Middle East Forum director of policy analysis Michael Rubin warns that Republicans are bracing for a midterm disaster, losing ground even in traditionally Republican states such as Texas and Mississippi. Rubin attributes the slide to flawed candidates, unease at the corruption surrounding the administration, and gasoline and electricity prices that President Trump promised to bring down.
Rubin contends Trump has undone 25 years of US-India progress through tariffs and threats of secondary sanctions over Indian purchases of Russian oil, and blames friends of Trump with lucrative Pakistani lobbying deals, calling it “policy by corruption rather than policy by principle.” He argues Turkey seeks to stoke a sectarian civil war inside India, predicts Iran will try to drag out tensions until the next US presidential election, and says Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman could face a palace coup.
BASU: Hello and welcome to The Sunday Guardian podcast. I’m Joyeeta Basu. Viewers, a lot is happening in the world, specifically when it comes to US and Iran. In fact, a lot is happening in the US also because the midterm elections are coming up. Now, which way things are headed, which way India-US relations are headed. You know, to discuss this, I’ve got a very special guest with me, a very keen observer of international international politics, Mr Michael Rubin. He’s Director, Policy Analysis, at the Middle East Forum. He has been a professor of history in the US, uh Israel, and in Iraq. Uh he has worked with the Department of Defense, specifically with the Pentagon, in the Bush administration. Welcome to the show.
RUBIN: Thank you. Thanks for having me.
BASU: Yeah, the first question is, of course, uh how are things in the US when it comes to the Republicans in particular, and Mr Trump?
RUBIN: You know, everyone is bracing themselves for a disaster. Many of the Republicans hold out hope that polling with regard to President Trump is notoriously inaccurate because many people simply don’t want to admit to exit pollers that they’re going to be voting for President Trump or for the Republicans. However, in this case, it’s a midterm election. President Trump isn’t directly on the ballot. And one of the problems is that the Republicans have nominated a lot of deeply-flawed candidates who President Trump may want, but aren’t able to translate their populist appeal to the general um the the Trump’s election appeal to the popular um to the regular people. And so, we’re now talking about the Republicans losing footholds in traditionally Republican states like Texas, like Mississippi. And so, we could see a real Democratic landslide.
BASU: Uh now, what happens if there is a Democratic landslide? Because we are hearing that even if the Democrats win the House, they may not win the Senate, or Senate is a toss-up. Is that the case?
RUBIN: Well, increasingly, it looks like the Senate may be um falling out of reach of the Republicans as well. Again, because there are some deeply flawed Senate candidates in play. Lindsey Graham’s sister is having trouble in South Carolina, which has always been a Republican state. And we’re also seeing in Texas a real um rebellion against the Republican candidate. What’s important to note, however, in many of these states, people are voting against the Republicans rather than for the Democrats. And so, that could have implication in 2 years if the Republicans field better candidates.
BASU: So when you’re talking about, of course Mr Trump is not on the ballot, but how much of his policies uh are contributing to this disastrous situation for the Republicans?
RUBIN: Well, look, when you’ve been president for 2 years, as the uh famous statement by President Eisenhower goes, “The buck stops here,” meaning the president is responsible. And people get exhausted with President Donald Trump’s antics. Uh certainly, the press has been uniformly against him, with reason. Um and there’s a general unease both at the corruption which surrounds his his administration, when Americans are struggling to make their payments, to buy their groceries, to see the president involved in insider-dealing which is netting him now more than a billion dollars is something that doesn’t go well with the electorate. But ultimately, where foreign policy comes into play is the price of gasoline, of petrol, of diesel um is going sky-high. And President Donald Trump had said during the Biden administration that when he would be president, the price of gas would come down. That hasn’t happened. Uh at the same time, because of unease surrounding artificial intelligence, because artificial intelligence, at a minimum, has been causing a spike in electricity bills, the fact of the matter is, many Americans are feeling, even if they’re making more than $100,000 a year, that they’re barely keeping their head above water. And so this is coming into play in the elections, as well.
