Where Is Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s New Supreme Leader?

It is now official: Ali Khamenei’s son has ascended the throne. Iran has a new supreme leader, 56-year-old Mojtaba Khamenei. After the death of Ali Khamenei, this marks the second major political outcome of the joint U.S.-Israeli air campaign against the Islamic Republic.

The establishment had other choices. One was former president Hassan Rouhani, an experienced operator with forty-six years of service in security and intelligence positions and eight years overseeing the civilian budget and ministries, though always subordinate to Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Several questions arise regarding Mojtaba Khamenei and his appointment as supreme leader. First, it remains unclear whether the eighty-eight-member Assembly of Experts ever convened to vote in full on his selection. A meeting of eighty-eight elderly clerics—whose average age is reportedly close to ninety—during an air campaign targeting the country’s leadership would have been nearly impossible. Was the decision made through some online mechanism? Even in that case, each of the clerics would have required technical assistance simply to join a meeting and cast a vote. The deeper question therefore remains: Which power centers and which individuals selected the younger Khamenei? What role did the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which maintains close ties to him, play in the process?

Second, where is Mojtaba? Since the start of hostilities on February 28, 2026, and the news of Ali Khamenei’s death, there has been no sign of his whereabouts or even confirmation of his health. Some have speculated that he might have been killed in the bombing of his father’s compound. His wife and several close relatives died in that strike. Could the regime have elevated a dead man to project the appearance of stability? That may be far-fetched. A supreme leader eventually must appear in public—likely soon, when an official funeral is held for Ali Khamenei.
Another possibility is that Mojtaba survived the bombing but was wounded and remains in hiding. This appears more plausible. If Mojtaba were healthy, the temptation for the regime to display him publicly to inject hope into the ranks of regime supporters would be great. Even a brief recorded video showing him alive—without any speech—would have demonstrated that the regime still has leadership.

Meanwhile, the regime’s rank-and-file enforcers spend much of their time in the streets, avoiding buildings that could be targeted from the air. They roam around intimidating ordinary citizens, brandishing weapons and shouting religious slogans. This is less a sign of strength than panic. They know that if the public floods the streets and topples the regime, they could face retribution for their role in the killing of tens of thousands of people.

Another explanation for Mojtaba’s absence is that the establishment wants to shield its last hope from a targeted strike. Officials may calculate that any movement, communication, or even a digital appearance could reveal his location. Reinforced bunkers and tight security did not save his father.

Still, many political and economic figures within the regime have begun signaling obedience to Mojtaba by offering bay’at—an Islamic pledge of loyalty to a leader. In early Islamic tradition, people publicly gave bay’at to a caliph or ruler as a declaration of allegiance and obedience. Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was among the first to do so, announcing: “Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei will steer the ship of the revolution toward a prosperous, advanced, and unified Iran.” President Masoud Pezeshkian also pledged allegiance. The regime’s so-called reformist wing has also begun to fall in line, reducing the chances of a Venezuela-style scenario in which Washington might back a regime insider willing to surrender to U.S. demands.

Mojtaba enjoys a strong alliance with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which more than ever calls the shots in Iran. Short of the Corps’ destruction, is difficult to imagine that the standard-bearer of the regime’s anti-Western and anti-Israel ideology would agree to any form of surrender that might open the door to an uncertain future—one that could threaten both its grip on power and vast economic interests.