Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command, told the U.S. Senate that Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, pledged to distance Iraq from Iran. Zaidi’s first moves since taking office suggest he was insincere.
Zaidi formed his government under Iranian pressure. Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani visited Baghdad at least twice during the cabinet negotiations. Leaks suggested he set red lines for Iraqi factions on files that overlap with Zaidi’s commitments to Washington. The Iranian Embassy’s congratulations show that Tehran does not see Zaidi moving away from Iran.
The Iranian Embassy’s congratulations show that Tehran does not see Zaidi moving away from Iran.
Zaidi submitted an incomplete cabinet. Parliament approved only 14 ministers out of 23. Key portfolios, including defense and interior, remain unfilled. These ministries control security, weapons, funding, appointments, and the state’s relationship with armed factions. A government that begins without defense and interior cannot credibly offer Washington major security commitments.
The delay gave the factions that backed Zaidi more time to arrange their place inside the government. Zaidi has not proven that he intends to distance Iraq from Iran. In Baghdad, he speaks the language of balance and de-escalation. In Persian-language media, he appears closer to confirming Iraq’s place inside Iran’s strategic orbit.
Zaidi’s cabinet gives several examples of why his promise to distance Iraq from Iran is not credible. Mustafa Sanad secured the Communications Ministry, one of the most important portfolios in a state built on networks, data, and digital infrastructure. Placing this ministry in the hands of a figure close to Qaani’s orbit gives the Qods Force a window into Iraq’s communications.
Zaidi also gave the Badr Corps the Transport Ministry and the Water Resources Ministry. He kept Qasim al-Araji, a Badr figure and former interior minister, as national security adviser. The Qods Force formed the Badr Corps in Iran in the 1980s and it remains a close linkage since. Its influence also extends into Iraq’s security forces. The Rapid Response Division grew out of Badr’s networks inside the Interior Ministry and was later accused of suppressing the 2019 protests, killing protesters, and protecting armed groups that attacked them. A government that gives Badr two ministries and keeps a Badr figure in the national security post cannot claim to be moving Iraq away from Iran’s orbit.
Qais al-Khazali’s presence at the parliamentary vote showed that Zaidi was not an independent actor within the Coordination Framework; he was Khazali’s candidate. If Zaidi intended to distance Iraq from Iran, Khazali would have been opposing him, not helping pass his cabinet.
Rather than disarming militias, Zaidi proposes to transfer them to the Popular Mobilization Forces, which have long provided cover for militia abuses. If the same commanders, fighters, loyalties, and unit structures remain, changing a faction’s name into a numbered brigade will not resolve the problem.
The Badr Organization shows what Washington ignores. Badr entered the state years ago and maintains working relations with institutions supported by the United States. Simultaneously, Badr gave factions political and security cover when they attacked Americans and diplomatic missions, and targeted protesters, activists, journalists, and opponents.
Zaidi has not proven that he can implement what he promised Washington. He has proven that he can delay confrontation.
Washington repeats its mistakes. It has backed governments that promised to balance the state and pro-Iranian militias, but the result was always deeper armed influence inside state institutions. Zaidi enters through the same door: commitments to Americans, understandings with the Coordination Framework, and delays over portfolios that define Iran’s position inside Iraq.
Iraq’s civil society sees U.S. support for Zaidi’s government as another retreat. Many expected the Trump administration to break with the Obama-Biden approach. Instead, they see Washington’s support for a Coordination Framework government and acceptance of insincere promises.
Zaidi’s government was formed under Qaani’s shadow, received Iranian approval, passed with factional support, began incomplete, left defense and interior unresolved, placed the Communications Ministry in the hands of a figure close to Qaani’s orbit, and put the Popular Mobilization Forces near the top of its program. These facts do not describe a government moving away from Iran.
Zaidi has not proven that he can implement what he promised Washington. He has proven that he can delay confrontation. Washington must now show that it has tools and mettle to force Zaidi to fulfill his promises to put Iraqi sovereignty above Iranian demands.
