As pressure on the Iranian regime mounts, an open question is whether Iranian-backed militias in Iraq will help the regime survive. While these groups have served as Iran’s forward forces, their loyalty may not extend to willingness to sacrifice what they have built in Iraq for a regime whose survival is uncertain.
The Iranian-backed militia groups, operating under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces, have been willing to implement the regime’s strategy of deterrence and fight Iran’s enemies outside its borders to protect the regime’s survival inside.
The Popular Mobilization Forces is not monolithic and comprises dozens of armed groups organized into three factions, one of which is pro-Iran. They include Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kataib al-Imam Ali. Trained and guided by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, they are not just allies but embedded in Iran’s regional strategy.
Pro-Islamic Republic of Iran groups have issued statements ranging from pledging to join the fight to urging supporters to dress in black to show “grief and anger.”
The Islamic Republic has spent decades and billions of dollars on proxy groups in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen to engage enemies beyond Iran’s borders. However, Israel degraded Hezbollah’s capabilities over the past two years, killing many of its leaders killed and weakening its capability to attack.
Pro-Iran militias in Iraq are geographically closest to Iran, and if Iran needs a force that can help its survival, these militias are the natural choice.
Over the past week, groups such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella for pro-Iran militias, has claimed dozens of drone and rocket attacks in “Iraq and the region” following U.S. and Israel military operations against Iran. Pro-Islamic Republic of Iran groups have issued statements ranging from pledging to join the fight to urging supporters to dress in black to show “grief and anger.”
Despite rhetorical bluster and small-scale rocket firings, these militias seem hesitant to escalate. This is because the pro-Iran militias operate inside a political reality that imposes restrictions on how far they can go. Iraqi public opinion is not blindly Iran’s favor, as evidenced by the October 2019 protests against poor services, corruption, and anger against Iran’s influence over Iraq’s institutions. A full-scale military mobilization by pro-Iran armed groups to help the Iranian regime would be unpopular and would impact the legitimacy of the entire Popular Mobilization Forces, not just particular groups.
The Iraqi government wants to stay neutral in the conflict. While the government has not been able to prevent the actions of the pro-Iran militias, in a statement, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani said that he does not want Iraq to be “dragged into the conflict” and pledged to protect “diplomatic missions and critical infrastructure.” Pro-Iran militias are part of Iraq’s political and security system and are on the government’s payroll so they cannot easily ignore the government’s position.
There is no official figure for the number of pro-Iran militias, but they can mobilize several thousand fighters. Although significant, that might not be enough to change the fate of a collapsing regime. Their experience in Syria also provides a cautionary lesson. They fought hard for Bashar al-Assad’s regime for years, but that was not enough to save it. If the Iranian regime faces the possibility of collapse, several thousand Iraqi militias will not be able to alter its fate.
If the Iranian regime faces the possibility of collapse, several thousand Iraqi militias will not be able to alter its fate.
The pro-Iran militias also have a lot to lose. After a U.S. strikes killed Popular Mobilization Force Chief of Staff Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis along with Qods Force chief Qasem Soleimani in 2020, the Iraqi militias loyal to Iran have been spared from systematic attacks and assassinations. They have retained most of their command structure, operational capacity, and weapon stockpiles. Over the past decade, they have entered politics, gained seats in parliament, and control major economic activities ranging from construction to trade to border-crossings.
They watched what happened to al-Muhandis and Soleimani. They watched what happened to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and dozens of other high-ranking officials and now watch what is happening to the regime in Iran. The question the leaders of these groups may ask is whether they are willing to risk losing everything they have built and become targets as they seek to save a sinking ship.
The pro-Iran militias were formed as part of Iran’s deterrence strategy to keep enemies outside Iran’s borders, not to save the regime from collapsing. Their ability to prevent the fate of a collapsing regime is limited, and they cannot ignore the public opinion in Iraq that resists deeper Iranian involvement. Their loyalty to Iran is real, but loyalty has limits, especially when survival is at stake.
