Middle East Forum director of policy analysis Michael Rubin argues that Taiz holds deep symbolic weight for the Houthis as a former center of Yemen’s imamate, and warns that its fall would let the group reinforce its lines and push forces toward oil-rich Marib. Rubin adds that if the Houthis later take Aden too, they would control roughly 2,200 kilometers of strategic territory from Pakistan to Bab al-Mandeb and Mokha on behalf of Iran.
Rubin contends that air strikes alone, whether American, Saudi or Israeli, have failed to reverse Houthi momentum because the group has adapted much like Iran’s other proxies, and that only ground operations combined with air power can hold Yemen’s rugged, mile-high terrain. He also argues that Donald Trump cares little about the midterms or Congress, feels emboldened by troop withdrawals from Gulf bases, and faces rising tension with Mohammed bin Salman as Houthi strikes on Riyadh’s airport embarrass Washington’s alliance with Saudi Arabia.
Translated from the Arabic broadcast.
HOST: When we look at the city of Taiz, it doesn’t seem to be in a good position at all. In your view, what if Taiz falls to the Houthi group? What would that mean for the legitimate government going forward?
RUBIN: Ahmed, remember that Taiz is important not just because of its location, but symbolically it is very important because it was a center of the imamate in Yemen before the civil war. That’s why the Houthis have always wanted to control it. But as you also know, Taiz was a capital because of its important position, and if the Houthis are able to control Taiz, that would let them reinforce their lines and put more pressure internally, while also directing more forces toward Marib, which is important because of Yemen’s oil resources.
HOST: If the Houthi group takes Taiz, don’t you think the next Houthi step or plan might be Aden more than any other area?
RUBIN: Yes, certainly. The problem with the Houthis controlling an area inland is that they tried before and were pushed back by the Southern Transitional Council and its forces. One interesting thing I noticed from that earlier fighting is that I heard STC members who were killed around Mukalla and other areas. This makes me believe that even though the Saudis may have some problems with the STC, because Saudi Arabia saw it as an extension of Emirati influence, the crisis became severe enough that the Saudis started allowing the STC, even with Emirati backing, to prevent a collapse like the one in 2015.
HOST: Despite the fierce air strikes Saudi Arabia is conducting against Houthi concentrations and movements around Taiz, these strikes don’t seem to be changing the reality on the ground or the Houthi push toward the city. Isn’t this the same pattern as with Iran — despite all the air strikes, the reality on the ground doesn’t seem to change much, whether in Iran or with the Houthis? The matter requires more ground action, as with Hezbollah, where Israel didn’t rely only on air strikes but advanced on the ground to change the reality. Don’t you think there’s an Iranian strategy that its proxies have adapted to, where they know exactly how to deal with air strikes regardless of whether they’re American, Saudi, Israeli or otherwise?
RUBIN: I agree with you one hundred percent. When Mokha was lost at the start after the attack, Saudi Arabia struck the airport in Mokha. I looked at Mokha airport — it looked good for the international audience, but the truth is Mokha only serviced two flights a week to Saudi Arabia, putting it on the same level as a small village in Alaska. It was more a message than a strategy. And Ahmed, as you know, I was also on these fronts myself, looking at them — it was about 140 kilometers from Taiz. This terrain is very difficult, and it will be impossible to simply affect the front lines with air strikes alone. In the end, either Yemen’s legitimate government or the Houthis will need to combine air power with ground forces, considering we’re talking about trying to control areas that rise a thousand meters or more. This reminds me of Afghanistan when the United States was trying to catch Osama bin Laden. Don’t underestimate the value of the terrain in and around Taiz.
HOST: A short while ago, as shown in breaking news, the Arab coalition announced that Saudi Arabia intercepted a ballistic missile fired by Houthi militias toward Riyadh — missiles continue toward Riyadh airport and Saudi airports. Doesn’t this open an opportunity for Yemen’s legitimate government, given that the Houthis are pressuring Saudi Arabia to the point where it is forced to respond forcefully — that the legitimate government now sees a chance that Saudi Arabia will help it more on the air level or other levels to break the siege on Taiz as a response to the Houthis?
