On July 27, 2026, drones struck oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. The Houthis claimed the attack, but the Saudi Defense Ministry said Iran-backed armed groups had launched the drones from Iraqi territory.
Two days later, the United States and Saudi Arabia struck militia sites inside Iraq. The Houthis then acknowledged that Mohammed Khalid al-Ayyashi had been killed in the strikes. His death placed a Houthi operative inside the infrastructure targeted in response to the attacks launched from Iraq.
Over the past several years, the Houthis have built a network in Iraq under the protection of Kata’ib Hezbollah and other Iran-backed factions.
Al-Ayyashi was not an isolated case. Over the past several years, the Houthis have built a network in Iraq under the protection of Kata’ib Hezbollah and other Iran-backed factions. The network moved from an office operating openly in Baghdad’s Jadriyah neighborhood to more secure locations in Babil Province, particularly Jurf al-Sakhar, aclosed military zone Kata’ib Hezbollah controls. The group maintains a site on a farm, near the former al-Hakam military-industrial facility. The site became more important after a U.S. strike on Jurf al-Sakhar in July 2024 killed a Kata’ib Hezbollah member and Houthi commander Hussein Abdullah Mastour al-Shibl, also known as Abu Jihad, a Houthi missile and drone expert.
Ahmed al-Sharafi, better known as Abu Idris, leads the network. He entered Iraq in 2023 and became the Houthis’ representative in the country. His responsibilities include managing relations with Iran-backed Iraqi factions and meeting militia leaders, political figures, and tribal sheikhs.
Before moving to Iraq, al-Sharafi was involved in the Houthis’ military manufacturing program. In Baghdad, he oversaw the group’s relations with Iraqi armed factions and helped transform its presence from political representation into a permanent operational network.
Abu Ali al-Izzi serves as deputy head of the Houthi mission in Iraq. He has operated in Babil and appeared in the Musayyib area shortly before the attacks on Saudi Arabia. He has also worked as a lecturer at an Iraqi university, giving him a civilian role alongside his work within the Houthi network.
Mohammed Abdul-Azim al-Houthi oversees religious and ideological activity. He regularly meets with Iraqi militia and political leaders and helps distribute Houthi religious publications and propaganda. His work gives the group a public and social presence that complements its military relationships.
Fadl al-Sharafi manages part of the network’s financial and charitable activities. He established the Citizen Charitable Foundation in Najaf, which collects donations from religious visitors. The organization gives the Houthis a mechanism for fundraising and relationship-building outside their formal political office.
Abdulmalik Murtadha, also known as Abu Talib, previously represented the Houthis in Syria under Bashar al-Assad. After the fall of the Assad government, he joined the Houthi mission in Iraq.
Kata’ib Hezbollah provides the network’s main political, military, and logistical cover. Houthi representatives operate under the protection of the faction’s leader, Ahmed Mohsen al-Hamidawi, and use vehicles and facilities the group controls.
A small group of representatives, drone specialists, religious operatives, and financial facilitators can work inside infrastructure supplied by Iraqi militias.
The Houthis do not need a large independent force in Iraq. A small group of representatives, drone specialists, religious operatives, and financial facilitators can work inside infrastructure supplied by Iraqi militias. Kata’ib Hezbollah provides bases, vehicles, security, storage sites, and local personnel. The Houthis provide technical expertise and claim responsibility for attacks, while Iran coordinates.
The July 27 attack exposed the result of that arrangement. While the Iraqi government promised an investigation into the specific attack, limiting that to one specific incident misses the point: Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi must explain how his predecessors allowed the Houthis to establish a safe haven in Iraq from which they can launch attacks on Iraq’s neighbors.
