Robert Silverman, a former U.S. diplomat with 27 years of experience working primarily in and on the Middle East, currently teaches at Shalem College in Jerusalem and edits the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. Silverman spoke to a December 22 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
For at least the past 60 years, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have been the five major regional powers in the Middle East. Logically, the first four should join forces against Iran because of the perceived threat posed by the latter against the other four. The expression “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” does not apply in the region. Rather, the “Hobbesian truth” is that “my enemy could be a temporary friend or ally, but ultimately is another enemy that I’ll get around to in due time.”
The “Hobbesian truth” is that “my enemy could be a temporary friend or ally, but ultimately is another enemy that I’ll get around to in due time.”
Turkey aggravates Egypt by trying to become the dominant Mideast power. It competes with Saudi Arabia for influence in Syria, which borders Turkey, and it is openly hostile towards Israel. Israel has “intense relations with Egypt; openly hostile usually with Turkey under Erdoğan; distrustful maybe with Saudi Arabia”; and may well see another round of conflict with Iran in the coming year. Egypt, whose tense relations with Saudi Arabia are attributable to Cairo’s loss of leadership in the Arab world over the past decades, is focused on internal issues and on challenges along its borders with Libya and Ethiopia. In addition, it has to deal with the threat to its Red Sea coast from the Houthis in Yemen.
Although there are many flashpoints in the Middle East, there is reason for optimism because “it’s quite possible to form a regional alliance among the four great powers, regional powers, but you need the U.S. there to bind them.” Most of President Trump’s foreign policy contained in the recent National Security Council statement of strategy favors regional alliances formed and sustained by the U.S.
Among the positive steps taken by the first Trump administration was bringing Israel into the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), one of Washington’s military regional combatant commands. Although CENTCOM mainly focuses on the Arab Middle East, it also includes Iran. Previously, Israel was placed within the European Command (EUCOM), “a mistake made by U.S. strategic planners for years.” Turkey, which is in EUCOM, is sometimes brought into CENTCOM for air exercises because of the presence of a U.S. air base in Incirlik, Turkey.
Currently, Israel conducts joint military, naval, and air command exercises with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as well as with other Middle Eastern countries. Jerusalem’s move to CENTCOM has already yielded benefits, as seen during the two Iranian missile barrages launched against Israel. Thus, CENTCOM coordinated a unified regional response, and several regional partners assisted in intelligence and missile interception. “You already see a de facto military alliance in place through CENTCOM.”
Further evidence of this alliance is the collaboration of major Middle East powers on President Trump’s 20-point plan for post-war Gaza. By gaining Turkey’s and Qatar’s approvals of his plan, Trump leveraged their positions as external supporters of the Palestinian Arabs to pressure Hamas into releasing the remaining live hostages held by the terror group. However, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that, in phase two of the plan, Israel will not be forced to accept the role of either country in Gaza’s international stabilization force. Qatar’s seemingly endless supply of money was “disastrous” for Israel when the Jewish state tried to buy peace with Doha’s millions, presumably placating Hamas at Israel’s southern border. Instead of quiet from Gaza, Hamas invaded Israel on October 7 and massacred Israeli citizens.
The immediate threat to Israel at this time is not Hamas, but rather Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as Iran, both of which are rearming.
Trump’s 20-point plan was adopted and incorporated into a U.N. Security Council resolution with the support of the international community. Phase two of the plan remains the thorniest phase because of Hamas’s refusal to comply with demilitarization as stipulated in the plan. The terror group currently controls the half of Gaza where the majority of the population lives, as well as what remains of its tunnel system.
The immediate threat to Israel at this time is not Hamas, but rather Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as Iran, both of which are rearming. “Hamas is surrounded; it’s not going anywhere.” Without the risk of hostages staying Israel’s hand, new tactics by Israel using unmanned weapon carriers effectively destroy tunnels where many of Hamas’s members hide. Jerusalem views Trump’s plan positively because “phase two will happen.” Whether Hamas demilitarizes and cedes government control voluntarily or “it’s forced to do that through IDF incursions” remains to be seen.
Given the potential for regional tensions to easily escalate, concerns have been raised over Israel’s ability to maintain its Qualitative Military Edge (QME) in the face of possible U.S. sales of F-35 fighters to Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. U.S. decisions regarding the QME consider the regional balance of power and “will not be done in isolation from Israel.”
Among other hurdles the U.S. had to overcome was the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) interest in purchasing the F-35. A member of the Abraham Accords, the UAE “has a formal agreement and a warm peace with Israel.” The sale did not go through, “and the UAE eventually got tired and went in a different direction for its aircraft.” The problem with the sale was not maintaining Israel’s QME, but protecting U.S. technology because of the “the potential for military theft by China.” The UAE’s entire cellphone network is run by Huawei and penetrated by China’s communist regime. Another problem was that Turkey, along with Europe, was supposed to manufacture some of the F-35 parts for the advanced U.S. fighter jet. Ankara was ultimately ousted from the F-35 program after it purchased the S-400 anti-aircraft system from Russia.
Still, a reason for optimism is the just-concluded commercial deal between Egypt and Israel—two countries in the region with a “very cold peace.” Egypt had built liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals to process gas from its significant gas fields in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Israel, which had formerly imported natural gas from Egypt through a pipeline built across the Sinai, has since developed its own offshore gas fields and exports small quantities of gas through the same pipeline. This reversal in the direction of gas is due in part to Egypt’s mishandling of its own gas extraction operations.
“None of us should be naïve, but there’s a big difference between being naïve and optimistic. And I believe it’s time for optimism based on the policies of President Trump.”
Plans are in the offing to increase Egypt’s import of Israel’s gas “to finally use these basically underutilized Egyptian LNG terminals to export Israeli gas to Europe,” which will be a “win-win for both places.” It is encouraging to see Israel use “its economic resources and economic strength” as a tool to supplement its military prowess.
The overriding risk to all these promising steps is that “a new U.S. president could undo Trump’s Israel policy.” This was the case under former President Obama after the Israelis unilaterally disengaged from Gaza in 2005. George W. Bush had issued a letter at that time that certain West Bank settlement blocs would be recognized as Israeli territory in a future deal, “which constitutes an agreement between the state of Israel and the United States.” However, in 2010, President Obama, with no prior warning to Israel, undid the agreement in a public speech. This is why Saudi Arabia is reticent about accepting any “executive promise about a security guarantee” rather than a treaty. “So this does happen, it is a problem, and it’s part of the long-term management issues in the U.S.-Israel relationship.”
Despite the complexities of managing so many moving parts, there is still reason to remain hopeful about the U.S.-led alliance, even with the still-unresolved phase two of Trump’s plan and the unknowns that lie ahead. “None of us should be naïve, but there’s a big difference between being naïve and optimistic. And I believe it’s time for optimism based on the policies of President Trump.”