RUBIN: Yes, in the end this could be an opportunity for the internationally recognized government in Yemen. The problem is that if we look at past Saudi behavior many times, if Saudi Arabia believes it’s facing a threat from the Houthis and isn’t getting enough support from the United States or other countries, Saudi Arabia is likely to cut a separate deal with the Houthis. So on one hand Yemen’s government can hope Saudi Arabia becomes more hostile toward the Houthis, but on the other hand they should worry that Saudi Arabia might abandon the legitimate government if it gets a promise from the Houthis that they will end their attacks on Saudi Arabia.
HOST: Do you think the continued Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, specifically the recent attack on Riyadh airport, change the red lines, the diplomatic lines, and the communications related to the Houthis, the international arrangements between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia? Don’t you think this changes the balance of power and might change Saudi strategy toward Yemen?
RUBIN: In the end this could happen, but at the same time, Ahmed, what worries me is that Houthi advances since the start of August have been significant, to the point that the Houthis — and those who support them — may feel they have the ability to win not only against the internationally recognized government but also against Saudi Arabia. I’ve been talking to people in shipping and banking, and the worst-case scenario we see is not just that attacks on Riyadh will cause Saudi isolation or conflict around Bab al-Mandeb, which could stop Saudi oil exports through Yanbu port, but also that if we see Iraqi Shia militias or the Revolutionary Guard simultaneously try to create conflict in this region, that would certainly affect Saudi Arabia and the Saudi kingdom. And when I talk about insurgency or conflict, it doesn’t necessarily mean targeting Saudi forces themselves, but if terrorist militias affiliated with Iran start placing explosive devices and bombs on buses and vehicles belonging to Aramco, then we will see all the Americans and Germans and everyone working in the oil sector in Saudi Arabia leave, and that would be more impactful than closing Hormuz or Bab al-Mandeb.
HOST: What will the Trump administration do regarding what’s happening toward Saudi Arabia, or the killing of the American citizen as a result of the recent Houthi attack on Riyadh airport?
RUBIN: On one hand there’s a lot of talk and international discourse that goes wrong when it assumes Trump cares a lot about what will happen in the elections less than a month away. Donald Trump cares little about anyone other than himself. So once the election is over and behind him, instead of being powerless because American focus will be on the next presidential election, Trump will feel liberated, and then he won’t have to answer or respond to anyone. On the other hand, what I hear is that Trump has become heavily involved with Mohammed bin Salman, and this is very difficult because President Trump will not accept responsibility for his own decisions. The fact that the Houthis appear to be winning against Saudi Arabia has caused Trump to lose patience with Mohammed bin Salman as well, so we’re seeing these tensions behind the curtain between Washington and Riyadh.
HOST: But isn’t it clear that Iran is playing every card available in the Middle East to raise oil prices higher, to pressure the Trump administration in order to achieve a major loss for the Democrats in the upcoming midterm elections? Polls now show the Democratic Party in a good position in both the House and Senate. Isn’t it clear that Iran has a goal behind all this escalation?
RUBIN: Yes, certainly, I agree with you on this point, but what I’m saying is that many people inside the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as diplomats and officials, believe this is what dominates thinking in Washington. But what I’m saying is that even if Trump loses Congress, he doesn’t care much about that because he doesn’t rely much on Congress. If anything has defined his administration, it’s his desire to ignore Congress, and frankly to ignore American law. Some might say academically that if Trump breaks the law, the Supreme Court will take some action, but it takes two or three years for the court to act, which means that by that time Trump will have left the White House, which means Trump knows he can ignore the law.
HOST: The US withdrawal from Iraq and pulling back many American troops from US bases in the Gulf Arab states — don’t you think this makes Donald Trump more dangerous when he threatens Iran compared to previous periods?