BASU: Yeah, so when you are looking at uh the rise in gas prices, I mean Mr Trump has always been saying that we do not have to look outward, so Iran war does not really impact us. Definitely uh that is not the case then, isn’t it?
RUBIN: Well, I mean, certainly the United States doesn’t get its gasoline from Iran um or from the Middle East for that matter. We we produce it domestically or we get it from Venezuela or perhaps even Brazil. But what Donald Trump has never understood is that all the prices of gasoline are interlinked, and therefore, trouble in one area causes trouble in another. You add into that the fact that um the rate the the prices of shipping um have increased tremendously, and that has um follow-through effects down the line. And ultimately, I think most people acknowledge President Trump has been wrong. Um the same thing is true, Joyeeta, when it comes to um the tariffs. President Trump has taken a very simplistic view towards tariffs. He has argued that this is the tool that the United States has been missing to quote, unquote, “Make America great again,” and he hasn’t understood that when you impose tariffs on foreign states, not only does it cause um diplomatic casualties, but ultimately, the American consumer is going to end up paying more, simply because the price of those tariffs is actually passed down to the American consumer.
BASU: Now, so when you’re talking about diplomatic casualty, me being an Indian, the first thought that comes to my mind is uh India-US relations. And that is the buzz over here, that in the last ever since Mr Trump has become president, India-US relations have basically gone back perhaps even 25 years. So, uh what what is the view in Washington? How do you yourself see it? And what is the view in Washington?
RUBIN: Look, I I agree with you that President Donald Trump has, in the matter of 2 years, undone 25 years of US-India growth. And it pains me, and it pains many other people in Washington, simply because we see in the 21st century the the relationship between India and the United States being incredibly important to shape the outcome of the century, to shape international security, to shape the global economy. India is the world’s largest democracy. It’s, in many ways, the world’s largest market as well. The fact of the matter is, it is a self-inflicted wound on the part of the United States. Now, here’s what worries me: I no longer think that the problem is just going to be limited to Donald Trump. Even though India and the United States should have close ties, the populism which we see also on the left, among the Democratic Party, among those who are going to accept as truth everything the Muslim Brotherhood or Khalistani um radicals say is going to be a constant drain on US or a constant impediment to US-India relations. What I’m afraid, if the Democrats take power, and we’re not just talking about the Senate and the House of Representatives, but ultimately about the White House, I’m afraid we’re going to become the new Canada, in which, for different reasons, the US officials are going to pick fights with India because of an almost irrational fear of Hindutva, which is going to be coming from some more radical constituents, which are going to have a fast track into the Oval Office.
BASU: Because that is quite worrying. You know, in this context that you’re talking about, uh picking a fight, uh and since you mentioned Lindsey Graham before this, I mean Lindsey Graham has been the brain behind this 100%, and I think it was actually he was talking about 500% tariffs on countries that are purchasing oil uh from Russia, when the fact is that US continues to do business with uh Russia uh maybe not in oil, but then other areas. So, the thing is that uh how although Mr Trump has not yet imposed any uh, I would say, sanctions, I mean secondary sanctions, what are the chances that he may do it?
