Israel’s Seven-Front War, Part Six: Lebanon

In a Middle East Forum (MEF)/American Jewish University (AJU) June 24 podcast (video), AJU’s Rick Richman moderated the sixth of a seven-part series of interviews titled “Israel’s Seven-Front War: Part Three: Gaza Strip.”

Guest speaker: Robert G. Rabil, professor of Middle East studies at Florida Atlantic University. The following summarizes his comments:

The Islamic Republic of Iran aims to undermine U.S. power in the region. Hamas’s invasion of Israel and the subsequent Gaza War enabled Iran to increase pressure on the West by activating Hezbollah, its proxy in Lebanon, against Israel. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is pursuing a strategy of “strategic deterrence” against Israel by waging a war he said will be “won by points” — meaning “a psychological war as much as a military war.”

In 2000, Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon and Hafez Assad, who occupied Lebanon and controlled Hezbollah, died. The U.N. demarcated the impermanent “Blue Line” border between Israel and Lebanon. After Assad, however, Hezbollah strengthened to become a “state within a state.”

In 2006, Israel invaded Lebanon after Hezbollah attacked an Israeli border patrol in a cross-border raid, killing and kidnapping soldiers. Although the U.N. passed Resolution 1701 calling on Hezbollah to move north of Israel’s border, the unresolved conflict continued in an Iran-Israel proxy war, or “shadow war,” during which Israel eliminated Hezbollah commanders.

The Syrian Civil War was underway in 2011 and Hezbollah, allied with Syria’s Ba’ath regime, and with Russian support, helped Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad fight his opposition. The military expertise Hezbollah gained transitioned it from a militant terror organization into an army with command leadership. From 2010 through 2024, Iran and Hezbollah enhanced their power by developing missiles and drone weaponry.

Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who was assassinated in a U.S. drone strike in 2020, envisioned various pro-Iranian proxies forming a united front, including Hamas, to encircle Israel in a “Ring of Fire.” The opening salvo was the Hamas invasion on October 7. The following day, Hezbollah announced it was supporting Hamas in Gaza by ramping up “a low-intensity war.” Although Israel has eliminated a significant number of Hezbollah’s senior commanders, Hezbollah rockets have forced tens of thousands of Israeli citizens to vacate their homes in the north of Israel.

The winding down of Israel’s Gaza war has drawn attention to Hezbollah in the north. Hezbollah knows it cannot defeat Israel. Instead, it employs a strategy of waging a “war of points.” Israel is in an untenable position because it cannot continue to prevent tens of thousands of its displaced citizens from returning to their homes in the north, even though Hezbollah’s arsenal of 200,000 rockets would inflict massive casualties if the low-intensity war were to erupt into a major confrontation.

Scenarios are floated that include Israel taking punitive action via air strikes on Hezbollah’s weapons cache of missiles, which are likely to be replenished by Syria. Another scenario posits invading Lebanon to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River. The overarching unknown is if Iran would get directly involved, which it has threatened to do should Israel launch such an invasion.

With numbers of Al-Hashd al-Shaabi, the Iranian-supported Iraqi Shia militias, in the Golan as well as in Syria, there is the possibility that Iran will open both the Lebanese as well as the Syrian front on Israel. Even though Hezbollah knows that Israel can inflict more damage on them than they can on Israel, in 2006, “half of Lebanon was destroyed,” but Nasrallah declared “a divine victory.” Exactly how many thousands Nasrallah may be willing to sacrifice is another unknown. On the other hand, “the last thing [Hezbollah] wants is for Lebanon to collapse as a state.”

While Israel considers its next move, Hezbollah, knowing that Israel may attack, has upped the psychological ante by releasing a video showing that it knows the locations of Israel’s “vital, strategic, military, economic, and industrial infrastructure.” Hezbollah is preparing for war, “but at the same time” does not want war. In their estimation, this is strategic deterrence. In 2010, Hezbollah engaged in “deterrence by terror.” Today, Nasrallah pronounces that “if the war should be imposed on us, we are going to fight by land, sea, and air, and we are going to have no regulation.”

As to why Hezbollah did not join Hamas in attacking Israel on October 7, one theory is that it would be premature for Hezbollah to risk major damage from Israeli retaliation because Hezbollah’s purpose is to be “a deterrent to Israel and/or the United States attacking Iran until Iran has a nuclear weapon. And once Iran has a nuclear weapon, then Hezbollah can attack under a nuclear shield, or a nuclear threat provided by Iran.”

The U.S. and France are pursuing diplomatic means to prevent war, but Hezbollah says it will only “stop when the Gaza War ends.” A political proposal to move Hezbollah north and discuss a land border would only occur if enough political pressure were exerted. In 2006, the U.S. told the Lebanese government it would stop providing money to pay Lebanese army salaries. Hezbollah, by then part of the Lebanese government, relented under pressure and withdrew from the border. A similar tack may pressure Hezbollah to agree to Resolution 1701, but like in 2006, Hezbollah may just return its forces to the border after another such withdrawal.

Israel can develop technologies to counter Hezbollah weapons and prepare for the day when invading Lebanon may be unavoidable, but the “real resolution” is within Lebanon. The Druze, Sunni, and Christian leadership needs to unite, take a hard line and pressure Hezbollah by saying, “Enough is enough. You are 35 percent of the population. You cannot hijack the decision of peace and war.”