Sinan Ciddi, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and director of its Turkey program, spoke to a November 10 Middle East Forum podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leveraged his country’s close relationship with Hamas to help achieve the current Gaza ceasefire and free the Israeli hostages. In return, he wants access to the Gaza peace process and is “trying to strong-arm” U.S. President Donald Trump into granting the Turkish military a “pivotal role” in the International Stabilization Force (ISF), the proposed multinational security deployment for the Gaza Strip. The Trump administration is “sympathetic” to Erdoğan’s bid, putting the administration at odds with Israel and a number of Arab states.
The Trump administration is “sympathetic” to Erdoğan’s bid, putting the administration at odds with Israel and a number of Arab states.
Over the years, Erdoğan hosted Hamas, providing diplomatic cover for its leadership, housing the terror group’s fundraising infrastructure, and facilitating recruitment of militants and terrorists for what Erdoğan has called “a resistance movement.” Turkey, along with Hamas’s other patron, Qatar, pressured the terror group to sign the ceasefire agreement or find itself isolated.
Israel has drawn a “red line” in objecting to Turkey’s presence in Gaza, while Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt also expressed opposition. Given Turkey’s patronage of Hamas, “it is not an impartial and credible actor that seeks to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians.” One of the requirements of the 20-point peace plan is for Hamas to disarm and disband, which it refuses to do, insisting upon retaining governance.
“From Israel’s perspective and the Arab states’ perspective that resists this, well, is Turkey going to be in a position to arm and reprovision Hamas on the one hand? And secondly, if conflict breaks out again between Israel and Hamas, is Turkey going to militarily assist and stand side by side with Hamas?”
If so, “you would be looking at a conflict between an Israeli military and NATO’s second-largest military, which has over 1.3 million armed personnel and quite catastrophic capabilities.” Erdoğan’s position in Gaza would “essentially push out Israel and really undermine its ability to dictate terms.”
“You would think that the United States and the Trump administration would be sympathetic to those who are suspicious and would want to say, ‘Hang on a minute, maybe we should not let the Turkish military participate in this ISF, the stabilization forces given these risk factors.’ It seems to be quite the opposite.”
Washington is open to Ankara’s request, and “what we’re seeing is suggesting that Turkey will be a part of this ISF, despite all these objections.” Turkey is already on the ground in Gaza administering humanitarian relief through its Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), a “tainted” organization with ties to the U.S.-sanctioned Muslim Brotherhood and to Gaza aid flotillas, such as 2010’s Mavi Marmara.
“Erdoğan recently said that Turkey ruled Jerusalem for 400 years, implying that it was a wonderful haven under Ottoman rule and therefore that it had some historical responsibility, a historical mission to fulfill an obligation to once again provide peace and calm. My argument would be to suggest that there are few people in the Middle East from various Arab states, including Arabs inside of Jerusalem or inside of present day Israel, who would be ecstatic about welcoming Turkish rule back into the modern Middle East. But again, this is a larger part of Erdoğan’s ambition to push itself back into the Middle East.”
Turkey is already on the ground in Gaza administering humanitarian relief through its Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), a “tainted” organization with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Erdoğan’s desire is to project power from inside Gaza as he has similarly done in Syria. Turkey expanded its military footprint in the latter “to fill the void left by Iran and Russia.” Sharaa’s regime has been nurtured and supported by Erdoğan, with Turkish troops in northwest Syria estimated to number in excess of 20,000.
Beyond territorial expansion, plus political and military power, Turkey wants commercial benefits by monetizing Syria’s land and offshore fossil fuel resources. In piping those resources across the Mediterranean Sea and through Turkey to Western Europe, it bypasses Russian resources and provides an alternative energy hub, thereby making it more appealing to Western Europe.
Although Turkey provided momentum for the Gaza ceasefire agreement, the former Biden administration kept Erdoğan at “arm’s length,” deeming the Turkish president too willing to play both sides as he had during the Ukraine-Russia war, “working against American interests.” As a senator, the Trump administration’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio had co-sponsored legislation to isolate Turkey’s expansionist and militarist ambitions while strengthening ties with Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and Mediterranean entities. However, the “Trump White House and senior advisors to the president” support Erdoğan’s overtures. Ankara has offered to handle stabilizing Syria’s security, as well as share the burden of responsibility in the Ukraine-Russia war to “help offset mediation costs [and] peacekeeping forces, if necessary.”
