Iranians opposed to the Islamic Republic are concerned by signals from Washington pointing to new talks with Tehran. Many hope, despite mounting anxiety, that President Donald Trump will not fall into the familiar trap of trusting Iran’s rulers at a moment when they appear weaker than at any time in the past forty-seven years.
On February 1, 2026, Axios quoted a senior U.S. official saying, “The Trump administration has told Iran through multiple channels that it’s open to meeting to negotiate a deal.”
Iran’s economy is in free fall, with no credible path forward for the government. The nationwide uprising in January 2026 stripped the regime of what legitimacy it still claimed. Millions of protesters and thousands of bereaved families are unlikely to forgive Iran’s autocrat, Ali Khamenei, and his officials for the killing of at least 20,000 civilians in just forty-eight hours on January 8 and 9.
“There’s no deal to be done here. These people are not trustworthy.”
News of possible talks unsettled even senior Republicans. Senator Lindsey Graham warned, “One thing you can’t do as president is talk like Reagan and act like Obama. There’s no deal to be done here. These people are not trustworthy.” He also pointed to the human catastrophe unfolding in Iran, saying protesters were “not protesting for a better nuclear deal. They’re protesting for a better life.” Addressing Trump directly, he added: “You said help is on the way. That has to be real. It has to be real soon.”
General Jack Keane (U.S. Army, ret.) also underscored the regime’s vulnerability, calling the current moment “a historic opportunity.” Speaking to Fox News, he said there was “a historic opportunity here to set the conditions through a military strike that puts the regime on the pathway to collapse.”
Across social media, many Iranian commentators expressed cautious optimism that Trump would ultimately authorize military action. Few opposition voices publicly voiced pessimism. Some argued that Washington was merely buying time to position forces for a decisive strike. The alternative, some warned, would be devastating for the opposition, demoralizing those who risked their lives during the January uprising. Some suggested that if the U.S. fails to act, mass protests in Iran could be suppressed for a generation.
No official details have emerged about Washington’s minimum demands if talks proceed. Will the administration insist on a complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and the removal of all enriched uranium, or only the roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched material Tehran has said it is willing to surrender? What limits would be imposed on Iran’s missile program? Would its existing arsenal of ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 1,250 miles—covering much of the region—remain intact?
The administration has emphasized verification, which may be straightforward to impose on nuclear and missile activities. Far more difficult to enforce is the third pillar of U.S. demands: Iran’s regional conduct and its support for proxy forces.
Iran has a long record of testing limits and exploiting any sign of weakness.
That support is both financial and military. Any deal with Washington would likely bring sanctions relief, allowing Tehran to earn more than $50 billion annually in oil revenues, most probably with less banking restrictions. Money is fungible, and monitoring whether the regime halts funding for its proxies would be difficult. Tehran could quietly continue financing these groups while waiting for an opportune moment to violate the agreement openly—perhaps near the end of Trump’s term. Iran has a long record of testing limits and exploiting any sign of weakness. Whether Washington could maintain sustained focus on Iran over the next three years remains an open question.
It is also unclear whether the administration intends to demand changes in the regime’s domestic conduct following what may be the largest peacetime massacre of civilians in modern history. If so, how would compliance be verified? Releasing a few hundred political prisoners would be a token gesture at best. The reality would remain unchanged: no political freedoms, no independent institutions, and a security apparatus ready to crush any protest by force.
Without meaningful political accountability and a measure of democracy, the regime will remain free to ignore the public interest—and to renege on any agreement it signs. Without those safeguards, no deal with Tehran can be trusted.