RUBIN: You know, ultimately, I’m hoping that more mature voices will whisper into his ear and somehow convince Donald Trump not to do it. But ultimately with Donald Trump, he can be very self-destructive, um and we don’t know how he would act. That said, I’m hoping that those around Donald Trump will convince him to play out what 100% sanctions on India would mean simply because it’s not I mean, India has a real need for energy. Let let me back up for a second, Joyeeta. I personally disagree with India’s the extent of India’s ties to Russia. Years on, I think that this is an avoidable issue that an Indian government might have um might have already explored alternatives to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. I make no I am incredibly um sympathetic to Ukraine. I’ve traveled to Ukraine. I believe that Ukraine is going to win this war, which is another reason why I think that India’s policy is self-destructive. That said, the way around this is to recognize what India’s needs are. India has real energy needs, and simply slapping 100% secondary sanctions on Indian goods isn’t going to fix India’s very real needs. So what the United States should be doing is asking India, how is it that we can wean you off Russian uh energy, and at the same time, um make sure that your energy needs are met. And there are other alternatives out there: um Venezuela, even though it’s a world away, you have um Libya, which has some of the best, highest quality oil out there. Um many of these countries which are traditional producers, which aren’t necessarily um undercut by the problems in the Persian Gulf right now, have the ability to pick up additional slack. And the question is, what is the United States doing to ensure that this would happen? We now see, for example, um even though Saudi oil um we see a we see an increase of oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz. So it’s at 77% of pre-war levels. We also see a situation in the Red Sea in which even though you have a decline in exports through the Bab-el-Mandeb, you actually have an increase in loadings at the Saudi Red port of Yanbu. What this means to me is that Saudi Arabia has struck a separate deal that enables its ships, its tankers, to go through the Bab-el-Mandeb. And so the point of this is, India has other alternatives. What is the United States doing productively in order to ensure that India has what it needs, that India um doesn’t that we don’t slap sanctions on India, and at the same time, we have a road map within India to reduce its dependence on Russia uh in a more permanent fashion? That’s what a presidential um a a more responsible presidential policy would be.
BASU: Yeah. Uh at the same time, you see there is some speculation here that while to Mr Trump, India is dispensable and a soft target, when it comes to China, those sanctions, those secondary sanctions will never be imposed. And this has to be also seen in the context of Xi Jinping’s uh recent visit to DC. So what is going on on that in that front?
RUBIN: Well, you know, unfortunately, there’s a pattern here, and it doesn’t just start with President Xi. I mean, the fact of the matter is, going back to Kissinger, going back to um his personal hatred of Indira Gandhi, there’s been a willingness to throw India under the bus on the part of so-called sophisticated American national security advisors, secretaries of state, and so forth. Um and so there is an element there which is worsened by the fact that friends of Donald Trump, who have won lucrative deals with Pakistani lobby firms, are whispering all the wrong things in his ear. It’s policy by corruption rather than policy by principle. So, we have a real problem there. That said, what India where India has a um strength in Washington is that while Donald Trump, for his own personal business interests or whatever, may be siding with Pakistan, India still has a huge reserve of sympathy. I mean, after 25 years, most people, including myself, who were advocates for close US-India ties, number one, you’ve got a bipartisan grouping there, and number two, um you’ve got a deep field, meaning all over the place, you have good friends of India. The issue is whether India is going to allow um the United States to maintain these strong ties after Donald Trump goes. Here’s the problem: we all know that in the United States, we’ve had a traditional policy. Uh and that traditional policy at times has been antagonistic to India, but generally, it had been moving in the right direction. The problem in India is there’s been the traditional old guard, the doyens of the political class, of the um of the diplomatic corps, of the civil service, who grew up in the Cold War and have traditionally been very anti-American. Now, the problem here is that because of Donald Trump, this class of Indian bureaucrats, and Indian officials, and Indian leaders can now, even if we have a sincere American leader who wants to regrow US-India ties, they’re going to be in the background in the Indian political discourse, telling everyone, “You can’t trust the Americans,” pointing at what’s happening right now and saying, “We told you so.” And that’s going to be generational to try to overcome.
BASU: Yeah, that’s in fact, that is what exactly is happening here. And the trust deficit that has come in here, you know, when it comes to the US, it has to be literally seen to be believed. I mean, there is too much skepticism, and it has gone down to the level of the ground, you know, the public perception. US has taken a major hit. So, the whole thing is into the Pakistan question. Is it, when you’re the the this sudden this not sudden, this has been going on for a while now, for over a year, is it all about personal interest and not about policy?
