Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) arrives at the White House on November 18. The meeting will determine whether Gaza becomes an economic hub integrated into the Abraham Accords or remains a terrorist breeding ground awaiting the next war. Trump faces a straightforward choice between two incompatible directions for Gaza’s future. One path leads through Riyadh and Abu Dhabi; the other runs through Ankara and Doha. There is no middle ground.
The facts on the ground demand an immediate decision. Hamas survived Israel’s military campaign with four operational battalions, recruited 15,000 new fighters during the conflict, and maintains control over 47 percent of
Gaza’s territory. The organization’s leadership operates from Doha while military commander Izz al-Din al-Haddad coordinates operations inside Gaza. These realities make reconstruction not merely a humanitarian imperative, but a strategic necessity to prevent Hamas from reconstituting its full military capabilities.
Gaza requires $50 billion for reconstruction. The question is not whether to rebuild, but who controls the money and therefore Gaza’s future. The answer determines whether the 67,000 Palestinians who died and the complete destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure lead to lasting change or simply reset the clock for another October 7.
The Case for Saudi and Emirati Leadership
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have earned the right to lead Gaza reconstruction through demonstrated action, not rhetoric. MBS dismantled the Wahhabi religious establishment that spawned al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the ideology animating Hamas. He stripped the religious police of arrest powers in 2016, reopened cinemas after four decades, lifted the driving ban on women, and doubled female workforce participation to 35 percent. Saudi schools purged antisemitic content from textbooks. The kingdom stopped funding Wahhabi institutions globally and codified legal reforms that reduced clerical power over the judiciary.
These reforms matter because they demonstrate Saudi Arabia’s institutional commitment to defeating the extremist ideology that created Hamas. When MBS told American officials in 2021, “do I care personally about the Palestinian
issue? I don’t, but my people do,” he revealed the pragmatic calculation driving Saudi policy. He understands that Vision 2030’s success requires regional stability, which a Hamas-controlled Gaza threatens. A prosperous Gaza integrated into regional trade networks advances Saudi interests.
The financial commitments back the strategic vision. Saudi Arabia invested $6.4 billion in Syrian reconstruction within months of Assad’s fall. The kingdom pledged $600 billion in American investments during Trump’s May 2025 visit, including a $142 billion defense cooperation agreement. When Putin recognized Riyadh as a “comfortable and credible mediator,” he acknowledged Saudi Arabia’s emergence as a diplomatic power capable of managing complex regional challenges. MBS demonstrated this capacity by hosting 40 countries at the Jeddah Peace Summit on Ukraine in August 2023.
The UAE under Mohammed bin Zayed provides the operational blueprint for Gaza reconstruction. MBZ pioneered the Abraham Accords, maintained flights to Tel Aviv throughout the Gaza war when every other carrier suspended service, and deployed $828 million in Gaza aid, representing 42 percent of total international assistance. The Emirates established three desalination plants on the Gaza-Egypt border and generated $3.2 billion in bilateral trade with Israel in 2024.
More significantly, the UAE waged and won an internal war against the Muslim Brotherhood. MBZ warned that “we are having a culture war with the Muslim Brotherhood in this country.” He subsequently banned the Brotherhood’s local affiliate Islah, purged 500 members from the civil service, and blocked $2.3 billion in Brotherhood-linked financial transactions. The UAE established Hedayah, the global counter-extremism center, and the Sawab Center that generated one billion impressions countering ISIS propaganda.
These achievements reflect capabilities, not aspirations. Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess the financial resources, with over $100 billion in available capital for reconstruction. They maintain the intelligence networks to identify and
eliminate Hamas infiltration of reconstruction projects. They command the regional credibility to work with Palestinian clans and civil society. Most critically, they have Israeli trust. Netanyahu approved the UAE’s January 2025 proposal to manage post-war Gaza contingent on Hamas disarmament. He told members of the Knesset (MK) in December 2023 that Saudi Arabia and the UAE would finance reconstruction.
The international coordinator role for this process requires someone who can navigate between Washington, Jerusalem, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Ramallah while maintaining credibility with all parties. Tony Blair uniquely possesses this combination. His Good Friday Agreement ended 30 years of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, achieving 71 percent approval in the North and 94 percent in the Republic. The peace holds 27 years later. This success demonstrated Blair’s ability to broker power-sharing between communities that had been killing each other for generations.
Blair’s eight years as Quartet Representative from 2007 to 2015 provided deep knowledge of Israeli-Palestinian dynamics. Critics charge he achieved little and favored Israel, but this criticism in fact recommends him for the current role. Gaza reconstruction cannot succeed if Israel views the coordinator as hostile. Netanyahu and Ron Dermer engage constructively with Blair. When Trump authorized Blair in August 2025 to coordinate Gaza reconstruction, Dermer participated in White House planning sessions.
