Middle East Forum Executive Director Gregg Roman joined Times of India to assess the third week of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, arguing that Washington has largely achieved its core military objectives while Tehran has shifted to a strategy of regime survival. Roman outlined a three-track pathway to regime change—military pressure, internal unrest, and elite defections—and said insiders within the regime could ultimately negotiate a transition. He warned the conflict is likely to continue for weeks or months and emphasized that the United States retains significant untapped military, economic, and covert tools if Iran refuses to capitulate.
PRASAD: Nearly two weeks into the U.S.-Israel war with Iran, Washington says its goal is to neutralize Iran’s military threat, while Tehran says it is defending its sovereignty. From your perspective, who is actually achieving their objective so far?
ROMAN: I think right now the United States has been able to engage in a top-level campaign eliminating its three objectives that they had declared at the outset of the war. The first was Iran’s rocket and missile launching capability. The second was its nuclear program. And the third was its support for proxy forces, which effectively violated the sovereignty of other countries in the region that Iran has been trying to tilt for the past three decades. I think they’ve accomplished most of their goals in terms of major military targets.
ROMAN: But now you see Iran trying to accomplish its second goal—not defending its sovereignty per se, but being able to ensure the continuity of the regime, which was taken out after the ayatollah’s decades in power on February 28 of this year. We saw a declaration from the new supreme leader, his son, who said that Iran will continue blockading the Strait of Hormuz and move toward a war of attrition, trying to survive the U.S. military onslaught. So now the U.S. goal isn’t just to destroy the military, but also to target the political regime that controls it, while the Iranian goal is simply to survive until the U.S. declares victory.
PRASAD: Would it be wrong to say that regime change still looks like a far-off goal?
ROMAN: I think regime change in this case is not like Afghanistan. Iran is an advanced system that has had control for nearly five decades. You’re not going to see a complete uprooting of the government like de-Baathification in Iraq. This is more about establishing deterrence and regime control by the United States, not pulling out the entire system root and stem.
ROMAN: I think the best way to go about this would be to encourage a period of chaos inside Iran so that a winner emerges who is not connected to the Islamic Republic. But the way the president seems to be going is to make a deal with someone within the system who will agree to U.S. conditions. And if they don’t, the bombs will keep falling.
PRASAD: Do you have any potential names of who this person or these people could be?
ROMAN: There are 17 individuals who signed a letter on January 11, two months ago, objecting to the regime’s slaughter of its people in more than 130 cities. On that letter were signatories who were part of the current or former government. Whether it’s members of the Rafsanjani family, figures like Tajzadeh, a former interior minister, Mousavi who has been under house arrest for years, or other ministers from the previous Rouhani government—these are individuals who have been inside the system.
ROMAN: I’m not saying they are all ideal, but they are people who could potentially make a deal with the United States under certain conditions: releasing political prisoners, shifting away from the Islamic system of governance, and ending nuclear development, missile production, and support for proxy forces.
PRASAD: So is the plan to achieve regime change internally rather than through U.S.-Israeli strikes?
ROMAN: I think there are three parallel processes that reinforce each other. The first is U.S. and Israeli military action that weakens the regime’s ability to control the streets. We saw strikes targeting the Basij militia checkpoints, which are used to suppress protests in cities like Tehran, Isfahan, and Mashhad. If the regime can’t control physical space, people can take to the streets.
ROMAN: Second is Iranian civil society—people inside the country, not just those in exile. And third are individuals within the government, mid-level officials and bureaucrats, who have expressed willingness to move toward a different system that is not based on hereditary succession or the current structure.
ROMAN: If these three elements work together, you could see a different government emerge. It’s not easy, but it creates a pathway.
PRASAD: This doesn’t seem like a short conflict. Iran’s attacks are continuing across the region.
ROMAN: This is not going to be a quick war. You’re looking at weeks, if not months. Maybe not at the same intensity, but sustained. Israel will likely maintain air superiority over Iran, and you may see Gulf states become involved—not necessarily militarily, but economically.
ROMAN: There is about $110 billion in Iranian funds sitting in Gulf banks that could be seized, which would strangle the Iranian economy and weaken the IRGC’s control. You’re also seeing regional positioning—Azerbaijan mobilizing near the border, Turkey moving forces, and Pakistan referencing its defense relationship with Saudi Arabia.
ROMAN: If Iran escalates far enough, it could trigger a broader Sunni response, which would add another layer of pressure. If that happens, I don’t think Iran stands a chance.
PRASAD: Some say U.S. involvement is driven by Israeli lobbying. What would you say?
ROMAN: I think the idea of an Israeli lobby driving this is outdated. If anything, that influence has weakened in the United States over the past 15 to 20 years. This is really about the U.S. settling accounts with Iran going back to the early 1980s, when Americans were killed by Iranian actions and proxies.
ROMAN: This is an American war that Israel has joined, not the other way around.
PRASAD: If Iran doesn’t surrender and those internal dynamics don’t align, what does the endgame look like?
ROMAN: You’re looking at asymmetric warfare—state-sponsored terrorism outside Iran’s borders if it can’t compete conventionally. But the U.S. still has many tools it hasn’t used. Not nuclear, but conventional, cyber, intelligence, and psychological warfare capabilities.
ROMAN: There’s a whole set of tools that haven’t been deployed yet. The campaign started with airpower, but it can escalate significantly if Iran refuses to capitulate.
PRASAD: Do you see boots on the ground?
ROMAN: I would imagine there are already special operators inside the country conducting target identification and targeted operations against senior Iranian officials. But I don’t see large-scale U.S. ground deployments.
ROMAN: The exception might be a limited operation to seize Kharg Island, which handles about 94 percent of Iran’s oil exports. If you cut off that revenue, you increase internal pressure and deepen divisions within the regime between those motivated by ideology and those motivated by power and money.