RUBIN: Yes, in many cases, yes, that is the case, and that’s what I was trying to say. Donald Trump won’t care much about diplomacy. He feels he is in a position of strength by not thinking about elections, and doing what he wants and thinks regarding Iran regardless of what Congress thinks. At the same time, if the United States withdraws from Qatar and many bases in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and instead focuses on Greece and Cyprus, in the end this means the United States believes it has a new position from which it can deal with the Iranian threat fully. Now when I listen to official American messaging, you’re absolutely right. Many candidates, Democrats and Republicans alike, say gasoline prices have risen a lot and we need to end this war. The problem with this logic is that the United States can end this war and go home, but it won’t be able to stop Iran or the Houthis from controlling Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz. So in the end, an American withdrawal would be cowardly and wouldn’t solve the problem. Another way to look at this problem: if the Houthis manage to control Taiz, then Aden, then Mukalla, you’re talking about Iranian control over 2,200 kilometers from Pakistan to Bab al-Mandeb and Mokha. That is a very large amount of strategic geography at the disposal of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
HOST: Iran has offered Saudi Arabia to play the role of mediator between Riyadh and the Houthi group. Do you think this offer or this news is laughable, or could it be an important development in the nature of what’s happening, with Iran trying to use some of the cards it holds to benefit from the whole conflict in the Middle East?
RUBIN: I agree with everything you said, and the truth is it’s like calling in firefighters to put out a fire we started ourselves. The truth is Iran wants to benefit from the war and also wants to benefit from diplomacy, and it will try to win in both arenas. It requires all the countries in the region not to let this happen. The United States has a bad habit of trusting mediators, like Pakistan and others. Honestly, I don’t think Saudi Arabia would be foolish enough to do this, because living in the same neighborhood as Iran, these ideological goals are inevitable for Iran. They won’t go into negotiations with the same foolishness and shortsightedness that Trump had.
HOST: There were reports we saw last week from the New York Times and other important sources saying Pakistan carried out some strikes on Houthi positions, officially denied, but there were reports discussing this issue. Also, Axios reported that Syria is considering sending two Syrian divisions toward Yemen to fight alongside the legitimate Yemeni government. With everything happening in Taiz and the continued general Houthi advance — despite the legitimate government’s counterattack, the Houthis are still the ones advancing on the map — do you think we could see greater escalation? Could we see Syrian forces in Yemen fighting the Houthis toward al-Jawf, toward Marib, which is considered the soft underbelly of Sanaa, as you know?
RUBIN: I take the Pakistani angle more seriously. If the Syrians went to Yemen, it would be like sending North Koreans to Croatia. One could say the Syrians might go to Yemen, but remember there are no prior operational ties between the Syrians and the internationally recognized government in Yemen. The Syrians aren’t accustomed to Yemen’s terrain, and to be blunt, Sanaa sits thousands of meters above sea level, and the Syrians aren’t used to fighting at such altitudes, so it would be a disaster if they fought there. But when we talk about the Pakistanis, that’s a different matter, especially since the Pakistanis, as I said, have a long history with the Saudis going back to the 1950s. They had joint operations demonstrated in 1979, and there’s also trust that’s been built since the Pakistanis helped Saudi Arabia with its internal security, so there could be some kind of internal role for Pakistan. But the other issue regarding Syria is the general suspicions in the region, especially regarding Israel — that if Syria came to Saudi Arabia, their goal might not be to fight alongside the Saudis but perhaps to confront Israel, and this could lead to more complications in the same way we saw Israel strike Syria over Turkish deployment.
HOST: Do you think the Trump administration will remain focused on the Iranian side, that the pressure, siege or potential strikes it is carrying out could lead to the possible fall of the Iranian regime, thereby eliminating all this danger in the region, including the Houthi group among these dangers? Or is it possible there will be a push to frame the Houthi group differently, similar to the framework used for ISIS, with an international coalition working against this group, which, if it controls Taiz as we’re discussing now, might think about reaching the Gulf of Aden as well?
