Turkey aims to develop sustainable energy with Chinese funding. The question President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan must answer is whether his embrace of Chinese technology will repeat the pattern of his pivot to Russian defense goods, the aftermath of which led to the U.S. government to expel Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.
Though flawed, the analogy with Turkey’s acquisition of Russian S-400 weapons remains alluring. Ownership of a nation’s power network can raise security issues, and the proposed investment includes electrical transmission infrastructure. While President Donald Trump has remained deferential to Erdoğan, the Turkish leader will likely not find such generosity from either a Democrat-led Congress or Trump’s successor.
Ownership of a nation’s power network can raise security issues, and the proposed investment includes electrical transmission infrastructure.
At the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change meeting in Antalya on November 12, 2026, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar announced a preliminary agreement with China’s National Energy Administration, in which China would invest $15 billion for energy storage, 4,000 megawatts of transmission infrastructure, and 7,000 megawatts of solar and wind power. Bayraktar said the collaboration could bring technology and turbine production to Turkey.
This might boost Turkish manufacturing and lessen the nation’s need on foreign fuels. However, neither side disclosed locations, funding plans, or completion dates. It is unclear how much risk Turkish partners, Chinese financiers, or the public would bear in the event of project delays or cost increases.
Turkey has cause to wait. In 2024, Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer BYD (Build Your Dreams) revealed intentions to build a $1 billion facility in Manisa, western Turkey, with an annual production capacity of 150,000 vehicles. As of mid-2026, construction had not begun. According to a BYD executive, the company placed the project on hold after Turkish authorities blocked the business’s access to incentives following delays.
Citing possible security concerns, Trump issued an order in August 2026 to examine foreign-supplied technology in the U.S. electrical grid. Turkey is not governed by that order, but it is a warning nonetheless, as U.S. authorities grow concerned with China’s strategic intentions and Turkey’s general orientation.
This is where Erdoğan’s personal relationship with Trump will be less of a shield than it looks. While Trump has said he wants to lift the sanctions on Turkey and was open to selling F-35s, he has no power to force Congress to abide.
A future administration could take a harder line on Chinese involvement if the actual contracts hand Chinese suppliers control over sensitive grid software, access to operational data, or responsibility for maintaining systems Turkey cannot easily replace. It might raise the issue in talks about defense technology or other joint projects. Patience is already thin in Washington due to Turkey’s problematic relationship with the Chinese cell phone giant Huawei, which U.S. intelligence believes poses an espionage risk.
Erdoğan should treat the S-400 episode as a reminder that some decisions carry consequences that outlast any one American presidency.
Even short of sanctions, a new disagreement could slow approvals and further strain a relationship already weighed down by years of defense friction. The real risk will depend on the contracts Turkey signs.
Turkey can still gain from Chinese know-how without putting all its eggs in one basket. It should insist on firm financing and clear deadlines, give Turkish companies a real role, keep control over sensitive infrastructure in Turkish hands, and seek competing offers from Europe, the Persian Gulf, and other investors.
The choice is not simply Beijing versus Washington. Turkey needs more renewable power, and China is well placed to help deliver it. Yet Erdoğan should treat the S-400 episode as a reminder that some decisions carry consequences that outlast any one American presidency. The BYD experience should be a warning that China is sometimes faster with promises than with delivery.
If Ankara locks in contracts and protects its ability to choose partners, the energy deal could strengthen its future. If it sidesteps those questions, today’s green-investment announcement risks becoming tomorrow’s diplomatic headache.