As Iranian protests accelerate, former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has put to rest any question about his cachet and recognition inside Iran. Iranians chant his name; whether they do so out of nostalgia, to annoy the regime, or because they truly believe in his ability is irrelevant.
While Pahlavi has stumbled repeatedly out of the gate, this is his moment. It remains unclear, however, if he is up to the task. The problem is not Pahlavi the brand, but rather, Pahlavi the administrator. He likes to surround himself with sycophants who chant his name and seek to punish any who disagree or question his decisions. His staff is fissiparous, and the organization of his office unclear. Many followers claim to speak on his behalf, but their approach is immature: They seek to punish dissenters rather convince them, and they respond to criticism with polemical attacks rather than addressing it.
Many of [Pahlavi’s] Iranian American opponents are those whom his organization unnecessarily and stupidly attacked.
Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi, when asked about his poor relations with American officials and the gratuitous attacks his aides made on them, quipped he no longer needed the Americans anyway. He was arrogant. He was also wrong, because the personal grudges his actions sparked led small-minded American officials to throw countless obstacles in his way that became, at best, distractions from his Iraqi political efforts and, at worst, fatal impediments.
Pahlavi, today, neither has the same personality nor cynicism, but he has nevertheless created the same dynamic. On a personal level, he is a nice, thoughtful man. He has vision, and he wants to do right by Iran and correct the wrongs in which his father engaged. But, by allowing his staff members to troll not only adversaries but also allies who might ask legitimate questions, he replicates Chalabi’s arrogance. He already pays the price for it. Many of his Iranian American opponents are those whom his organization unnecessarily and stupidly attacked. Rather than act like a king, he allows his office to act like drunken street fighters.
While it is shameful that the U.S. executive branch across administrations has refused to meet Pahlavi at any meaningful level, he has interacted with the legislative branch. The tendency of his supporters to slash and burn often mis-perceived opposition to ingratiate themselves to Pahlavi has already caused some senators to say privately that they have washed their hands of crown prince. His supporters demand 100 percent agreement and treat anything less like an enemy. But American policymakers are not Iranians, and they may only agree with 80 percent of what he says. To punish them for disagreeing on 20 percent is self-defeating.
By tolerating online behavior reminiscent of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, Pahlavi transforms his image from bridge-builder and consensus figure into autocrat and cult-leader. Such trolling is also strategically stupid, as Pahlavi’s goal should be to win over fence-sitters and opponents, rather than simply punish or antagonize them. Indeed, one of his prominent supporters who cast aspersions at opponents, real and imagined, even took the Twitter (X) handle “cyberpunish,” though, perhaps in recognition of the embarrassment she became, has since changed it.
While inspiring fanatical loyalty may affirm Pahlavi’s credentials, it also sets the stage for failure. Because Pahlavi allows himself to be all things to his supporters, his precise positions remain unclear. This open a Pandora’s Box in which Pahlavi’s own supporters engage in a circular firing squad that, at best, distracts from forming a new order, let alone from connecting and cooperating meaningfully with Iranians who have been on the front line of the fight against Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
While inspiring fanatical loyalty may affirm Pahlavi’s credentials, it also sets the stage for failure.
In 2006, Radek Sikorski, then a think tank scholar in Washington but today the foreign minister of Poland, sponsored a conference in Gdansk, Poland, to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Solidarity movement. Lech Wałęsa and other freedom leaders from the former East Bloc spoke about how they won control but then lost elections soon after, due to the mistakes they initially made when first assuming power after an autocratic regime’s collapse. Dissidents from Cuba, Zimbabwe, and various Arab countries sought to benefit from their lessons learned.
The shah now casts such lessons aside as he ignores the behavior and rhetoric of those who serve in his name. Should he return to Iran, his success likely rests on cutting ties with many of his most vocal online supporters, as well as the aides who believed it wise to embrace a strategy of trolling. If they antagonize senators and professional policymakers, they will catalyze internal resistance with their gratuitous insults and arrogance. Pahlavi may believe he can have it both ways, but this is foolish. He also may believe he must indulge his top supporters because of their loyalty, but the only thing about which he should now worry is the loyalty of Iranians inside Iran.
Pahlavi can be a great ruler, but he might also end up as a forgotten footnote in history, like Chalabi or the Mojahedin-e Khalq’s Maryam Rajavi. The decisions he makes now will determine which path he takes.
