Islamic Republic of Iran officials vow to rebuild the nuclear facilities destroyed in the joint Israeli-American air campaign in June 2025, insisting they will never accept U.S. demands to abandon uranium enrichment. Yet Tehran now faces a dilemma: Its strategy of deterrence through nuclear ambiguity risks becoming irrelevant unless it restores its nuclear infrastructure.
President Masoud Pezeshkian declared on November 2, 2025, that Iran would rebuild its nuclear program. “Knowledge resides in the minds of our scientists,” he said. “The destruction of buildings or factories will not cause any problem; we will rebuild them again, with even greater strength.”
Since the world uncovered Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities more than two decades ago, Tehran has pursued a dual policy—denying any intention to produce nuclear weapons while expanding facilities and operations with limited or no civilian justification.
Before the June strikes, Iran reportedly possessed over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent.
“Nuclear opacity, also known as deliberate ambiguity, refers to a state’s policy of intentionally concealing the true status of its nuclear weapons capability,” a research paper on Iran’s nuclear strategy states. Governments following this approach refrain from confirming or denying possession of nuclear arms and withhold key information about their development, deployment, or strategic purpose. The aim is to maintain deterrence and political leverage while postponing or avoiding the diplomatic, legal, and military consequences of openly declaring a nuclear arsenal.
Before the June strikes, Iran reportedly possessed over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, requiring only further refinement to weapons-grade purity to construct several warheads. This posture allowed Tehran to project deterrence by hinting at nuclear capability, while avoiding the potential consequences of overt weaponization. Although Iran did come under United Nations and U.S. sanctions for nearly two decades, it maintained support from China and Russia in the past two decades and avoided military action by the United States until June 2025.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on November 3 rejected any possibility of Tehran accepting U.S. conditions for a new agreement, describing American demands to end enrichment and curb Iran’s missile and proxy activities as “illogical and unfair.”
At the same time, Araghchi claimed that the 400 kilograms of enriched uranium “lie buried under the rubble.” He added: “We have no intention of removing them until conditions are right. We have no information on how much of the 400 kilograms remains intact or destroyed, and we will not know until we dig them out.”
Mohsen Jalilvand, a Tehran-based analyst, views Iran’s ambiguous posture on the issue of the 400 kilograms of uranium as part of its attempt to maintain deterrence. By stressing that the material still exists—though inaccessible—Araghchi reminds the world that Tehran retains the potential for weaponization without admitting any active intent to recover or use it.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on November 3 rejected any possibility of Tehran accepting U.S. conditions for a new agreement.
Several factors, however, now undermine the foundations of Iran’s nuclear ambiguity strategy. Foremost is the damage sustained in June by enrichment facilities and other installations, which were central to weaponization research and development. Independent satellite imagery and Western intelligence assessments indicate that Israel struck between eight and twelve nuclear-related sites during the air campaign.
Analysts say the coordinated operation crippled key components of Iran’s enrichment and weapons-support infrastructure and exposed gaps in its air-defense network. Tehran has been tight-lipped about the impact of the attacks, although it has not claimed the strikes failed to inflict damage.
Rebuilding the enrichment potential depends on how many centrifuges were destroyed or damaged. One estimate by the Institute for Science and International Security said 22,000 centrifuges were “knocked out.” However, other estimates put the total number of centrifuges before the airstrikes at 18,000.
The International Atomic Energy Agency estimated after the attacks that Iran could resume the production of enriched uranium “in a matter of months.” However, the difficulty is not just manufacturing centrifuges but reconstructing the reinforced underground facilities where they were placed.
The second factor is the looming threat of follow-up strikes, should Iran attempt to restart enrichment or resume weaponization research. Pezeshkian himself warned officials in August: “You don’t want to talk? You won’t negotiate? So, what do you want to do—fight?! They came and struck; if we rebuild now, they’ll just come and strike again.”
If Tehran neither agrees to a deal nor rebuilds its nuclear capacity, can this ambiguous stance buy enough time until, as officials hope, President Donald Trump’s term ends and a new U.S. administration takes a softer line?
This strategy carries two flaws. First, the Iranian economy remains crippled by sanctions. Lifting these sanctions—and only a negotiated agreement can achieve that—is the regime’s sole path to economic relief.
As long as Tehran continues to arm Hezbollah and the Houthis, any violent anti-Israeli incident could trigger a new wave of airstrikes.
Second, the leadership may gamble on surviving domestic discontent and managing an impoverished, restive population until 2028, but it cannot dismiss the risk of another Israeli assault. As long as Tehran continues to arm Hezbollah and the Houthis, any violent anti-Israeli incident could trigger a new wave of airstrikes. Iran’s nuclear decisions no longer determine its fate alone; its regional policies have become equally perilous. Tehran seeks nuclear deterrence primarily to preserve its freedom of action in the region and sustain its ideological campaign for dominance.
For Iran’s Gulf Arab neighbors and Israel, the nuclear issue was never an isolated technical matter. They have always viewed it as a security threat inseparable from Tehran’s expansionist ambitions.
The June air operation, which exposed the shocking fragility of Iran’s military defenses, has also ignited debate within the regime. Some insiders question whether the nuclear pursuit has delivered any tangible benefit. Iran has sold more than a trillion dollars’ worth of oil since 2005, yet it endures 50 percent inflation, $150 monthly wages, water and power shortages, and a deepening sense of despair, while the Gulf Arab states and Turkey surge ahead.
Sadegh Zibakalam, a well-known commentator in Tehran, captured the growing disillusionment in a recent X post: “Mr. Pezeshkian has once again emphasized the resumption of nuclear activities. Two key questions remain: after three decades of direct and indirect costs, including sanctions, what has this program actually achieved for the country? Has it even added a single kilowatt to Iran’s electricity supply? And why do nuclear activities in other countries face no such obstacles?”
Moreover, not only has Iran’s nuclear deterrence eroded, but so have its non-nuclear instruments of intimidation against Israel. Since Hamas’s attack in October 2023, Israel has systematically degraded Tehran’s regional allies. From the downfall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria to the elimination of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, Israel has shown that the Islamic Republic cannot rely on its proxy network to sustain leverage or deterrence through the threat of multi-front war.
The remaining question is whether the Trump administration has deliberately moved Iran down its list of foreign-policy priorities or is quietly allowing time for a deal—one that many in Washington and the region would see as a capitulation to U.S. terms. In June, Trump halted the air campaign, declaring a ceasefire. Many expected the Iranian regime to collapse at that point and viewed his decision as a lifeline for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Yet Tehran continues to insist on uranium enrichment, missile development, and support for militant proxies, clinging to the same pillars that have brought it isolation and decline. The regime may not be so lucky should Trump end his ceasefire.