Blair’s relationships with Arab leaders provide the funding pipeline. His Tony Blair Institute advised Saudi ministries on Vision 2030 implementation, while he maintains staff in the UAE and regular contact with MBZ. When Blair needs to discuss reconstruction funding, MBS and MBZ take his calls. His consistent opposition to Islamist extremism aligns with reconstruction’s fundamental requirement: preventing Hamas’s return. Blair called radical Islam “a first order security threat” and launched initiatives with Leon Panetta to counter extremism. His Global Extremism Monitor tracks over 120 terrorist organizations, including Hamas.
The Palestinian Authority engaged with Blair despite reservations. Deputy President Hussein al-Sheikh met Blair on October 12, 2025, and confirmed PA readiness to work with Trump and Blair on reconstruction. The PA prefers
direct Gaza control, but accepts international oversight during transition.
Hamas calls Blair “the devil’s brother”—a rejection that validates rather than disqualifies him, as any coordinator acceptable to Hamas would be unacceptable to Israel and the United States. The purpose of reconstruction is eliminating Hamas control, but a coordinator Hamas welcomes would preserve their influence.
Blair’s reconstruction proposal includes establishing a technocratic Palestinian committee, creating an international stabilization force, and implementing phased security transfers. His “Gaza for Gazans” framework empowers local leadership while preventing Hamas infiltration. This approach balances Israeli security requirements with Palestinian aspirations for self-governance.
The Disqualifying Record of Turkey and Qatar
Turkey and Qatar cannot participate in Gaza reconstruction leadership because they created the conditions that produced October 7. Their decade-long support for Hamas makes them structurally incapable of overseeing Hamas’s elimination.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan transformed Turkey into Hamas’s primary state supporter outside Iran. Hamas opened its Turkish office in 2011. Erdoğan met Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh at Dolmabahce Palace on April 20, 2024, to discuss relocating Hamas headquarters from Qatar to Turkey. Turkey provided medical treatment to over 1,000 Hamas members and granted passports to senior operatives. The U.S. Treasury designated Turkish company Trend GYO for managing Hamas’s $500 million investment portfolio.
Erdoğan’s rhetoric eliminated any pretense of neutrality. In October 2023 he declared that “Hamas is not a terrorist organization; it is a group of mujahideen defending their lands.” He compared Hamas to Turkey’s founding forces under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and never condemned the October 7 massacre that killed 1,195 Israelis including 815 civilians.
Turkey’s Muslim Brotherhood connections compound the problem. Ankara hosts 1,500 Egyptian Brotherhood members who fled after 2013 and provides them with media platforms to organize against Egypt’s government. Erdoğan defended the Brotherhood as “not an armed group, but an ideological organization” despite their terrorist designation by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. Since Hamas emerged from the Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch, Turkish support for the Brotherhood means support for the ideology that created Hamas.
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies identified Turkey as “likely the biggest financial hub for the terrorist entity, allowing Hamas’s donors to use Turkey’s financial system to facilitate the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars to its Gaza base.” Turkey deployed 80 specialists to Gaza in September 2025 under hostage recovery cover, laying the groundwork for an expanded presence. Netanyahu drew a red line against Turkish forces on October 21, 2025, recognizing the threat of Turkish-Brotherhood infiltration.
Historical precedent also warns against Turkish involvement. Turkey’s 1974 “Peace Operation” in Cyprus resulted in permanent occupation of the island’s north and expulsion of 150,000 Greek Cypriots. The occupation continues 51 years later, suggesting that Turkey would likely pursue similar expansion in Gaza.
Qatar’s record is equally disqualifying. The emirate hosted Hamas’s political bureau since 2012, initially at U.S. request to facilitate communication. This arrangement metastasized into comprehensive support. Qatar transferred
$1.8-2 billion to Hamas over the years, pledged $360 million annually in January 2021 and provided $30 million monthly from 2018-2023. While these payments ostensibly supported Gaza’s civilian population, Hamas controlled and weaponized the funds.
Hamas’s own documents expose the relationship’s depth. Former Hamas chairman Israil Haniyeh, assassinated by Israel in July 2024, told Qatar’s foreign minister in December 2019 that Qatari cash was “Hamas’s main artery.” In May 2021, Haniyeh informed Yahya Sinwar, who succeeded him as Hamas’s chairman until his own assassination in October 2024, that Qatar’s emir privately “agreed on discreet financial support” for “resistance” activities. An intelligence report concluded: “Qatari funding and policies led directly to October 7.”
Qatar-funded Al Jazeera functioned as Hamas’s propaganda arm, with Hamas installing a dedicated “Al Jazeera phone” to coordinate with network management in Doha. Captured documents prove “cooperation between Hamas and Al Jazeera was systematic, organized and continuous.” The IDF exposed six Al Jazeera journalists as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives in October 2024.
A Saudi diplomat warned in October 2025: “Excessive Qatari involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction will cause Trump’s plan to collapse” because Qatar will undermine deradicalization efforts and try to ensure that Hamas remains in the picture and returns to power.