RUBIN: I I if I had to guess, it would be at least 80% personal interest. Look, from a policy standpoint, yes, the United States has had some ties with Pakistan in the uh before. After Nehru frankly rejected President Truman, we ended up allied with Pakistan during the Cold War. But Pakistan was always the ally of second choice, and there is always a great deal of resentment because of it. From Pakistan’s standpoint, we are a fair-weather friend. Every time we need Pakistan, we lift sanctions on them. And every time we don’t need Pakistan, we impose sanctions on them, and they have every right to be cynical. That said, Pakistan has openly played a double game, I mean most recently with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. I mean, we can’t forget that just 15 years ago, Osama bin Laden was found living in Abbottabad, which is where India um where Pakistan has its major um military academy. He was clearly under protection. So the fact that we would trust Pakistan now, to me, is unbelievable. You add into that what we’ve had with Pahalgam, um what we had with Operation Sindoor, what we’ve had with Pakistan’s um basically sale of its own sovereignty to China as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and you cap this all off with the Mecca um Defense Pact, which is clearly meant as something which is at the very least um second-guessing the American political um the American military commitment in West Asia, and ultimately you have a Pakistan that we really can’t trust. I mean, the problem is, President Donald Trump likes uniforms, he likes generals, he likes the um the illusion of the strong man, and he likes going to places, frankly, that or dealing with press corps that uh with countries that don’t have a vivacious press, that don’t have a democracy, and therefore, in which the dictators control which press questions will be asked to him, so he doesn’t have to deal with the same um cynicism that he receives in Washington. So when he goes, I mean, he’s not going to Pakistan right now, but when he goes to places like Beijing um or elsewhere, he doesn’t believe it or not, the Chinese journalists don’t ask him tough questions. Um he likes that. He likes the red carpet carpet treatment, and the Pakistanis are very, very good at that sort of um for lack of a better word, cultivation of dictators. God knows they’ve had enough practice.
BASU: No, but at the same time, there is something very ironic. Uh because, you see, Mr Trump also seems to like Mr Putin a lot. Okay? But then to go around telling countries like India and China, frankly, I’m not so certain whether he’s going to do it to China or not, that, “If you buy anything from him, I’m going to impose uh sanctions.” I mean, this is so contradictory.
RUBIN: It is contradictory, and I have no excuse for it. That said, one thing to keep in mind, Joyeeta, um when I was last in Ukraine in June, um I went to the Presidential Palace, and I didn’t meet with Zelenskyy, but I met with his first deputy. And one of the biggest complaints of his first deputy was that US mediators, uh Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, had been to Moscow seven times, but they hadn’t once been to Ukraine. And the reason why this is important is, again, I can’t emphasize enough that when you are in Ukraine, and I’m not just in Kyiv, I’m not just going for a day, I’m going out to the frontline in Kharkiv and Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia uh in Odesa and so forth, what you actually see is a real whole-of-nation, not just a whole-of-government approach, a whole-of-nation approach, where you really do feel in the streets the enthusiasm and the um the morale of the Ukrainians. The fact that Witkoff and Kushner have now gone to Kyiv makes me believe that they too have seen this. We’ve seen major Republican influencers like Laura Loomer, once they went to Ukraine, completely flip their positions. The reason the reason why this is important is it’s quite possible now that Witkoff and Kushner have gone back to the White House and told Donald Trump, “You know, Ukraine is going to win, and you’ve going to you’ve got to be on the winning side.” So that’s one thing to keep in mind with regard to Donald Trump’s hypocrisy, but let’s face it, Donald Trump um has no shortage of hypocrisy in his actions.
BASU: That That’s that’s very good, very interesting way of putting it. Uh now, if we can talk a little bit about the other war that is going on, that is the Iran war. I mean, is there likely to be an end to this or what we are witnessing or we are suspecting is that Iran wants to drag it out definitely until the midterm so that the Republicans are humbled uh in the at the hustings? Is Is that the case?
