Middle East Forum director of policy analysis Michael Rubin argues that a prospective India-Israel-Japan partnership mirrors the Mecca Pact, with Israeli technology, Indian manpower and Japanese financing as counterparts to Saudi capital, Pakistani manpower and Turkish industry. Rubin contends the weakest link is the Israel-Japan relationship, since Japan’s post-Fukushima dependence on Persian Gulf oil makes Tokyo cautious about siding with Israel, and he suggests folding Japan into the existing I2U2 dialogue alongside the United Arab Emirates.
Rubin warns that China’s demographic decline, not just its rise, could push Beijing toward aggression to distract from internal crisis, drawing parallels to Iran and Russia. He states that China occupies Indian territory in Aksai Chin and threatens Japan’s Senkaku Islands, while Israel faces no comparable territorial threat from Beijing, and he cautions that India’s failure to modernize could leave it exposed if Washington hesitates to back New Delhi against China.
Excerpt: Michael Rubin’s remarks and the questions put to him.
KHETA: Wow. Thank you, Nina, for those, insightful comments. now I would like to bring Dr. Michael Rubin to share his opening remarks. Over to you, Dr. Rubin.
RUBIN: Thank you so much. I’m not an expert on this topic like my colleagues in the panel are, but a few observations. First of all, when you’re a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And because I focus on, the Middle East, West Asia, what I see when I look at this developing partnership is almost a parallel rival bloc to what we’ve seen with the Mecca Defense Accord or Mecca Pact, whatever we wanna call it. when it comes to the Mecca Pact with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, we have Saudi capital, we have Pakistani manpower, we have Turkey, Turkish industrial, military industrial developments and so forth. when it comes to, a potential India-Israel-Japan, pact, that’s admittedly not being discussed in that context at this point in time. You also have, Israeli technological know-how, you have, Indian manpower, you have Japanese financing. So there seems to be almost a parallel there. The Chinese, of course, are the elephant in the room, and it is what unites India and Japan at least. Unfortunately here, Israel lags. And if we look at the India-Israeli relationship is strong, if we look at the India-Japanese relationship is strong, the weak link really that needs to be worked on is the Israeli-Japanese relationship. After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan became even more dependent on Persian Gulf oil. And so Japan has been remarkably cautious when it comes to Israel, especially when it comes to choosing sides in the Israeli-Arab conflict. If it does need to choose sides, I’m not sure it would choose the right one at this point of time just because of economic realism. Indian-Japanese trade is relatively, small, less than three billion dollars, and that’s something which ultimately needs to be worked on. When we have these ideas for alliances, we often talk about creating trilateral dialogues and so forth given Japan’s concerns. and also, I should say that Israel has traditionally been a weak link with regard to China, which has repeatedly frustrated American policymakers, perhaps at the level below, congressmen, the secretary of state, and those who do most of the talking. But at the professional civil service, what really drives unease with Israel is not issues with regard to the Palestinians or the polemics we hear now, but rather Israel’s military dealings with China. And I don’t mean just officially, because India, Israel’s private sector is just as, if not more of a problem when it comes to dealing with China. At any rate, given the Japanese reluctance to engage formally, especially with regard to Japan’s, the current, interpretations of Japan’s constitution, pacifism, and so forth, ultimately I think the best way forward would be to bring Japan into an existing dialogue like the I two U two. especially because in a situation like that you would have, a Persian Gulf representative with the United Arab Emirates, and that could ease some of the Japanese concerns, especially with regard to antagonizing other states. Now, of course, the United Arab Emirates can be polarizing, in politics, but there’s a moment now where perhaps India, Japan could take advantage of this simply because with Saudi Arabia, having its back against the wall because of the Houthis. I know having spent some time in Yemen last year, that several of my contacts in Yemen who were with the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council have been killed fighting in the last couple days, which leads me to believe that the United Arab Emirates has given a quiet green light for some of their proxies or allies to fight alongside the Saudis. That gives an opportunity s- perhaps for Japan to slip into some of these dialogues without having the baggage of appearing to choose one side or the other in this really self-destructive Riyadh-Abu Dhabi, competition. But with that, just so just in summary, I mean, I really think what we need to work on is the Israel-Japan component of any of this partnership, and the way forward would be to have Japan join the I two U two. That’s, that’s basically all I have to say right now.
KHETA: Thank you, Dr. Karas, for highlighting China’s, role in the emerging tri- trilateral partnership and placing it within the broader context of great power rivalry. So thank you to all our speakers for sharing their perspective. And now moving on to our Q&A. my first question is to you, Dr. Rubin. So how could you, like how could instability in West Asia affect this strategic cooperation among these three, countries?
RUBIN: Who was that directed to?
KHETA: To you, Dr. Rubin.