Empowering Gaza’s Clan Structure
Preventing Hamas’s resurgence requires empowering Gaza’s indigenous power structure: the clan system. Gaza’s 608 registered mukhtars represent 72 percent of the population through six major Bedouin confederations. These traditional leaders historically handled 70-90 percent of disputes outside formal courts through 41 reconciliation committees. Hamas co-opted rather than destroyed this system after 2007, incorporating mukhtars into its General Administration for Clan Affairs.
The clans demonstrated their capabilities during the recent conflict. Yasser Abu Shabab’s 400-fighter Popular Forces secured humanitarian corridors for six consecutive months. Hossam al-Astal’s Counter-Terrorism Strike Force cleared Hamas cells from neighborhoods while protecting civilians. In March 2025, these forces secured World Food Programme convoys, ending systematic looting and proving their ability to provide practical security.
The clans control Gaza’s economic infrastructure: commercial networks with Egypt and Jordan, 60 percent of arable land, and cross-border trade relationships. Their mukhtars possess street-level intelligence about their communities and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms that no external authority could replicate.
Notable families like the Sa’id al-Shawwa, Abd al-Shafi, and Rayyes clans maintain networks of professionals—doctors, lawyers, engineers, educators—who never joined Hamas but survived by avoiding confrontation. When
Israeli forces offered partnership to 12 major clans in early 2024, 11 declined, but this rejection reflected their desire for self-preservation, not ideological commitment to Hamas.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE understand tribal politics from successfully integrating their own tribal structures into modern governance. They can identify which Gaza clans merit support and investment. The $50 billion reconstruction budget provides leverage to mandate inter-clan cooperation on major projects, require supply chains crossing clan boundaries, and issue commercial licenses only to multi-clan partnerships. This economic integration creates the strongest bulwark against fragmentation.
Turkey and Qatar would instead work through Hamas-aligned factions they supported for years. Qatari reconstruction would channel resources through Hamas networks rebranded as civil society organizations, while Turkish involvement would empower Muslim Brotherhood affiliates. Only Saudi and Emirati leadership ensures resources flow to the 72 percent of Gazans who never chose Hamas rule.
The reconstruction framework creates a triangle of stability: Israeli security guarantee as the foundation, Saudi-Emirati funding as the structure, and clan-based governance as the mechanism for Palestinian self-determination. Each element requires the others. Israeli military dominance provides the security envelope protecting Gulf investment, Saudi and UAE capital creates economic incentives for clan cooperation, and clan governance provides legitimacy and local knowledge preventing Hamas infiltration.
Trump’s 20-Point Plan establishes the Board of Peace with presidential chairmanship, providing executive authority and coordination mechanisms. This high-level commitment signals to all parties that America backs the reconstruction framework with presidential prestige.
The arrangement requires compromises. Saudi Arabia must proceed with Israeli normalization before achieving a Palestinian state. MBS’s January 2025 comment to Blinken—“I don’t care personally about the Palestinian issue, but my people do”—suggests flexibility on the issue. A reconstructed Gaza governed by clans, developing economically, and free from Hamas represents tangible progress toward Palestinian self-determination. MBS can credibly claim Saudi leadership prevented Gaza’s complete destruction and enabled Palestinian reconstruction, unlike Qatar and Turkey, hosted Hamas leadership, funded its military buildup, defended its terrorism, and bear responsibility for October 7’s devastation.
Israel accepts this framework because Saudi Arabia and the UAE demand the same preconditions Israel requires: complete Hamas disarmament, exclusion from governance, and security guarantees preventing rearmament. The UAE already agreed in principle to manage post-war Gaza contingent on these conditions. That vision becomes reality only if Trump makes it the centerpiece of his Middle East policy on November 18.
When MBS enters the White House on November 18, Trump should announce Saudi-Emirati leadership of Gaza reconstruction and leverage the meeting to lock in the framework: Saudi-UAE commitment of $30-50 billion over five years, Blair’s appointment as international coordinator, clan-based governance structure, and linkage to Saudi normalization with Israel. This arrangement transforms Gaza from terrorism’s ground zero into proof that Arab moderation and economic development offer Palestinians a better future than Hamas’s endless war.
This is not a difficult choice. Saudi Arabia and the UAE reformed their societies away from extremism, invested billions in regional stability, maintained peace commitments under pressure, and earned Israeli trust through actions, not words.
The alternative—allowing Turkey and Qatar to shape Gaza’s future—guarantees Hamas’s survival under new branding and ensures October 7 was not the last massacre, but merely the most recent.
The window for decision closes when MBS leaves Washington. If Trump fails to secure Saudi-Emirati leadership, Gaza reconstruction will proceed under Turkish-Qatari influence by default, and Hamas will survive, rearm, and strike again. The deaths of 67,000 Palestinians will have been in vain. The cycle of violence will continue until the next October 7 forces another choice between the same alternatives.
Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed represent the Middle East’s future: economic integration, religious moderation, and coexistence with Israel. Turkey’s Erdoğan and Qatar’s Al Thani represent its past: ideological extremism, perpetual conflict, and terrorism as statecraft. Trump’s November 18 decision will determine which vision shapes Gaza and therefore the broader region. The choice should be obvious. The consequences of choosing wrong will be catastrophic.
