The Lebanon Trap Inside the Iran Deal

A Lebanon Ceasefire is Just a Poison Pill: Having signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran, President Donald Trump is triumphant in rhetoric. While the agreement is only for 60 days, Trump believes it is not only superior to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action but can be the framework for ending Iran’s nuclear ambitions and, more broadly, stopping the corollary wars Iran’s proxies have sparked.

The Islamic Republic promotes a different narrative. Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher-Ghalibaf, Iran’s chief negotiator, quipped, “Everything we sought to achieve through military action, we obtained several times over through negotiation; it was not even comparable.”

Ghalibaf is right. Many of Iran’s demands—tolls, reparations, and an end to all sanctions—were never meant to be serious, but rather were the equivalent of flinging mud at the wall to see what stuck. Ghalibaf’s audience for such outrageous demands was his internal competitors within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rather than a foreign audience.

Ghalibaf might go further. Sensing Trump’s desperation for a deal, he placed a poison pill inside it: An end to the war in Lebanon, a conflict in which the United States is not involved.

Just as Hamas unleashed the current conflict when, during a ceasefire, it invaded Israel and perpetrated the largest single-day massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, so too did Hezbollah launch the current conflict with Israel when, on October 8, 2023, it began lobbing missiles and artillery into northern Israel.

Israel responded with a singular goal to end Hezbollah. “Operation Grim Beeper,” as the Hudson Institute’s Michael Doran named it, castrated and blinded Hezbollah’s rank-and-file. Israeli targeted strikes decapitated Hezbollah’s top leadership and several layers of its military. With Hezbollah against the ropes, Israel and the Lebanese government, for whom Hezbollah represents a joint threat, commenced direct, opened negotiations for the first time in more than 40 years.

By agreeing to Iran’s demands that Israel cease its attacks on Hezbollah, never mind that Hezbollah provoked the conflict, Ghalibaf creates a poison pill. A wiser Trump would have told Ghalibaf that if the Islamic Republic wanted to protect Hezbollah against Israel, Tehran should talk directly to Jerusalem. Such a response would have affirmed both that, unlike Hezbollah, Israel is an independent actor and would also have shown that the real problem in the region is Iran’s refusal to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist.

Instead, Trump allowed his desperation for a deal to make Israel the problem rather than Hezbollah, a terrorist group responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans, thousands of Lebanese, and tens of thousands of Syrians.

This is not the first time White House desperation for a deal with rogues or terrorists has led a president to turn on democratic allies.

As President Bill Clinton’s negotiations for the Agreed Framework with North Korea advanced toward a deal in 1994, South Korean leaders became increasingly frustrated.

Cut out of the discussion by the White House and State Department, South Korean President Kim Young-sam took to the pages of the New York Times to blast Clinton’s deal. “If the United States wants to settle with a half-baked compromise and the media wants to describe it as a good agreement, they can. But I think it would bring more danger and peril,” he said. “We should resolve the issue through dialogue. There is nothing wrong with that. The problem is, we think we know North Korea better than anyone. We have spoken with North Korea more than 400 times. It didn’t get us anywhere. They are not sincere,” he said, and urged the United States not to “be led on by the manipulations of North Korea.”

Kim’s outburst earned him Clinton’s ire. Arrogance trumped reality, and wishful thinking won the day. Trump’s treatment of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu simply fits the same pattern.

Of course, in hindsight, Kim was right, and today North Korea is even stronger than it was when the Agreed Framework took effect. Hezbollah, too, now gets a second wind.

The problem is this: Hezbollah continues to pose an existential threat to Israel.

On October 23, 2002, Lebanon’s Daily Star newspaper quoted Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah as saying: “If they [the Jews] all gather in Israel, it will save us the trouble of going after them worldwide.”

While Hezbollah was previously committed to disarm, Trump’s Memorandum of Understanding will give the terror group a free pass while punishing Israel should it try to prevent the reconstitution of Hezbollah’s arsenal.

The nature of existential threats, such as that which Hezbollah poses to Israel, is that diplomatic inconvenience is not an excuse for inaction. Iran will rearm Hezbollah, and Israel will act.

The Iranian leadership will then use Israel’s actions as an excuse to walk away from the deal, having collected at least $24 billion and perhaps even more. France and others who take a soft approach to Hezbollah in the hope of commercial dealings with Iran will jump on the bandwagon to blame Israel.

The Islamic Republic laid a trap; Trump walked into it. Trump’s peace will not last; quite the contrary, it will enrich terrorists and allow the Islamic Republic a backdoor to escape its own responsibilities under the Memorandum of Understanding.

Published originally on June 18 under the title “The Poison Pill Inside Trump’s Iran Deal: A Lebanese Ceasefire in a War America Isn’t Even Part Of.”