RUBIN: Let me disagree with you just a little bit, Joyeeta. The Iranians don’t want to drag it out to the midterm. They want to drag it out to the presidential election. And the reason I say this is the in 2 years. The reason I say this is the Iranian vice president has said this directly in Persian, that the Iranians are going to be in a period of neither war nor peace for 2 years. And that coincides, he didn’t say Donald Trump’s name, but that coincides with the end of Donald Trump’s term. So I suspect that that is where we’re heading. Now, I wrote an article uh that was published um this week that throws a little bit of cold water on the White House um declarations that the blockade is working with regard to Iran for reasons which I’ve already mentioned to you, that when we see uh Saudi oil flowing not only through the Strait of Hormuz, but through the Bab-el-Mandeb, when the rest of the oil in the Bab-el-Mandeb is not flowing, that leads me to believe that the Saudis have cut a separate deal with the Iranians. They’ve done this before. They’ve done this with the Houthis before. And ultimately, what it is, is a situation of kicking the can down the road. So perhaps, in the short term, we’re going to get a stabilization in the price of oil. But in the long term, we’re um what the Saudis are doing is giving resources to the Houthis, giving resources to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which also promises, for another reason, that um for ideological reasons, why this war is going to continue. Now, what we are hearing a great deal in the United States political discourse right now, especially from Republicans, is that we’ve got to end this war, we’ve got to come home so that gasoline prices drop. But the fact of the matter is, once you’ve hit the hornet’s nest, you can’t simply walk away and expect the hornets to all go home. The Iranians If the United States removes itself from the region, you’re going to have a situation in which the Iranians have a vote on whether or not they continue to interfere with freedom of navigation. And so, um no matter what happens, I think the world is in this situation for another 2 years at least.
BASU: Well, I mean that’s uh that’s scary for the rest of the world as well, isn’t it? For us as well, I mean because the oil situation stays very uncertain.
RUBIN: You’re You’re absolutely right. But, I mean, I Look, I mean, when I go to a place like Ethiopia, um Ethiopia is worried that they do not I mean, of course Ethiopia is landlocked, that they don’t even have the diesel to bring in food into the capital, and so there’s real fear in Addis Ababa of starvation, of famine. The fact of the matter is, India, as bad as the situation is, is in a much better situation than than some other um places around. And ultimately, look, the there there’s other issues going on. When we look at the Iranian economy, um at the time of the Islamic Revolution, it was 70 rial to the dollar. Now, it’s 2.5 million rial to the dollar. The fact of the matter is and it it it’s crashing. The fact of the matter is, what we don’t know, because the Iranians are opaque, is how they’re paying their forces and at what point are we going to see Iranians rebel again. We’ve already seen at universities uh a resumption of some protests. Now, when I look at Iranian uh Revolutionary Guard papers and publications, the way they will look at the massacres which took place on June uh January 8th and 9th, 2026, when um the Americans believe 40,000 Iranians were killed in the street, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard doesn’t really deny those numbers, but the way they conceive of them is that they have bought time for another decade in power. And the logic there is, it’s not random people going out on the streets to protest, it’s actually um the student organizers, the civil society organizers for the future. And by literally killing them all, they believe that they have purchased themselves a decade in power. It’s anyone’s guess to see whether that will remain. And again, the the um elephant in the room is we have Schrödinger’s ayatollah in charge. No one has seen Muqtada al-Sadr, and even when um there are letters issued in his name, they’re not issued in his handwriting. And so, ultimately, um the Iranians have a serious internal problem as well, and it is possible that they themselves aren’t going to be able to last 2 years.
BASU: So, um as uh you’re Director of Policy Analysis at the Middle East Forum, how do you see the Middle East uh developing, or how do you see uh events in uh Middle East taking place in the maybe next 2 years? I mean, a decade is too long a time, of course.