Erdoğan said Turkey has a “historical responsibility” to the region, citing the Ottomans’ longtime rule over Jerusalem, while presenting himself as an interested party vested in maintaining “peace and calm in this part of the world.” In bargaining with the Trump administration, Erdoğan has also supposedly offered Washington access to its significant deposits of lithium—the primary component in rechargeable batteries powering electric vehicles and portable electronics like phones and laptops.
Trump, leery of what he sees as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “forever war” in the region, “would like nothing more [than] to essentially offload” some of the burdensome peacekeeping demands and accept Erdoğan’s offer to shoulder more than a “fair share” of the task. Trump “thinks that Turkey can play a constructive role in the stabilization force.” Should that happen, Israel will balk at withdrawing its troops from Gaza. The counterargument to Ankara’s full-court press is that there are a “plethora of Muslim states” without “toxic credentials” and who stop short of saying Hamas is a resistance movement, making their role in Gaza’s ISF more palatable to Israel.
The counterargument to Ankara’s full-court press is that there are a “plethora of Muslim states” without “toxic credentials” and who stop short of saying Hamas is a resistance movement.
Inclusion of Turkish forces in the ISF would indicate “a fundamental lack of perspective and credibility and impartiality, and Turkey’s glaring expansionist and militarist aims in the region that should put the U.S. President’s mind on caution to say, ‘Look, we should employ other powers if we’re serious about peace.’”
“Many of us have suspected that Erdoğan has not just regional but global ambitions to position Turkey as a major power. You can cite whether it’s Syria, whether it’s the Mediterranean, but whether it’s outreach towards Europe and how he positions himself against the Ukraine-Russia conflict as a security partner for Europe, but also just Turkey’s military buildup as a military power. So, if I just gave you one statistic, which would be to suggest that right now the Turkish military is domestically involved in constructing 35 warships, which includes one aircraft carrier. Now that total number of ship construction in Turkish shipyards, that is more than the entire European Union’s arsenal of ships under construction.”
“Turkey is on the precipice of becoming a major military entrepreneurial power that’s becoming increasingly self-sufficient or with the aim of basically saying, ‘If I’m going to project power, I need to have my own capabilities that is independent of the United States and Western Europe,’ although it’s still largely dependent upon the U.S. and Europe for advanced capabilities for now.
“But it may become increasingly, if not totally, independent by the mid-2030s, and to what aim? Well, with the fall of the Assad regime inside of Syria—and with Iran’s weakening as a result of that—its hold on Syria and Russia’s withdrawal from there—what we have seen is the Sharaa regime or the Julani regime move into there. What’s interesting about that is that the Sharaa regime is a regime that was 100 percent nurtured and raised and supported by Erdoğan for years.”
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The Israeli military is very thin. It’s stretched. Its numbers are considerably smaller than Turkey’s.
“So, that’s territorial expansion, but they’re also seeking to use that territory to essentially project further power, but commercial, as well as political, as well as military power. They’re seeking to monetize Syria’s fossil fuel industry, both on land but also offshore, and pipe those fossil fuel resources through the Mediterranean, through Turkey to Western Europe to bypass Russian resources. So, Turkey essentially becomes another energy hub that’s an alternative to Russia, which would make the country much more attractive to Western European eyes. But in doing so by enlarging its military footprint inside of Syria, it also undermines Israel’s projection of power.
“Because if you look at how Israel positions itself now, it’s also militarily very stretched—wars with Lebanon, wars with Iran, Hamas, potentially Syria. The Israeli military is very thin. It’s stretched. Its numbers are considerably smaller than Turkey’s. Despite its military accomplishments in the last two years, the other aspect that Erdoğan has very much burrowed in on is Israel’s international image unfortunately has been tarnished quite a bit in the last two years. Erdoğan is no stranger to trying to exploit that to the maximum effect. If he gets his way in Gaza by positioning Turkey’s military inside there, he’s also going to run the table and try to say, ‘Well, I’m also going to project power from inside of Gaza too.’”