RUBIN: Okay. Look, I mean, instability in West Asia, impacts all these countries. I’m, I’m not sure whether there’s a special magic formula with regard to instability in West Asia. When it comes to instability in West Asia, I mean, when it... with regard to India and Japan, there is immediate economic ramifications. When it comes to Israel, there’s both economic and military ramifications. That said, it’s hard to isolate the ramifications of instability in West Asia simply to one region or a few countries because the reverberations are going to be quite continuous, abroad. I should say that one aspect which we do not talk about often, but which I find fascinating, is when the Iran war broke out, initially in talking to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees people, it was the only war that they could think of where more people came into the war zone than left, simply because, many Iranians trusted the precision of Israeli and American bombing, and therefore went to check on their properties and check on their families. However, if we get to a point where the Islamic Republic of Iran collapses, one a- one issue we haven’t factored into conversations is what would it mean for massive refugee flows from Iran? Most of those refugee flows would flow elsewhere into West Asia, especially into Turkey, which doesn’t need, where Iranians don’t really need visas and demand, unless they’re declare that they’re staying more than ninety days. but what would an Iranian refugee flow into Pakistan, look like, for example, or into Central Asia? And what ramifications might that ultimately have, elsewhere in South Asia? So I could rabbit on, but, I won’t. I’ll turn the floor back over.
PANDYA: Thank you. Any thoughts from Michael? Michael has been a keen watcher of India.
RUBIN: I’ll, I’ll have a piece in tomorrow’s Sunday Guardian. no, Sunday Guardian. Sorry, I gotta get my dates right. with no school today, it feels like a Saturday. At any rate, I’ll have a piece in the Sunday Guardian this week, looking at population decline, because while most people in the United States would worry about the rise of China, for some time, many of us have been worrying about the decline of China. and when we look at... There’s a common assumption that when population is burgeoning, that that leads to aggression. I mean, during World War II, Lebensraum and so forth. But the fact of the matter is, when population crashes, when demography declines, that can often also lead to war. We’ve seen this with... Or contribute to war, I should say. we’ve seen this with regard to, Iran, which suffered one of the largest peacetime declines in fertility leading up to, since nineteen eighty-eight, leading up to the current wars. And we’ve also seen this with Vladimir Putin in Russia. The fact of the matter is, while India’s population is growing, if we look at the same United Nations population statistics, China’s population is crashing. This is the result of femicide. This is the result of thirty-six years of the one-child policy. and what I worry about is the follow-on effects of economic decline and then the Chinese dictatorship lashing out in order to distract. many people in Washington will talk about what this could mean for Taiwan. And of course, we had the Central Intelligence Agency leak that it thought that China would be capable, would have the ability to take Taiwan by twenty twenty-seven. But, while everyone— While China would have to question whether the Americans would come to, Taiwan’s defense, the whole reason we now have a base in Australia is it’s out of the range of, Chin- most Chinese missiles. the, issue is if China doesn’t want to go after Formosa, it can try to take a few outlying Taiwanese islands, fine. But it might start being much more aggressive towards India as it looks for a way to distract. That’s my concern looking into the future, not in 2027, but perhaps in 2032 or 2037. and what’s frustrating is it doesn’t seem that India is getting its act together, with the realization that it could face greater aggression, if not in Ladakh, then in Arunachal Pradesh, a- and so forth. So put it this way, when you were summarizing before, Abhinav, you were talking about India, Japan, and Israel, putting Israel aside because it doesn’t have the same sort of conflict with, China. But the way I would summarize this is China occupies Indian land. It occupies Aksai Chin, and it’s encroaching elsewhere. China seeks to occupy Japanese territory in the Senkaku Islands. Israel doesn’t have to face that concern from China, but China does pose a threat, and I’m not sure whether India’s fully internalized that, it’s facing a war of the future, not rehashing the wars it fought in the past. And I should also say some frustration, and this extends to a frustration touching on topics that Carice and I talked about, in that one of my worries is that China may calculate that if there is any sort of conflict, the United States would throw India under the bus the way Dr. Henry Kissinger once did. and that actu- that belief that the United States might not engage in deterrence, could actually accelerate conflict. When it comes to, when it comes to China, a- and the US, and what I would clarify to, Dr. Carice, she’s absolutely right that Israel’s taken great strides, and the ex- Israeli exports to China have declined significantly over the last six or seven years because of US pressure. But there’s still a lot... I mean, there’s a sense in the US, especially with the Port of Haifa, especially with, Lenovo and Infinidat, that if the United States takes their eye off the target, that Israel’s gonna pivot in the wrong direction. And it’s just a sense that I think the Pentagon has, which is unfortunate.
PANDYA: Thank you.
RUBIN: And Carice-
PANDYA: Thank you, Michael. Thank you
RUBIN: ... is shaking her head, so...
PANDYA: You have spoken without, I would say, diplomatic niceties, you know, hard facts, which I’ve always appreciated, you know. I like your bluntness. You know, I think, you know, we need to listen to your artic- I mean, your thoughts more and read your articles more. so yes, I think, I mean, from my side, my, I don’t have any more questions. But, if, we can invite Nina and, Carice for any last thoughts if they have, and then we can wrap it up because we are already, close to our today’s session.
RUBIN: I think Carice needs to respond because I’ve-
PANDYA: Yeah
RUBIN: ... I saw her shaking her head, and it’s only fair that she gets to respond if she disagrees.
PANDYA: Nina, your thoughts?
RUBIN: Sorry, wait. And I would say that for anyone here, of course, through the Middle East Forum, I can publish any responses and any debates on this issue, including framed as a debate within Us- Usinus Foundation and so forth. So just let me know if... And we pay. Thanks.