RUBIN: Um look, West Asia, the Middle East, has never been um a a place of true stability, and that predates Israel’s founding, um that goes back to the Ottoman Empire. The big problem right now uh first of all, let’s talk about the good the good aspects. I mean, this tragedy averted with the Flydubai flight, um ultimately refocuses the Middle East on certain key issues. The fact is, the United Arab Emirates-Israeli relationship remains strong. The fact of the matter is, even though Saudi Arabia doesn’t have a normalization agreement with Israel, Saudi Arabia treated the Israelis with the utmost respect, um and the Israelis have been extremely grateful for it. And it really shows the um and frames the problem of terrorism in a way that ordinary people in the Middle East can understand. Um the If there’s ever been a stress test, the Abraham Accords have shown that that stress test has um it it’s survived the stress test. We also see with Saudi Arabia uh and the problems it is facing with regard to the Houthis, with regard to other elements, the fact of the matter is Saudi Arabia seems, increasingly, to be willing to um drop some of its rivalry with the United Arab Emirates. We might talk about Israel and Iran, but the real driver of conflict in the region right now in a broader way, to me, has been that Saudi-Emirati rivalry in Yemen, in Sudan, uh to some extent in Libya, to some extent in Syria, in Ethiopia as well. The fact of the matter is, if we can resolve that, there’s a better chance to have the scaffolding of peace. When it comes to Iran and Israel, look, that war is not over. It’s an ideological war, and at this point, both sides are simply re-arming. The elephant uh the biggest problem moving forward is Turkey, and that’s a problem not only for Israel, but frankly, it’s going to be a problem for India as well, because I think that Turkey is going to stop nothing short of um provoking not only not only arming Pakistan and provoking and supporting terror groups in uh from Turkey’s perspective, the Kashmir cause, but I think Turkey’s goal is deeper, that they want to create a sectarian civil war inside India itself. Uh and ultimately, that is what I worry about going into the future.
BASU: So, is Turkey so basically, is there some sort of a turf war going on between Saudi Arabia and Turkey in terms of Turkey wants to be the overlord of the uh Arab Muslim world?
RUBIN: Um on its surface, no. But I think it’s inevitable that we’re going to get there. On one hand, those who want to argue against Uh first of all, I agree with your statement, Joyeeta. But those who would want to argue against it, Joyeeta, would point to this Mecca Pact, where you have Turkey, you have Pakistan, and you have Saudi Arabia. But again, the biggest problem there is that just as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as in his self-perceived role as leader of the Muslim world, wants to internationalize Jerusalem, if you scratch the surface, he wants to um he he wants to internationalize Mecca and Medina as well, and put it under the control of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, uh which he believes Turkey will dominate. So you’ve got a situation where Turkey, in its long-term goals, are willing to go after what really is the core, the central pillar of the Saudi monarchy’s um visualization of its own legitimacy as the custodian of the two holy mosques. So, ultimately, I don’t think this um truce between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is more It’s not a peace, it’s a truce, but ultimately, um I could see Turkey moving further, and if Turkey doesn’t want to go after Saudi Arabia initially, then India becomes a more tempting target for Erdogan to reinforce his international role as the guardian of the Muslims, as someone who doesn’t believe that Muslims should live under non-Muslim rule.
BASU: So, how is Pakistan relevant in this? Because we saw what happened. They were not willing to uh help the Saudis. I mean, they may have a military I mean, apparently it’s a military pact as well, this this Mecca uh defense agreement. Uh but Pakistan is not willing to fight the war for on behalf of Saudi. So what exactly Pakistan What is it, what is Pakistan’s leverage in this?
RUBIN: You know, Joyeeta, in this, I’ve actually talked to several Pakistanis, and I always get the same answer: from Pakistan’s perspective, this is about their own domestic military industry and uh increasing their markets for their own domestic military industry. When it comes to this pact, I mean, pretend this pact didn’t occur. You still have Pakistan, which, over the years, has helped Saudi Arabia a great deal in terms of its own internal security. Uh Pakistan has So So the ties are nothing new, and if I press the Pakistanis on this, beyond talking about the Pakistani logic of having a market for their own domestic military goods, what they will say is, “Yes, it’s it’s a um a NATO-like pact of mutual defense, but that has to do with an actual invasion of territory, and not something which is going on in Yemen, or something that’s going on um somewhere else.” The fact of the matter is, Pakistan never has a shortage of excuses, but it really makes me think that this Mecca defense pact is really going to be a flash in the pan. I should also say that I’m not sure that um Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman can can survive the current crisis. Yemen has, to use an analogy I’ve heard from Saudis when they talk to Americans, Yemen has always been Saudi Arabia’s Vietnam. Um you had If you remember going back to Operation um Desert Storm, the liberation of Kuwait, the the major Saudi general at the time, I think it was Khalid bin Sultan.