RUBIN: First, when we look at the Houthis, there’s no room for error. I oppose the Houthis, but the Houthis are fundamentally different from Hezbollah in Lebanon, or Kataib Hezbollah, or Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq. The reason is that the Houthis are not proxies created from scratch by the Islamic Republic of Iran, but from the Yemeni perspective, many Yemenis see the Houthis as a national extension of the imamate they once had. This means the Iranians helped them grow rather than creating them. So there’s a sense in Yemen that the Houthis may be pro-Iran but are legitimately Yemeni in origin. For this reason, I think the Houthis’ ability to move beyond the march on Saudi Arabia is limited. That said, just as there was a deployment of Hezbollah or some Pakistani or Iraqi Shia fighters in other areas within the so-called Axis of Resistance, it wouldn’t surprise me to see the Iranians use the Houthis as mercenaries in different countries. With that said, I don’t think the Gulf Cooperation Council states will face any real threat from Houthi expansion and the spread of their control. One question related to the GCC is: while the Houthis show they’re not interested in such expansion, how long will it take for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE — how long will it take these five countries to tell the Sultanate of Oman that they need to stop sympathizing with the Houthis? To say you are mediators is one thing if you’re trying to bring peace, but if the Omanis want to be taken seriously, they need to prove the Houthis aren’t interested in peace, and that it’s time to expel them from Muscat.
HOST: After October 7th, it became clear to the United States, to Europe, and to the international community in general that the Houthi group isn’t easy and is dangerous, possessing quality missiles, quality drones, and very dangerous naval capabilities. It’s believed that all the American and European operations against the Houthis were timid, the objectives weren’t clear in all the operations against the Houthis, and they didn’t ultimately have an effect. Who bears responsibility now for the Houthi rise in this way compared to any other faction in the region — if we compare things to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the Houthi group, dear sir, appears to be the strongest. Is the American administration the one that bears responsibility for not paying attention to the Houthis? Which European countries do we blame today?
RUBIN: I like this question, and there’s little blame that can be assigned, but let me talk about one issue we haven’t discussed. The Houthis, from the perspective of Pentagon officials in America, fall into a preferential position because on one hand we have Central Command, and on the other hand we have Africa Command, and the Houthis sit between the two, especially when we talk about the Houthis cooperating with General Burhan in Sudan or with al-Shabaab in Somalia. At the same time, we know the State Department has a bureau for these affairs, and Central Command also has its own office for such affairs. But do these two offices talk to each other? For this reason the Houthis have been successful in operating in this geographic area on the border between two different bureaucracies that don’t communicate with each other, each wanting to pin responsibility on the other side.
HOST: The Giants Brigades are an interesting force; they are part of the legitimate government and still fighting the Houthis, but as you know there have been major changes regarding the Giants Brigades and their support. How do you assess the state of this force, which is considered important and knows how to fight the Houthis and is equipped and trained? It’s believed the equipment and training have reached more advanced stages than what the legitimate government has obtained in confronting the Houthis. How do you assess the state of these forces?
RUBIN: When we look at some of these units fighting, the problem with Yemen’s government is that Yemenis talk about themselves — the truth is that the internationally recognized government has more presence in Oman, in Abu Dhabi, in Jordan, and other areas, more than its presence in Aden. When it comes to the southern forces, they are the most capable, but Saudi Arabia underestimated them because of Saudi competition with the UAE. What I fear is that this competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is also creating space for disasters not only in Yemen but also in Sudan and perhaps even in Libya. Regarding the south and the southern forces inside Yemen, when I was there on the Dhalea front, one of the problems that existed was the lack of effective drones, at least compared to what the Houthis had, and that was a result of Saudi Arabia and the UAE not making use of them. I had no doubt that if we had equipped some of these strong battalions inside Yemen, they could have defeated the Houthis. But the problem is, to use the American expression, too many cooks spoil the broth. When you have too many commanders trying to lead, it leads to chaos.
HOST: Our dear guest joining us via Zoom from Washington, the former Pentagon official and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum, Mr. michael Rubin. Thank you very much for being with us today.
