For the first time since 1979, Iranian protesters pose an existential threat to the Islamic Republic. What comes next could be messy. To achieve the best outcome, outside powers should create conditions under which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has no choice but to surrender and pass leadership to a new head of state.
The Islamic Republic has weathered previous protest movements and two wars.
This scenario requires two components. First, there needs to be a leader who can step up and fill the vacuum. Former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is emerging as that figure. On January 6, 2026, Pahlavi issued a call for protests on January 8 and 9. It was the first time that Pahlavi had given a specific date for protests, and it was a test of his legitimacy. He triumphed. The nationwide turnout was massive. Demonstrators set many government vehicles and properties on fire. The regime was not expecting such a turnout, evident by the fact that it waited until the protests were underway to disconnect the internet.
The second component is making the fall of the regime an inevitability that even Khamenei cannot deny so that he must surrender power in exchange for his and his family’s safety. This is a difficult task. The Islamic Republic has weathered previous protest movements and two wars. Khamenei was the president during the Iran-Iraq War and the supreme leader during the rest. He may be overconfident about surviving the current protests and future crises. But he may also now recognize that his chances of dying a natural death as the supreme leader diminish every hour. These two propositions might sound contradictory, but they are not.
For Khamenei to change his assessment, he must experience the loss of his regime’s mechanism of repression as well as his clerical brain trust. The Twelve-Day War has made significant progress on this front by killing top generals and officials. The United States or Israel needs to conduct more such eliminations to shift the balance of power in favor of the protesters and psychologically corner Khamenei. This means two categories of targets: the suppression apparatus and Khamenei’s confidants.
The most important target would be Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, who fits both categories. Mojtaba has been the architect of the regime’s crackdowns since the Green Movement and his death would serve as both the loss of a key lieutenant and a morale blow to his father. It would create a fear that hanging onto power might come at the cost of other family members.
The most important target would be Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, who ... has been the architect of the regime’s crackdowns.
Armed security forces and prosecutors also fit in the first category. The pro-monarchy National Union for Democracy in Iran has a partial list of these figures. The list recommends individual sanctions. The regime also increasingly relies on post-unrest executions rather than street violence. Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, a Khamenei confidant, reaffirmed this in a post on X: “This time, we will not give any leniency to the rioters.” Those eliminating the regime’s apparatus of repression should therefore target proactively judges like Eje’i and prosecutor-general Mohammad-Javad Azad.
Figures in the second category include Esmail Khatib, Ali Shamkhani, Ali Larijani, Mohammad Mohammadi-Golpaygani, and other longtime Khamenei confidants. Shamkhani and Larijani implement foreign policy and are unlikely to involve themselves with the crackdowns. But in times of crisis, Khamenei has always turned to them for advice and, likely, psychological comfort.
The risk of decapitating the regime is two-fold. First, it creates a vacuum. Second, it will require a military strongman, rather than a liberal, to clear the mess and legitimize himself. But for Khamenei to hand the state to someone else, it will minimize these risks. The question now is whether Khamenei’s spite will surpass his patriotism and quest for self-preservation.