BASU: Okay.
RUBIN: And he became a hero uh once Kuwait was liberated, and there was even talk of him becoming um I mean, first he became defense minister, and then he was going to become, perhaps, even the king himself. But he entered Yemen, I believe it was around 1999, and it was an absolute disaster. And so, he’s more or less faded away. When you look at Yemen today, the reason why the Houthis were able to take Mocha and Perim Island and get directly onto the Bab-el-Mandeb was because Muhammad bin Sultan uh Muhammad bin Salman, the crown prince, basically kneecapped the Southern Transitional Council because he saw them as too pro-Emirati. They were the only ones who had had any record of successful fighting of against the Houthis. At the same time, because Crown Prince Muhammad bin um Salman wanted to focus on Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification and um his own economic projects, he didn’t want the constant drain of the Yemen war, and so he paid off the Houthis. I mean, and you can feel for him: the Houthis had sent a thousand drones and missiles into Saudi Arabia, and President Obama, President um Obama, President Trump during his first term, and President President Biden didn’t do a damn thing. And so he understood he couldn’t trust the United States, so he cut a separate deal. But when you cut a deal with terrorists, there’s always going to be a blowback. The point is right now that Muhammad bin Salman has this problem. The Houthis have a stranglehold over um Saudi exports, and the fact of the matter is, it could bring him to his knees. Make no mistake: when you lock all your rivals up in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel and you beat them and you extort money from them, granted money that’s stolen, ultimately the knives are going to be out for you. And when I talk to people involved in the finance sector, in risk advisory and so forth, they make very clear that perhaps Muhammad bin Salman isn’t as um solid in his positioning as he was just two weeks ago, and that you really could have a palace coup in Saudi Arabia as well. So have that on your calendar for, if not 2026, 2027.
BASU: Oh, my god. That sounds That’s a very interesting prediction. Well, now we will have to I mean, thank you so much for having this long discussion, but I have one question, the final question. Um coming back to India-US relations. Now, you said that that bipartisan consensus about having good relations with India uh may not be there in the next administration as well, if it is even if it is a Democrat, because Democrats are also if they are populist, they are not always pro-India. And I personally think this whole H-1B thing has been Mr Trump has been able to create it in a, you know, it it’s like some kind of a bogey in a manner that India is the bad boy in the room. What can these two countries do to revive the relationship, given that there are people like you and others who want this relationship to be revived?
