaller but strategically significant states like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Nearly every relevant Middle Eastern actor appears on the list, including countries that deeply concern Israel and with which Jerusalem has serious disagreements, notably Turkey and Qatar.
Equally important are those who are absent. China and the United Nations stand out by their absence. This is no coincidence. Trump himself has suggested that the Board of Peace will not be limited to Gaza but will eventually address other global conflict zones.
Trump’s new global mechanism
In effect, he is attempting to create a new global mechanism with broad authority, one that bypasses the UN, weakens its relevance, and openly competes with the system Beijing is building through BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, and other multilateral frameworks.
Iran and Venezuela represent two open and visible fronts of the same broader geopolitical rivalry. India’s prominent presence, by contrast, underscores its role as a key arena in the strategic competition with China.
Within this context, Russia’s inclusion is strategic. By inviting Moscow, along with former Soviet states Russia considers part of its sphere of influence – such as Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan – Trump is signaling an effort to pull Russia away from China and reintegrate it into a Western-led framework after four years of sanctions and isolation following the war in Ukraine. Trump and Putin also share pragmatic interests from energy markets and the Arctic projects, to space and nuclear governance.
Here, another absence is striking: Ukraine. Kyiv’s exclusion sends a blunt message. Trump is signaling a pragmatic worldview in which power and recurses determine influence, values and moral arguments are secondary at best, and leadership is centralized in his hands.
What this means for Israel
For Israel, this potential US-Russia realignment presents real opportunities. Israel and Russia share multiple points of intersecting interests: the Syrian arena, Israel’s growing influence in Azerbaijan, mutual rivalry with Turkey and Qatar, the fight against Islamist terrorism, and a shared interest in keeping Iran weak.
Russia’s notably neutral response to Israel’s June 2025 strike in Iran, which reportedly disappointed Tehran, highlighted this convergence. In the past, Israel and Russia have demonstrated an ability to cooperate pragmatically in both security and economic spheres. Moscow, when it chooses, can act as a stabilizing and balancing power.
However, there are also risks. Russia views Israel’s ambitions to export natural gas to Europe via Cyprus and Greece unfavorably, seeing them as competition. Moscow also opposes the development of southern and central trade corridors such as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, preferring instead to promote the Arctic Northern Sea Route. From that perspective, Russia benefits indirectly from instability in the Red Sea, which undermines southern trade routes that could enhance Israel’s strategic value.
It is too early to draw firm conclusions. Much remains unclear: under what conditions Russia might integrate, how China will respond, and whether this new council can function at all. One conclusion, however, is already evident. Trump is attempting to reorder the world based on power and resources.
For Israel, this creates a significant window to act proactively and pragmatically, maximize its security and economic interests, and leverage its regional and global bargaining power – without hesitation.
Published originally on January 21, 2026.
