Despite the ongoing military operation, the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and dozens of other leaders, and decades of popular discontent, the Iranian regime has not fallen. There have been repeated calls from Iranian opposition groups and others, including President Donald Trump, urging Iranians to rise up, and saying help is on the way. These calls have gone largely unanswered and have not resulted in a large-scale uprising capable of threatening the survival of the Iranian regime.
Over the past two decades, Iran has seen several popular grassroots protests that have challenged the regime. In December 2025, people in many cities and towns, upset by rising inflation and political repression, took to the streets demanding change in the largest protests since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Each time, the Iranian regime has accused foreign actors of instigating protests and suppressed them, sometimes with extreme violence.
Over the past two decades, Iran has seen several popular grassroots protests that have challenged the regime.
The question is why none of these protests has reached a tipping point in which the balance of fear shifts and ordinary people start tearing down statues and portraits of dictators and take over public institutions. In Iran, has the moment for toppling the regime passed, not yet arrived, or become impossible? The 1991 Iraq uprising that nearly toppled the Saddam Hussein regime might provide some lessons.
During the Operation Desert Storm in February 1991, George H.W. Bush called on Iraqis to “force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.” Coalition aircraft dropped leaflets encouraging people to “fill the streets and alleys and bring down Saddam Hussein and his aides.” Many Iraqis answered the call and rose up. As an 11-year-old living in Sulaymaniyah, I witnessed the Kurdish uprising. Within a short time, people took control of government institutions. It was not a peaceful moment; elements of the regime resisted until the end. People tore down Saddam’s statues and ripped down his giant portraits of him that covered nearly every corner and wall of the city.
The coalition forces controlled Iraqi skies and prevented the Iraqi military from using air to quell the protests. By late March 1991, Saddam had lost control of fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. For a moment, it appeared that the Saddam regime could fall. The population was rising, the regime was weak, and the conditions were in place. It still was not enough. Tipping points are only visible in hindsight. A society can mobilize, sacrifice, and push the regime to the edge, yet still fail to topple it. The difference between almost making it and actually making it is where revolutions are make-or-break.
Iraq had a well-established, strong, armed opposition movement, especially Kurdish and Shi’a—many of whom Iran supported with networks in cities and towns. When the time came to rise up, they mobilized operatives, especially in the Kurdish north. Saddam’s decades of suppression had created a condition for tens of thousands of people to seize the opportunity.
The difference between almost making it and actually making it is where revolutions are make-or-break.
During Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam deployed nearly half-a-million troops in Kuwait, which left insufficient forces in Iraq to suppress domestic unrest. When the Coalition forces bombarded the regime’s military command-and-control capabilities, protestors seized the moment to take control of towns and cities
Once towns and cities fell, protestors seized weapon depots and military bases and used firepower to fight the regime and gain further ground. In Iraqi Kurdistan, within days of the uprising, a coalition of Kurdish opposition parties began organizing local governance to provide security and manage daily life, thereby providing some degree of structure and preventing chaos.
But then everything changed and the tipping point did not arrive. The U.S. administration hesitated to further intervene, fearing the Lebanonization of Iraq. The Coalition forces stood by as Saddam’s helicopters and his Republic Guards killed 100,000 and displaced millions.
There are differences between Iraq 1991 and Iran 2026, however. In Iraq, the regime carried out mass atrocities against Kurds and Shi’a, who make the majority of the population. This crystalized generations of organized, experienced armed opposition, with networks that reached many cities and towns. In Iran, the regime has been effective in targeting opposition groups and undermining civil society before they can coordinate to the same degree.
In today’s Iran, it is unclear whether opposition groups have strong networks in major cities capable of coordinating a large-scale uprising. Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last shah, has visibility, but his actual popularity inside Iran and the depth of his organizational networks remains unknown. The Mojahedin-e Khalq has experience fighting but carries deep baggage. It is far from certain whether Kurds can push deep into regime-held territory, hold ground, and govern what they take.
In Iran, the regime’s security forces show no sign of fracture. They will suppress an uprising and might fight to the end.
Many Iranians may see the current U.S.-Israel military operation as an attack on their nation and their faith. The operation lacks a broad international coalition, a United Nations mandate, and many people may hesitate to rise up, afraid of the perception that they are siding with Israel. There have been mixed signals about the goal of the military operation. In Iraq, that ambiguity proved fatal for tens of thousands of people who answered the call but were left exposed to Saddam’s suppression.
In Iran, the regime’s security forces show no sign of fracture. They will suppress an uprising and might fight to the end. When the security forces hold, so do regimes. Rarely do such regimes allow peaceful movements to bring about changes that threaten their survival.
It is possible that, like Iraq after 1991, the Iranian regime will survive and become both more isolated and more repressive. Saddam’s collapse came in 2003 only after a full-scale invasion. At the same time, though, history is full of regimes that looked unshakable days before they fell. Both Iranians and the West should realize: When the moment comes, it comes quickly and often unexpectedly.