RUBIN: Okay. Well, first of all, Joyeeta, I absolutely agree with you that the main I think the mainstream base of both the Republicans and the Democrats are both pro-India. The Trump faction, uh the MAGA faction, is following Trump down this rabbit hole of just blaming India um of of tariffs and so forth. And as I said before, the progressive wing of the Democratic Party is like Justin Trudeau on steroids at this point. Now, what can we do? If I were advising the president of the United States, what I would say is, we have a mutual concern with regard to China. China is increasingly going to lash out as its population collapses, which is the natural result of its 36-year uh previous one-child policy. So, um as China has to deal with this, it’s going to lash out, and India could be a victim. One thing I would say: the Americans are most worried about Taiwan and about the Senkaku Islands of Japan. India, of course, is worried about Arunachal Pradesh, uh and look, you have a huge chunk of India occupied in Aksai Chin. The fact What I would say is, number one, that the United States and India are going to work together um to if if China moves towards Taiwan, then the United States, at the same time, is going to help India retake Aksai Chin. At the very least, we’re going to give China something to think about. And you can say, “Well, that’s dangerous. China is a nuclear power.” Well, so is the United States, so is India. And the fact of the matter is, before the early 1950s, I’m sorry, before the 1920s, Aksai Chin didn’t appear on any Chinese maps as Chinese territory. Now, you can have a declaration like this, but declarations aren’t enough. What I would take, I I was fortunate enough to go to Ladakh and to tour the border. What I would do is have increased military exercises, both in places like Alaska or Montana in the United States, as well as in Ladakh, between some of the Indian uh army units and the 10th Mountain Division of the United States. And the reason for this isn’t to saber-rattle at China, but it when you have that sort Let me put it this way: when you have a diplomat have a meeting or a conference, there’s a limit to the personal relations which develop, because everything is stage-managed and it’s over uh I mean a whiskey here, or uh a tea there. But when you’re exercising with military leaders, I mean, and you’re you’re in the field, and when you’re you’re you’re going through meter-high snow and so forth, you actually have a bonding that can’t appear in a diplomatic um in a diplomatic conference room. And so if we start doing that, symbolically, it will show not only China, but also the Indians and the Americans who their true friends are. Uh and to me, that would be a way to start rebuilding the the relationship, understanding that any political promises we make are just going to be met with cynicism on New Delhi’s side, and rightfully so.
BASU: Yeah, but but I would uh just as my final comment, I would say, you know, but Mr Trump, number one, he seems to be trying to be friends with Mr Xi Jinping, and number two is, you see, he has already put bodies like the Quad, for example, when you’re talking about military exercises, of course, they are going on. They are happening, but something like Quad has been put on the back burner, much to China’s glee. You know, so, so which way are we headed that way?
RUBIN: Joyeeta, I’m talking about post-Trump. I mean, at this point, you’re not going to get a repair with Trump, and I can say that Trump’s offer, when Xi was in Washington, to sell um China weapon systems, I mean, the fact of the matter is, if I were China, I would say, “I’ll take one of everything,” because you know China’s just going to reverse-engineer, and so this is something that not even Trump’s allies in Congress would be able to stomach. The fact of the matter is, uh whether it’s senility, whether it’s just not giving a damn, we have a problem. But one note of pessimism: most presidents care whether they lose in midterms, and we have what’s called the lame-duck status, where um a president becomes powerless once um he’s when he can’t run again, once he’s past the midterms. I don’t think Donald Trump cares, and he may look at not having to face another election as somehow liberating. Uh he uh he may lose Congress, he may lose the Senate, he may um if they go down the usual line of um investigating him, he deserves investigation, but he’s going to be able to paint himself as a martyr. That’s going to be a problem. Ultimately also, if we want to look more broadly, the Democrats also have a problem with their progressive base. If I can be so blunt, if the Democrats can’t tell the difference between a man and a woman,
BASU: Yeah.
RUBIN: and this becomes the focus of their final 2 years, then they are going to lose the presidency the next time around. And we may get JD Vance, we may get someone else, but ultimately, the ball is going to be in the um the Democrats’ court, and I’m afraid the Democrats are going to fumble it because, again, there’s a tendency in the United States right now to look at what they see on Twitter and assume that is where the mainstream is, not realizing that those who tweet and those who comment and those who are on social media represent perhaps the 5% fringe rather than the mainstream of the Democrats and the Republicans.
BASU: Yeah, that’s a very good point because now that you mention it, I have to say, the outrage on Twitter, I would say, or X, as it’s called now, against Indians and H-1B, I think that outrage, the MAGA outrage, that has kind of impacted Donald Trump’s policy towards India, which I think is really sad.
RUBIN: Mhm. I agree.
BASU: So, thank you. Thank you, Michael, for early morning in the US right now when this is being recorded, but making time for this show. It’s always enjoyable talking to you.
RUBIN: Thank you so much, Joyeeta.
BASU: Yeah. And thank you, viewers, for watching. Until the next time.
